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final year of his/her study at Otterbein.
Submissions, prepared according either to the MLA Style Manual or The Chicago Manual of Style, should be sent in 
duplicate and addressed to Paul Eisenstein, Faculty Advisor, Aegis, 227 Towers Hall, Otterbein College, Westerville, 
Ohio, 43081.  If you are submitting through the U.S. Mail and wish for one copy of your submission to be returned, please 
include a self-addressed envelope with sufficient postage.  Authors’ names should not appear on submitted essays; instead, 
submissions should be accompanied by a cover sheet, on which appear the author’s name, address, and the title of the 
essay.  All essays accepted for publication will need eventually to be submitted on hard diskette in Microsoft Word.
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Editors’ Introduction
Ashar Foley and Michelle Yost
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At the inception of Aegis, we wished to provide a forum for students to exchange their 
research and ideas within the disciplines of the humanities, a goal concurrent with Otterbein 
College’s mission to provide a broad liberal arts education.  Both the humanities’ qualitative 
values and the philosophy of the liberal arts aim to cultivate critical thinking in their practi-
tioners and students, thus fostering an educated, interested, and versatile populace.  As Milan 
Kundera writes in The Art of the Novel, this invested encouragement of inquiry is crucial to us 
in an era beleaguered by “the din of easy, quick answers that come faster than the question and 
block it off” (18).  Closer to home, personally valuing inquiry and enlightenment is significant 
to each of our futures: once we are loosed upon the professional world, it will not be our abil-
ity to recite facts by rote that determines our potential worth to an employer, but our ability to 
synthesize new concepts with an old paradigm.  John Locke stated, “[O]f all the men we meet 
with, nine parts of ten are what they are, good or evil, useful or not, by their education” (74).  At 
this stage in our lives, who we are is very much determined by what we choose to learn.  It is 
the contention of the humanities as well as of the liberal arts that the most desirable education is 
one that aims at a greater understanding of all humanity—through exposure to new languages, 
religions, histories, and literatures—and that this understanding can help us to see and overcome 
the artificially constructed differences that often stand between us.  The old adage “ignorance is 
bliss” may be ironic, but it also has dangerous implications, leading us to fear engagement with 
the unknown or to engage the unknown in the wrong manner.  Our forebears having spent ten 
thousand years constructing human civilization, we should not revel in knowing nothing about 
it.   The anonymous authors if the Treatise of the Three Imposters warned that “the world is filled 
with vain and ridiculous opinions; nothing is better able to give them currency than ignorance” 
([Anderson] 95).  Therefore we must choose to learn everything we can to combat willful ig-
norance.  It is not enough to read only one book or to hear only one philosophy; rather we must 
have a plurality of philosophies and viewpoints upon which to draw.  In this way, education is 
the foundation of a functional democracy, and when we leave this campus, it will hopefully be 
with the versatile, mutli-faceted knowledge with which to make the proverbial contribution to 
society.  Humbly, we hope that Aegis will be one of many factors in the individual’s pursuit of 
enlightenment at Otterbein College.  
Works Cited
Anderson, Abraham.  “Treatise of the Three Imposters.” The Enlightenment: A Brief History with 
Documents.  Ed. Margaret C. Jacob.  Boston: Bedford/ St. Martin’s, 2001. 
Kundera, Milan.  The Art of the Novel.  Trans. Linda Asher.  New York: HarperCollins, 2000.  
Locke, John. “Some Thoughts Concerning Education.” The Enlightenment: A Brief History with 
Documents.  Ed. Margaret C. Jacob. Boston: Bedford/ St. Martin’s, 2001. 
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Aegis had the opportunity to interview one of Otterbein College’s 2004 visiting Humanities 
Scholars, Dr. Sherri A. Inness.  We asked her about her investigations of unconventional primary 
sources, and how these investigations effect change within both academic and non-academic 
spheres.  
AEGIS: While you are professor of American literature, you publish works dealing with popular 
culture, philosophy, and history as well as literature.  How did your studies in American and, 
presumably, English literature lead you to such interdisciplinary research interests?
INNESS: I’ve always been interested in women’s studies, so I’ve done a great deal of work 
with women’s studies issues, whether it’s in teaching a class in a women’s studies department 
or studying literature and culture issues from a gender/race perspective.  I also think […] that, 
these days—certainly in the contemporary world of academe—you find so many people take 
a more cultural studies approach to their work than merely focusing on American literature or 
British literature.
AEGIS: So you find a lot more flexibility in the fields of English and women’s studies now?
INNESS: There’s a great deal of flexibility that doesn’t always manifest itself in every under-
graduate class.  […] I think probably we all would agree that some of the best work being done 
today is by people […] questioning what it means to be a literature professor […].  Does it just 
mean that you have to focus on canonical texts by great authors?  No.
AEGIS: Among all the work done in the humanities, studies of traditionally marginalized groups 
have been particularly effective in changing the popular discourse.  For example, ethnic studies 
have increased the general knowledge and acceptance of ethnic individuals and their issues. 
Throughout your career, how have you seen the rise of women’s studies alter the popular percep-
tion of women?  Going further, how may it have altered the experience of being a woman?
INNESS: One thing that it has altered is the whole idea of women being important and being as 
important to consider as men.  Part of this is considering how women’s popular culture carries the 
same influential cultural messages as does [that of] men.  One area that I’m fascinated by is girls’ 
culture because this is a field that only gradually is being let into the academic community, only 
gradually let into the academic discourse.  Still we’ll find […] professors who don’t mention girls 
whatsoever.  They mention women, adult women, but young girls are left out or […] laughed at as 
funny or not as important.  Many think about Barbie as being less important than GI Joe, but this 
attitude is shifting. What you discover in the academy is that, over the last few decades, there has 
been a boom in interest in girls’ studies across the disciplines.
Interview with Dr. Sherrie A. Inness: 
New Research, Unexpected Sources
Ashar Foley and Michelle Yost
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AEGIS: Do you think this will alter how we view girls’ culture and how we approach their 
Barbies and TV shows?
INNESS: It’s definitely giving it more importance than in earlier years, and [it’s] something that’s 
being taken much more seriously.  I have a friend, for instance, getting her doctorate in communica-
tions at Temple University now, and she’s writing her dissertation on girls’ television shows.  So, 
even though she’s from a bit of a different discipline, she’s looking at shows such as The Powerpuff 
Girls and other shows, talking about the role of the girl hero—again, something that you wouldn’t 
have seen twenty-five years ago.  She said that there was a lot of acceptance for her work—it wasn’t 
marginalized because she was looking at girls and their interests.
AEGIS: In your anthology, Kitchen Culture in America, you edited a collection of essays that inves-
tigates how women learn gender and societal roles, not just in the kitchen, but in cookbooks, cooking 
shows, magazines, sex manuals.  You call for a critical analysis of these cultural phenomena, stating 
“We need to reflect on how and by whom the food items that we consume are created, as well as 
about how food serves as a marker of identity in our culture.”  Our question is, do you see this work 
and those akin to it as change agents and, if so, what is your vision of the changed society? 
INNESS: Absolutely, there is room to change society by thinking about gender and food.   This 
is the area that’s particularly crucial because it’s something we just haven’t given enough thought 
to, or perhaps it’s […] that we thought about food as being [within] a specific discipline, such as 
nutrition, or maybe the history of food, or the anthropology of food, but not as much attention 
has been [paid] to [the] more broad cultural lessons and lessons about gender roles that food 
and its culture convey to us.  I am fascinated by how much food is a marker of who we want 
to be, and also it’s about how we set up various boundaries between ourselves and the world. 
For instance, some of my students at Miami say, “We won’t eat Chinese food, it’s too unusual.” 
Well, obviously there’s more going on than simply saying a food preference.  Lessons about 
race and strongly racist stereotypes are also being conveyed.  Food choices are about different 
issues, including what’s exotic and what’s Other.  
AEGIS: One of the things we were personally curious about was that women obviously seem 
to find their place in the kitchen—they’ve been there for hundreds of years—so, why is it that 
the culinary arts have become so popular among males that we have Emeril, Rocco de Spirito, 
Jamie Oliver, and that these male figures have become so important in restaurants? 
INNESS: Actually, there’s a long tradition that goes back for centuries of assuming that the best 
chefs must be male, that men are the only ones who can operate on that very highest of culinary 
levels.  Obviously, it makes a difference that they’re getting paid large salaries, too.  It also makes 
a difference that they’re allowed to be creative [whereas] the woman who has to feed her four 
kids seven days of the week doesn’t always have that opportunity. 
AEGIS: Throughout your research, you employ a variety of surprising primary texts, a few 
examples of which are cookbooks, toys, films, juvenile serial fiction, and women’s colleges. 
Were your research questions inspired by your encounters with these everyday items, and what 
are the challenges and rewards of working with these sorts of texts?
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INNESS: One reason I’ve looked at so many everyday objects, such as cookbooks or Girl Scouts 
series books, is because I’ve seen them out there in our popular culture and wondered about what 
cultural work they were doing.  I wrote an essay on the American Girls Collection because I saw 
the American Girl dolls and their very posh homes, equipped with every sort of luxury known to 
dolls.  I was interested by what exactly [they were] doing out in culture, and why many of my 
students had actually purchased American Girl dolls or wanted to purchase them for children 
in the future.  What messages were being sold to women and girls?  I’ve always been curious 
about how some of these popular texts shape women’s or girls’ lives.  I’m fascinated by how 
real women’s lives, whether in the 1920s or today, are really being influenced.
AEGIS: What are the challenges of those sorts of texts?
INNESS: With some of the popular texts, you’re not going to find the same amount of scholar-
ship that’s already been done on Shakespeare; if you’re going to research him, you can go to the 
library and find dozens, hundreds of books that you can use.  [With] the American Girls Col-
lection, it’s going to be very tricky to find anything, or you’re going to have to find something 
that has been written about a broader topic, such as the history of dolls in the United States, and 
apply it to your subject.
AEGIS: On a personal level, how do you think these “en-gendered” books and films, advertising, 
and media representations of feminine life influenced your own concept of yourself in society?
INNESS: It’s interesting to think about how they influence you, no matter how much of a cagey 
consumer you are, no matter how much you’ve recognized that some of the images they are sell-
ing us and sending to us are false, but at the same time, it’s easy to get lured in.  Consider Martha 
Stewart […]: when I read her books, I know many of my friends have said one of the difficult 
aspects of reading such glamorous food-writing is that you think to yourself, “Maybe I should be 
doing it like that.  Maybe my food should look quite as glamorous as hers does.”  I know many 
women who feel pressure to be that over-achieving super-woman, someone who really can cook 
at that kind of gourmet level and also have a professional job and also balance all kinds of other 
demands.  It’s impossible for almost anyone to escape the influence of such popular works.  
AEGIS: Would you like to see those popular works changed?
INNESS: I’d say that I’d like to see some popular works changed, but not everything because it’s 
such a huge area.  Think about a character such as Barbie, for instance: you could criticize her 
image.  Why does she have that Malibu beach house and why doesn’t she have a more realistic 
job?  You also have to see how women read against that image, or [how] girls read against it, 
too.  I know many girls who would play with Barbie but […] have her being a surgeon, instead 
of a school teacher.  We do rebel against society’s gender stereotypes.
Dr. Sherrie A. Inness is Professor of American literature at Miami University.  A prolific scholar, 
her most recent books include Disco Divas: Women and Popular Culture in the 1970s and Ac-
tion Chicks: New Images of Tough Women in Popular Culture.  During her visit to Otterbein, 
she presented her research in the latter work.  
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Gustav Klimt carved himself a place in history through his gutsy interpretations of the 
themes, Philosophy, Medicine, and Jurisprudence.  Living in a period in which classical painting 
was a way of life, Klimt was considered one of the leading modern artists of his time in Vienna, 
Austria.  Vienna University asked him to be a part of a major painting project that would inspire 
scholars for generations to come.  Instead of conforming to public views of art, Klimt used this 
opportunity to deviate from the ordinary and to unveil to the world a new way of thinking and 
painting.  Commissioned to glorify Vienna University’s academic faculties, Gustav Klimt used 
the three “university paintings,” as the media referred to them—Philosophy, Medicine, and 
Jurisprudence—to explore the insignificance of humanity’s voice in its own fate and the eternal 
recurrence of its existence.  
 The conception of the idea of “the university paintings” occurred in 1891.  Vienna Uni-
versity submitted plans for decoration of the ceiling, located in the Great Hall of the Heinrich von 
Ferstel’s University building, to the Ministry of Culture and Education (Vergo 49).  After debate 
over who should be commissioned, it was decided that the effort would be split between Gustav 
Klimt and Franz Matsch: “Matsch was to be responsible for the central panel and Theology, 
Klimt for the remaining faculty paintings and ten of the spandrels (Whitford 68).  All together, 
the ceiling would be decorated with a central panel exemplifying the theme, “The Victory of 
Light over Darkness,” and four faculty paintings entitled, Theology, Philosophy, Medicine, and 
Jurisprudence (Vergo 49).  Surrounding these would be sixteen “spandrels, representing, among 
other disciplines, history, anatomy and the natural sciences” (Whitford 68).  Matsch and Klimt 
were to collaborate on their styles, making the paintings as similar as possible; aside from that, 
they had free reign to interpret the given subject matter however they pleased.  Being two of 
the most celebrated artists of the time in Vienna and based on the works they had previously 
produced, it was expected of Matsch and Klimt to come up with powerful, classic pieces similar 
to Raphael’s School of Athens.
 In 1900, Klimt revealed his first painting, Philosophy, to the public in an exhibition at 
the Secession (Whitford 68).  The Secession was “a public building, its potential and intended 
audience the broad mass of citizens whose tastes the Secessionists hoped to educate and elevate” 
(Bailey 62).  Klimt was an active member amongst this group of artists, the ‘Secessionists,’ and 
even served for a time as president.  It was Philosophy’s unveiling at this exhibition that put 
into effect a public controversy due to an unforeseen style and content of the university paint-
ings which would last for years, reignited each time another of Klimt’s university paintings 
was initially exhibited.  Klimt had reached a point in his career in which he began to reevaluate 
both his art and himself as an artist: “Having made the transition to Symbolism, Klimt found 
it impossible to take a traditional positivist approach to the themes he has been assigned […] 
the requisite subject matter demanded a sober examination of life’s great questions, themes that 
would preoccupy him throughout the rest of his career” (Bailey 148).  The noise surrounding 
Philosophy, Medicine, and Jurisprudence: 
Klimt’s Contemplation of Human 
Existence
Kari Benge
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Philosophy
by Gustav Klimt
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Klimt’s paintings reached such an extreme that a case was taken to the Viennese Parliament to 
decide the fate of the paintings.  The Parliament ruled in favor of Vienna University, but it was 
decided that the paintings would not hang in their original planned location, but in a nearby 
museum gallery.  Klimt, however, annoyed and affected by all the negative media attention, 
decided that the Ministry “could not have the pictures that were still in his possession, in any 
case unfinished and, as far as he was concerned, his property.  The advance payments would be 
returned” (Whitford 73).  In his letter to the bureaucrats, dated April 3, 1905, he explained:  
His Excellency, Minister Dr von Hartel, has given me from his actions clearly 
to understand that my work has now become an embarrassment to those who 
commissioned it, if this task, which has consumed years of work, is ever to be 
completed, then I must seek to derive from it once again some satisfaction, and 
such satisfaction is totally lacking as long as, under the present circumstances, 
I must continue to regard it as a State commission.  I am therefore, faced with 
the impossibility of bringing this task, which is already so far advanced, to 
completion.  (Vergo 61)
This is a perfect example of how emotionally entwined Klimt had become with his paintings. 
They were his feelings, his outlet, his way of speaking to the world.
 Klimt’s university paintings do not exist today.  During the Second World War, after 
Austria’s surrender to the Nazis, the castle where Philosophy, Medicine, and Jurisprudence and 
numerous other paintings had been placed for safekeeping was burned to the ground.  In order 
to prevent the building from falling into enemy hands, retreating S.S. Troops had set the castle 
ablaze (Vergo 62).  While it is regrettable that the paintings that formed such a massive turn-
ing point in Klimt’s career no longer exist, there are black and white photographs which give a 
glimpse of how they looked.  
 Although these photographs are devoid of color, their content and composition are still 
quite apparent.  Klimt’s first painting, Philosophy, is composed of very organic lines.  Along 
the left edge of the painting, a chain of human figures creates a very solid, vertical line.  This 
chain of bodies begins with young children at the top and continues with figures ageing until 
finally, at the bottom, an old man seems ready to die.  The critic Ludwig Hevesi describes this 
as “untroubled children, blossoming young bodies entwined, pleasure and torment, labour and 
strife, the struggle, creation and suffering of existence, and finally the withering, icy greyness 
of old age” (Frodl, Natter 230).  Within the implied downward line of figures, wispier diagonal 
lines weave in and out creating movement that halts only when the viewer reaches the bottom, 
where the face of a woman stares out of the painting, making eye contact with the viewer.  While 
the left side of the canvas makes up the foreground, the right side creates depth, implying the 
endlessness of an outer space that is only broken by the sphinx-like head that forms seemingly 
out of nothing.  Light is also a tool Klimt used to create drama in Philosophy.  By placing the 
lightest parts of the painting—the human figures—in a column, the people seem to fuse together 
and become one.  Critic Richard Muther captures the emotion Philosophy brings forth when 
viewed: “The whole weight of thought, the whole colouristic nervosity of our times are embodied. 
The Heavens open.  Golden and silver stars twinkle.  Points of light shimmer.  Naked forms waft 
hither.  The green mist gathers itself into tangible forms. A fiery head, wreathed in laurels, regards 
us with large, earnest eyes” (Vergo 50).
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 Many were very upset about Klimt’s interpretation of Philosophy, however, “accus[ing] 
Klimt of presenting ‘unclear ideas through unclear forms’” (Schorske 232).  The public and 
those who commissioned Philosophy were expecting a very classical painting that celebrated 
the subject of the title.  When Klimt presented his pictorial image of what he saw as philosophy, 
critics said, “it is nothing but nonsense, translated into the medium of paint and executed upon 
a large canvas” (Vergo 55).  Similar to the majority of new art forms, it was not that the public 
had a specific problem with Klimt’s painting, but rather that it was that the piece was something 
different, something new, something to which they had been previously unexposed.  Another 
critic, Friedrich Jodl, could only argue that it is “not against nude art, nor against free art that 
we struggle, […] but against ugly art” (Schorske 234).  
 Despite all the criticism, there were many who defended Philosophy.  A prominent Art 
History professor of Vienna University, Franz Wickhoff, countered Jodl’s attack by holding a 
lecture with the provocative title, ‘What is Ugly’ (Vergo 57).  The concept of constructing an 
abstract and unearthly piece of artwork reflecting personal beliefs was a very modern and not 
yet widely accepted one.  One of the few critics who actually appreciated the genius of Klimt’s 
conception wrote:
We see a piece of the universe in mysterious fermentation, a movement whose 
rhythm can only be guessed at […].  One thinks of cosmic dust and whirling 
atoms, of elemental forces, which first seek things out in order to become tan-
gible through them.  Swarms of sparks fly about, each spark a red, blue, green, 
orange-yellow or flashing gold star […].  At one point in this rolling cloud of 
colour a green fog accumulates […].  A stony, immobile visage appears, dark, 
like that of an Egyptian basalt sphinx […].  This is an enigma, the image of 
the riddle of the world, an allusion to it.  And flowing from top to bottom past 
this silent, veiled face is a bright stream of life.  (Whitford 69)
 
This painting is obviously full of symbolism: the chain of figures represents the end-
less cycle of our human lives, their unclothed state depicts them being handed over to fate and 
having no say in the everlasting cycle that controls them (Bailey 148).  The female head located 
at the bottom of the painting, as explained in the exhibition catalogue, represents Knowledge 
(Whitford 69).  She is the one who pulls the viewer into the painting, acting as a link between 
the viewer and the passive chain of humanity drifting through space.  Klimt portrays Knowledge 
as the only conscious piece in the never-ending chain.  She is the only connection that man has 
with the viewer, the depths of space, and the unknown, as represented by the sphinx-like vi-
sion, which could also be interpreted as the sum of all the gods of human worship.  Knowledge 
“provides the key to the riddle of human existence. Only with its aid can man make sense of 
what might otherwise seem to be a pointless and aimless life” (Whitford 69).  This is the idea 
Klimt attempted to portray through Philosophy: while humanity’s place in the universe amounts 
to “blind energy in an endless round of meaningless parturience, love and death,” as Schorske 
so eloquently expresses, there is but one hope for understanding and making contact with the 
unknown—Knowledge.
 Medicine was the next in the series of Klimt’s university paintings.  Compositionally, 
this was very similar to Klimt’s previous painting, being made up of very organic and natural 
lines.  The right side and background of the painting is dominated by a “swarm” of human figures 
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creating a circular line and a sense of motion around a dark, central skull figure.  This circle is 
a mass of human bodies, all at different stages in life, from birth to death.  They twist and fold 
around one another, giving the illusion of one giant organism.  Schorske describes this section of 
the painting as “a phantasmagoria of half-dreaming humanity, sunk in instinctual semi-surrender, 
passive in the flow of fate.  Death dwells centrally within this river of life, his black veil swirling 
strong among the tangled bodies of the living” (240). The left side and middle ground is comprised 
of a woman pulled out from the mass of bodies with a baby at her feet.  The viewer’s eye is taken 
from the mass of humanity on the right, to the woman floating by herself, to the priestess figure 
in the foreground at the bottom of the painting.  This priestess woman is noticeably separate from 
the circle of humanity behind her; yet she, because of her gaze, acknowledging the viewer, is the 
link between the viewer and the mass of people.  She holds up a snake that seems to blend with 
the linear decorations on her highly ornamented dress, giving her an air of superiority.  Light is 
once again used to create drama:  with a dark center, the circle of much lighter figures blends 
into a sea of bodies.  Bailey describes this as hovering “between linear dynamism and physical 
passivity, between sensuality and spirituality, and between proximity and distance” (149).
 One would think, having been exposed to Philosophy, the public’s reaction to Medicine 
would be less dramatic; however, this was not the case: “No longer was it mere professors who 
attacked his work, but powerful politicians as well” (Schorske 242).  The public could not seem 
to get past Klimt’s use of nude figures in his pieces.  One critic exclaims, “The figures represented 
in these pictures might be suitable for an anatomical museum, not, however, for one of the public 
rooms of the university […] where they must, on account of their crudeness of conception and 
aesthetic deficiency, offend the general public” (Vergo 58).  They even accused Klimt of being 
a pornographer because of his realistic depiction of female nudes (Whitford 72).  Interestingly, 
doctors were also highly offended by the painting.  The reviewer for a popular medical journal, 
the Medizinische Wochenschrift, wrote, “Klimt’s Medicine is not a representation of medicine. 
For quite apart from all tradition, the artist […] must […] make two important functions evident: 
first healing and, second, the prevention of disease.  Of these two functions not a trace is to be 
seen in Klimt’s picture. It depicts birth, sickness and death […] the work has nothing to do with 
the nature of medicine” (Whitford 72).  In support of this, Bitsori and Galanakis argue, “it was 
obvious that the painter wanted to emphasize the powerlessness of the healing arts and made no 
attempt to represent the triumph of medicine in the way that doctors would expect” (2).  
 Klimt did not try to defend his erotic way of painting women; he simply explained that 
he had a lack of interest in “my own person as the ‘subject of the picture,’ I am more interested 
in other people, above all, women” (Vergo 60).  Klimt’s friends and contemporary defenders pre-
sented him to the public as a “misunderstood, lonely artist who was persecuted for his rebellious 
art” (Bitsori, Galanakis 2).  At this time, when Medicine was presented to the public in 1901, the 
“university painting controversy” had been going strong for close to two years.  Klimt and his 
defenders obviously had heard the same or similar statements made over and over.  Less and less 
public statements were made on his behalf, although, as one can see by Klimt’s continuance with 
the project, he firmly stood his ground in defense of his paintings.
 In the same way as with Philosophy, Klimt used Medicine to make a statement.  Begin-
ning with the background of the painting, the skeletal figure represents death.  Death is a central 
part of the circle of humanity; not only does humanity revolve around Death, but Death’s dark 
veil branches out and becomes part of the circle of endless figures representing humanity:  “these 
figures are profoundly unfree, at the mercy of some higher power” (Hofmann 23).  The young, 
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healthy woman who emerges from the circle, drifting above a baby, represents Life: the only links 
between the drifting bodies and Life are provided by Life’s extended arm and the arm of a male 
nude shown from the back (Bitsori, Galanakis 2).  This shows the doctors’ feeble control over life 
and death through medicine.  In the foreground, seemingly of little relevance to what is taking 
place behind her, is a richly dressed priestess representing Hygeia, the Greek goddess of medicine 
(Whitford 72).  According to the Greek legend:
Hygeia is ambiguity par excellence; accordingly, she is associated with the 
snake, the most ambiguous of creatures.  Along with her brother Asclepius, 
Hygeia was born a snake out to the tellurian swamp, the land of death.  The 
snake, amphibious creature, phallic symbol with bisexual associations, is the 
great dissolver of boundaries: between land and sea, man and woman, life and 
death […].  Thus Klimt proclaims the unity of life and death, the interpenetra-
tion of instinctual vitality and personal dissolution.  (Schorske 242)
Klimt used Medicine to imply that Life and Death are an endless cycle, each so entwined with 
the other they cannot break free.  Medicine merely pulls life away from this eternal recurrence 
for a fraction of a second, never rid of the arm which will inevitably pull Life back into the 
never-ending circle.
 Jurisprudence is the third and final piece in the collection of Klimt’s university paintings. 
Jurisprudence, similar to Philosophy and Medicine, is organized into three very distinct grounds. 
The foreground and bottom of the painting are comprised of an old man being consumed by a giant 
octopus, his head bent with his hands clasped behind his back in shame.  The middle ground and 
midsection have three female goddess figures in vertical positions with a thick black fog swirling 
around them.  The background and top of the painting contains three smaller, standing females 
with the two on either side bending towards the middle woman.  Floating in vertical bands around 
their feet are heads, which almost become nonexistent as they blend in with the elaborate patterns 
behind the three women.  While this painting is comprised of many organic lines, it does not con-
tain as much movement as the previous two paintings.  The implied lines are mostly vertical and 
horizontal, with the only movement brought about by the black mist surrounding the three goddess 
figures in the middle ground.  Light is once again used to create drama, drawing the viewer’s eye 
first to the hunched man, then to the three goddesses, and finally to the busy background.  Ludwig 
Hevesi, a critic and friend of Klimt, first saw Jurisprudence a few months before its completion in 
Klimt’s studio.  His explanation of what he saw is quite detailed:
Never was a painter more fantastical, and yet more true to Nature.  How many 
times has he drawn the old sinner who appears in Jurisprudence as the accused. 
This old, emaciated man, with sunken head and hunched back […] he stands 
there, his gaze averted, already condemned.  On that occasion, he looked like 
a mere shadow on the canvas, tormented by three incorporeal ghosts.  These 
three […] twentieth-century lemurs, by Klimt out of the daughters of Toorop, 
yet unmistakably with their father’s features […] and then the reddish hair, these 
strange, comet-like tresses around their heads, studded with gold […] golden 
snakes with gleaming teeth […].  Conscience gnaws with golden fangs!
No, in fact Conscience is represented by the giant squid in whose tentacles the 
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poor sinner is emmeshed.  A mighty octopus which, pressing its body against 
his, wrestles with the accused.  A monster of skin and slime, indestructible, 
insuperable […].  And yet, a magnificent squid, its skin patterned with spots 
like a leopard.  The latest design of a submarine leopard […].  There is, in-
deed, a black humour about the whole thing.  Unsuspected, it emerges from 
this fantasy of grimness and gravity like the golden snakes from the hair of 
the Gorgons.  (Vergo 81)
Passages like this one let people living today know what it must have felt like to stand before 
one of Klimt’s paintings.  Without this particular passage, the colors of Jurisprudence might as 
well have never existed; fortunately, Hevesi brings them back to life.
 Not everyone was this receptive to Jurisprudence, however.  While most of the con-
troversy over the paintings had died down, the critic Karl Kraus didn’t relent and was one of 
the main voices of opposition against Klimt’s Jurisprudence: “[F]or Herr Klimt, the concept of 
Jurisprudence is exhausted by the notions of crime and punishment.  To him, the ‘rule of law’ 
means nothing more than ‘hunt them down and wring their necks.’  And to those who are more 
than content to have ‘nothing to do with the law’ he presents the terrifying image of the trans-
gressor” (Vergo 83).  They also had problems with the style of the painting.  Critics said, “[A]t 
least Philosophy and Medicine were similar in style and composition, but Jurisprudence was so 
much simpler, bolder and more powerful in its colours than either of the earlier pictures that it 
might have been produced by another artist entirely” (Whitford 73).  
 Ludwig Hevesi was one of the few people to voice his liking of Jurisprudence.  Moser 
was also a fan, and in 1903 created a beautifully designed exhibition exclusively to contain 
works by Klimt and spotlight his university paintings.  While Klimt’s paintings weren’t exactly 
loved by the public, the unveiling of Jurisprudence didn’t create the shock that Philosophy and 
Medicine had because the novelty of their unique newness had subsided. 
 However, even though the painting is the last in the set of three, it does not mean that it 
has any less significance.  Jurisprudence is centered around the old man, one of the bodies that 
makes up the chain in Philosophy and the circle in Medicine.  Formerly buried and unheeded, the 
man’s consciousness—represented by the octopus—has now overpowered him and is holding him 
at trial before the three goddesses.  These Goddesses of Fate have power over this dark domain 
and are in complete control of what will happen to this man (Hofmann 23).  Pushed to the back 
and made to seem insignificant are “the allegorical figures of Jurisprudence: Truth, Justice, and 
Law” (Schorske 250).  Klimt equates these figures with those of Knowledge in Philosophy and 
Life in Medicine: they are present, yet have no real authority in humanity’s fate.  Klimt gives 
the actual judges even less credit.  They are just “there with their dry little faces, heads without 
bodies” (Schorske 250).  The viewer has a hard time even recognizing their existence because 
they blend into the decorative pattern of the background.  This symbolizes the superficiality of 
judges.  Schorske gives a great description of the statement Klimt makes through Jurisprudence: 
“the reality of the law, however, lies not in that upper realm of stylized regularity and static de-
corum, but in the vacuum-like space beneath, where justice is carried out.  No crime is recorded 
here, only punishment” (251).
 Gustav Klimt was a very introverted man; it was through his paintings that he developed 
a voice which would speak to the world.  Instead of using traditional methods for his university 
paintings, Klimt’s methods are “personal, and in each case extraordinarily pessimistic.  Human-
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kind is depicted as a mass of suffering bodies whose plight cannot be ameliorated by the mortal 
disciplines taught by any of the faculties in question” (Bailey 63).   Klimt uses the themes Phi-
losophy, Medicine, and Jurisprudence to show the public that humanity is not anything significant. 
Along the same lines as Friedrich Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence theory, he uses the chain and 
circle of humanity in Philosophy and Medicine to show that no one is special (Nietzsche 467). 
Each person is merely part of a flow of humanity that is everlasting.  As a whole, the university 
paintings have “two interacting fields of force: one is the ordinary human experience; the other 
is the rigid power of the forces that govern man” (Hofmann 24).  Gustav Klimt came to the 
conclusion through his paintings that humanity is nothing exceptional: mankind is nothing more 
than a recurring blip in the universe, paint on a canvas for the gods to manipulate with the flick 
of a wrist.
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The Dissolution of the White-Indian 
Dichotomy: The Development of 
Empathy as Historical Reconstruction
Jason Carney
The manner in which historians have perceived Native Americans is constantly being 
defined and refined.  For quite some time historians have been sensitive to a euro-centric or a 
white view of “Indians,” a view which hides important aspects of the Native American role in 
colonization.1  By historiographically analyzing a series of articles and books published from 
1973 to 1998, I will characterize the development of the “white view” of Native Americans that 
historians believe has become inadequate for forming a proper understanding of colonization. 
Accordingly, I will attempt to construct the authentic view of the Native American’s role in 
colonization that contemporary historians believe is necessary for a full understanding of the 
White-Indian colonial relationship.  At some points, this authentic view of Native Americans is 
explicitly described by the analyzed historians, the article under analysis directly speaking to a 
need for such a view.  Other times, however, the view must be described using implications pres-
ent in the methodology, tone, and connotations of a historian’s scholarship.  By characterizing 
the view of Native Americans that historians are rejecting and by attempting to glimpse the view 
of Native Americans that historians are promoting, we can begin to see two historiographical 
trends: (1) Historians were and are conscious of a European monopoly on constructing histori-
cal reality in colonization; (2) Historians are attempting to understand and ultimately empathize 
with the Native American experience of colonization.
I. Establishing a positive and separate Native American identity
In 1978, James Axtell defined ethnohistory as “the use of historical methods and mate-
rials to gain knowledge of the nature and causes of change in a culture.”2  When this definition 
of ethnohistory is applied to historians’ perceptions of Native Americans in colonization, we 
can lay the bedrock for the white view of Native Americans that historians are attempting to 
move past.  When applied to the Native American population in the context of colonization, the 
phrase, “change in a culture,” presupposes the existence of a separate Native American cultural 
identity.  Rather than the “Indians”3 being assessed using Euro-hegemonic cultural terms—such 
as “wanting in a long list of attributes: letters, laws, government, clothing, arts, trade, agriculture, 
marriage, morals, metal goods, and above all religion”4—Native Americans are viewed as hav-
ing individual cultures.  Rather than the “Indians” simply being assessed as Europeans lacking 
European attributes—in other words a negative entity—they are viewed as a separate positive 
culture altogether.
A year later, Calvin Martin wrote that “the tendency to interpret another [Native Ameri-
can] culture using the norms and values of one’s own culture as a point of reference”5 results in 
research which “is essentially White history: White reality, white thoughtworld.”6  This reliance on 
“White history,” Martin goes on, “has its place […] but the point is that it has subtly transgressed 
its explanatory boundaries to pose as the sole or only valid or only serious explanation of what 
transpired when Indian and White met.”7  The view of Native Americans this statement seems 
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to reject is one generated from the “White thoughtworld,” which Martin believes is extremely 
different from the Indian one. 
What are the consequences of viewing Native Americans while seated in the White 
thoughtworld?  Martin believes that “the Indian was a participant-observer of nature, whereas 
we in our Western culture tend to be voyeurs.  We keep our distance from Nature; we plunge 
into it enveloped by an arsenal of protective paraphernalia or admire it though a picture frame 
or scrutinize it through a microscope lens.”8  Martin can only mean that the Indian thoughtworld 
is something that must be kept in mind while assessing Indian culture.
II. Identifying the morally-charged roots of White-Indian historiography
However, does Martin make any moral judgments of the White thoughtworld? Terms 
like “arsenal of protective paraphernalia”9 connote an inherent aggressiveness in the White 
thoughtworld, if we are to accept “arsenal” as generally referring to weapons.  Quite possibly, 
by using the example, “admiring [nature] through a picture frame,”10 a picture frame being 
an entity responsible for setting up aesthetic boundaries, the ultimate subjugation of nature to 
European “progress and development”11 is predicted and acknowledged.  The phrase, “scruti-
nize [nature] through a microscope lens”12 sets up the White thoughtworld as unquestionably 
separate from nature—a muddy dog at a white tablecloth dinner.  In characterizing the Indian 
thoughtworld, Martin says “the chief aim in life in virtually all North American Indian societies 
was to be saturated with the primordial Power of Nature which seemed to pulsate throughout all 
creation.”13  This characterization, when set in opposition to the White thoughtworld, connotes 
Europeans as invaders of nature, connotes White skin as ultimately a powerful inhibitor against 
union with nature.
In 1973, John A. Price, addressing stereotypical depictions of Native Americans in 
movies,  wrote, “as a predominant feature in their way of life, most Indians did not regularly 
ride horses, hunt large game, wear tailored hide clothing, or wear feathers in their hair.”14  He 
goes on to say, “other rich and diverse North American cultural heritage[s] should not be dis-
placed or demeaned15 through such biased and narrow portrayals.”16  Before Axtell considers 
the historical changes in Native American culture, before Martin begins talking about a “White 
thoughtworld,” Price acknowledges an unfair “demeaning” of Native Americans through ste-
reotyping by popular culture, a morally-charged conviction.  The cultural-disenfranchisement 
of “North American Indians”17 is further defined by Price: “Indian life was seen [in silent films] 
as savage and at an earlier stage of development, and therefore rightly vanishing as Indians are 
exterminated or assimilated into white society.”18  His morally-charged focus on Native American 
stereotyping represents a sentiment present in White-Indian historiography at the time.  Martin 
and Axtell never explicitly state moral motivations in their scholarship.  However, if we consider 
Price’s historiographical placement—a mere five years before Axtell—a moral motivation in 
some form might be attributed to the development of Axtell’s and Martin’s shared agenda, an 
apparently morally neutral agenda to enrich the research of the Native American experience 
during colonization.
A year after Price’s article, in 1974, Kenneth M. Morrison wrote, “According to […] 
the classic civilized-primitive duality […] Europeans were superior to savage people because 
they could point to a written history which was both progressive and cumulative.”19  His analysis 
of this classic “civilized-primitive duality” very clearly characterizes the historiographical con-
sideration of “Amerindians”20 at the time: “Recent considerations of the American Indian show 
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that this view is incorrect in its assessment of both Europeans and Indians.  Aboriginal cultures 
had political, economic and social structures.  More amazingly, in light of civilized judgments, 
primitive people developed highly sophisticated and normative ethical systems independent of 
Hebraic or Christian revelation.  The civilized-primitive framework can no longer be taken seri-
ously.”21  Although this statement seems typical of the historiographical framework characterized 
by Axtell and Martin, it possesses some of the same morally-charged biases so blatant in Price. 
The language, “more amazingly,” connotes a not-so-distant historiographical scene wherein the 
idea of primitive people developing sophisticated systems of ethics would have been a peculiarity, 
an interesting piece of jaw-dropping party trivia. The adjective “primitive” is also dated in this 
context, in that today we understand it more as a temporal identifier.  Morrison uses “primitive” 
in an old-fashioned manner, as a description of what we Europeans might consider undeveloped, 
uncultured, simple, pastoral, or other such masked pejoratives.  
III. The moral-charge of Axtell’s and Martin’s view of Native Americans
At this point the rejected historiographical approach to Native Americans, deduced from 
the cues and clues evident in Axtell and Martin, has two characteristics: (1) Native American 
culture is viewed as non-pluralistic and as merely a European culture lacking certain traits, a 
culture which “[stands] in error and [is] deficient in civilization,”22 and (2) Native American 
culture is viewed as separated from nature in the same way we Europeans are separated from 
nature by our White-thoughtworld, as characterized by Martin.  Although the perception of Na-
tive Americans inherent in the scholarship of Axtell and Martin seems to lack a moral charge 
(and ultimately a quantity of bias associated with a guilt-ridden European who has taken the 
destruction of the Native Americans upon his or her shoulders), we can see its influences and 
development in the earlier morally charged scholarship of Price and Morrison. 
Accordingly, works that seem to be free of such moral biases, for example those of 
Axtell and Martin, follow in the moral tradition of their scholarly predecessors.  Axtell implies 
that Europeans set themselves at the capstone of some sort of natural hierarchy of humanity, 
a moral assessment which needs to be assessed, rectified, and corrected to the vilification of 
the Europeans, the Europeans who forced the Native Americans into a cultural identity defined 
by a negativity.  However, this identity pigeonholes the Europeans as existing in a completely 
separate world from that of Native Americans, a morally deficient, aggressive, binding, and 
intrusive world.23
IV. Establishing Native Americans as participants in cultural war 
In 1981, Kathleen Joan Bragdon, attempting a reevaluation of New England Native 
American stereotypes during the post King Phillips war era, wrote, “in spite of […] pressures 
towards illegal behavior, notwithstanding their well-documented abuse of alcohol, the Indians of 
late 17th and 18th century Massachusetts do not seem to have merited the reputation for laziness, 
insubordination and thievery attributed to them by the commentaries of the period, any more24 
than did the English.”25  Up to this point, it had been the historiographical trend to consider Na-
tive Americans, although as worthy of a voice in the Colonial narrative as Whites, as a different 
voice altogether.26
Bragdon, however, begins27 a trend in which Native Americans are considered not so 
different from the White Colonials.  Although the Colonials are subject to a completely different 
culture, a primary empathy is established with the Native Americans due to their committing 
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illegal behavior no more or less than Whites.  The historiographical agenda in the Bragdon article 
is to portray Indian illegal behavior as neither meriting any special emphasis nor any special 
downplay.  They are on the same level as the Whites with whom they were sharing the American 
Colonial stages at that point in history.
 As is evident in the Bragdon article, the historiographical view of Native Americans 
in the 1980s takes a more empathetic turn from the European side,28 with the White Colonials 
and Native Americans understood as not so intrinsically different in psychology or worldview, 
as characterized by Martin.  This empathetic spin in the 80s is not that the Indians are given 
European traits, nor is it, in accordance with Martin’s ideas, that the White historians finally 
and nobly understand themselves as perceiving a world outside of the Indian thoughtworld.  To 
properly represent this rising empathy for the Native American experience of colonialism, we 
must return to Axtell seven years after the first article cited in this paper. 
In Axtell’s book, The Invasion Within, published in 1985, he portrays the Native Ameri-
cans of Colonial New England and New France not only as victims of cultural Imperialism but 
also as participants in cultural Imperialism: “[T]he Indian’s conversion of hundreds of ‘civilized’ 
captives to ‘savage’ life tore from the hands of the colonists, however briefly, their sharp conceit 
as the ‘chosen people’ of God and their unexamined faith in the superiority of their own customs 
and opinions.”29  In this book, the Native Americans are no longer perceived as a defenseless 
cultural force caught in the throes of European oppression and obliteration.  Rather, the Native 
Americans are portrayed as an active force in a larger arena of cultural conflict, a force capable 
of making choices, of coordinating a strategy, of doing everything but standing silently with 
their hands folded, waiting to be converted and relocated.  The Axtell of 1985 and Bragdon of 
1981 assess both cultural forces, White and Native American, along the same lines and factors 
as combatants in a cultural war.
V. The White-Indian dichotomy dissolves: empathy utilized as reconstruction
Seven years after Axtell’s The Invasion Within (1992), Virginia Dejohn Anderson began 
her article about Native American attempts at livestock domestication with a story representing 
the extent to which the Native American and European experiences of colonization can be ac-
cessed through empathy: 
“On a late spring day in 1669, the ambitious younger son of a prominent Rhode 
Island family received a letter from the town clerk of Portsmouth. […].  We 
can only wonder what Metacom, whom the English called King Phillip, made 
of the preemptory directive from the Portsmouth town clerk – for indeed it 
was to him, son of Massasoit and now sachem of the Wampanoags himself, 
that the letter was addressed.”30  
Anderson’s tactic is to catch the reader, seated in a Euro-hegemonic mindset, off guard by allow-
ing him to assume that only Whites were “ambitious younger son[s] of prominent […] Rhode 
Island famili[es].”31 
When she reveals that this person, described the same way a European is typically 
described, is in fact a Native American, she portrays that the socio-economic hurdles of the era 
were not faced exclusively by Europeans, but were also dealt with by Natives and oftentimes that 
these hurdles were faced using the same tactics.  This is an interesting change of historiography 
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when compared to the earlier Price statement of 1978: “the tendency to interpret another [Native 
American] culture using the norms and values of one’s own culture as a point of reference”32 
results in research which “is essentially White history: White reality, white thoughtworld.”33  If 
we note that Anderson’s historiographical view of Native Americans seems to run contrary to 
that of Martin, we can conclude that things have indeed changed in twelve years.
The use of empathy to reconstruct the Native American experience of colonization 
becomes most clear in the work of Helen C. Rountree.  In her article, “Powhatan Indian Women: 
the People Captain John Smith Barely Saw,” she employs “living history” tactics to understand 
a generally undocumented female Native American lifestyle.  Interviewing the Native American 
staff at the Jamestown Settlement museum, Rountree reports, “[T]he settlement’s Indian Village 
staff could tell me in detail about doing hands-on crafts that could be practiced in town.”34 
To further characterize her unorthodox research tactics and the extent to which she 
allows herself to empathize with the Native American experience, consider her description of 
Indian root-digging: “Digging Tuckahoe for bread making was women’s work. […].  It can be 
very hard work in itself, as we have discovered; it also involved travel […] which in turn required 
women to have regular access to dugout canoes and strong bodies to paddle them.  Before I 
tried any foraging or canoe paddling, I thought of Indian women as hardworking but not ‘fitness 
nuts.’”35  As is obvious, much of Rountree’s research insights come from her actually reliving, to 
some extent, the experiences of the Native Americans.  The historiographical scene at the time 
permitted this style of research; however, it would have been looked upon with a raised brow in 
the era of Martin and his Indian thoughtworld.
***
 Although the white view of Native Americans began with assessing Indian-culture 
strictly as a negative (as a European culture lacking certain traits), it developed into a more posi-
tive entity, with Indians possessing their own culture characterized by different traits altogether. 
This movement, motivated by a morally charged trend which can be seen in the earlier works of 
Price and Morrison, was not free of bias.  The dichotomy that would have had White historians 
completely distance themselves from Native American reality, propagated by Martin, eventually 
gave way to a more empathetic historiography.  This empathetic historiography raised the status 
of Native Americans from a separate, distant, and intrinsically different cultural force subject to 
European encroachments to active participants in the historical tides of their era.  As the histo-
riography of our contemporary era reveals itself, historians are understanding themselves and 
their life experiences as not so different from that of the Native Americans.
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discipline that is altering their angles.  From my position it doesn’t seem like Native American 
historians are the ones manufacturing this empathetic spin in the historiography. 
29 James Axtell, The Invasion Within, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 333.
30 Virginia DeJohn Anderson, “King Philip’s Herds: Indians, Colonists, and the Problem of 
Livestock in Early New England,” Colonial America 5th ed, (New York: McGraw Hill, 2001), 
332. 
ae
gis 2
0
0
5
24
ca
rn
e
y
31 Ibid, 332.
32 Calvin Martin, “The Metaphysics of Writing Indian-White History,” Ethnohistory 26 (1979): 
153. 
33 Ibid, 153.
34 Helen C. Rountree, “Powhatan Indian Women: The People Captain John Smith Barely Saw,” 
Ethnohistory 45 (1998): 3.
35 Ibid, 3.
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Antonio, Mercantilism, and the 
Other: The Failed Project of Christian 
Universalism in The Merchant of Venice
Ashar Foley
Of all Shakespeare’s plays, The Merchant of Venice is arguably the hardest to critique, 
because its characters do not fall along clearly drawn lines of good and bad.  It does not suffice 
to analyze the play with a simple narrative of Good versus Evil or Christian versus Jew, as the 
title merchant and chief Christian, Antonio, is often given to bouts of cruelty while the principal 
representative of Evil and Judaism, Shylock, insists on his own subjectivity and feeling.  Clearly, 
a more implicit and pervasive force is at work in the play, a force more general and explicatory 
than good or evil tendencies in particular characters.  Though less rooted in text than the earliest 
critiques, recent criticism points to the ramifications of modernity in the burgeoning, cosmopoli-
tan society of mercantile Venice in its various readings of the play: set in one of Renaissance 
Europe’s foremost port-cities, the characters in The Merchant of Venice must come to terms with 
the new prevalence of the Other organic to an open-trade economy.  The Christians in the play 
begin with a universalist vision in which everyone can be a Christian, thereby dispelling the no-
tion of difference, alterity, and inequality.  However, the possibility of dissolving the boundaries 
between the established Venetian Christians and those strangers either entering into or living on 
the perimeters of their society proves to be too disturbing, ultimately undermining the project 
of Christian universalism or exposing it as a facade.  My project attempts to cast Antonio as 
one such Christian: while the nature of his trade, marked by outreach and flexibility within a 
progressively global economy, reflects the communal and difference-dissolving tenets of his 
faith, the fear of completely doing away with all distinction between himself and the enigmatic 
Other (present in Shylock) gives rise to hatred, the effects of which subvert Antonio’s Christian 
values and pose previously unknown threats to his livelihood.
Faced with new and clear delineations of nations, Antonio and Shylock employ differ-
ent methods of trade that reflect their respective faiths: the Christian merchant, in keeping with 
his community-oriented, universalist outlook, makes many exchanges and is flexible, while the 
Jewish usurer is more “self-contained” and rigid, living off the interest of the money lent to his 
clients and adhering to all bonds (Adelman 20). 
Antonio as merchant is a character who very much works in the nascent world commu-
nity, actively involved in a society tied together by money and exchange.  He takes risks, putting 
his cargo out to sea with the hope that his gains will further his own wealth as well as the general 
economy.  Gary Rosenshield points out the valorization of Christian capitalist venture as opposed 
to the Jewish practice of usury, stating that Shakespeare “elevates Antonio’s mercantile activities, 
presenting them as regal, noble, knightly, courteous, and gentle” (4).  Indeed, in the Christian 
world, Antonio is reputed to personify all these characteristics.  The play’s pair of cheeleaders, 
Solerio and Solanio, intermittently sing their comrade’s praises with statements like, “A kinder 
gentleman treads not the earth” and “the good Antonio, the honest Antonio—O that I had a title 
good enough to keep his name company!” (II.viii.35; III.i.12-14).  Also, Antonio is flexible when 
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it comes to lending a hand to others, particularly to his beloved friend, Bassanio, when Bassanio 
needs a fast loan.  Although he would not usually stoop to dealing with a money-lender, Anto-
nio tells Shylock, “Yet to supply the ripe wants of my friend,/ I’ll break a custom” (I.iii.63-64). 
Clearly, we can see Antonio as a character whose arms are extended to the community, whose 
activities are very much a life-force within the mercantile society.
In contrast, Shylock’s own unventuresome mercantilism seems rigid and parasitic on 
society.  Whereas Antonio is constantly engaged in acts of outreach and contribution, risking his 
goods at sea and lending money gratis to those in need, Shylock seems to suck the profits from 
his clients, acting as a sort of economic black hole.  He ventures no capital and takes few risks. 
This is evident in the difference between his own conceptions of human relationships and property 
and those of the Christian Bassanio: while Shylock exclaims “My daughter!  O my ducats!  O my 
daughter!”  (II.viii.15) indicating that he would have them both back in his possession, Bassanio 
speaks of Portia as a capital venture, “a golden fleece,” adding that “many Jasons come in quest 
of her” (I.i.170, 172).1  Clearly, Shylock fulfills the historical stereotype of Jew as accumulater of 
material wealth to the extreme, extending it even to the overprotection of his daughter, Jessica.  His 
house is a hermetic tomb, illustrated in the scene just before the masque parade, in which Shylock 
bids Jessica to lock the doors, close the casements, and “let not the sound of shallow fopp’ry enter/ 
My sober house” (II.v.35-36).  It is little wonder that Jessica confesses to Launcelot that she feels 
her home is a tedious “hell” (II.iii.2).
It is also little wonder, however, that Shylock should be so concerned with weighing 
himself down with material goods: his connection to a society of Christians—and indeed to 
any larger society—is fragile, constituted almost entirely by his dealings as a despised money-
lender.2  Such an existence is frighteningly precarious.  Agnes Heller explores the implications 
of Shylock’s role as Other in Merchant, commenting that he is “absolutely rootless and [his] 
relation to [his] world is purely accidental and contingent” (1).  Heller defines an absolute 
stranger as one without a country to which to return, and without a cultural context by which 
outsiders can understand the stranger as an individual.  Shylock seems aware of his own other-
ness, of how he must appear within the business realm to a society of Christians highly involved 
in commercial exchange.  He tries by his own methods to remedy his rootlessness: unable to 
rely on venturesome commerce within a society that shuns him, he focuses on the preservation 
of his own wealth and lineage in order to have some sort of foundation and identity.  While 
established Christian merchants like Antonio already have a solid groundwork in their kinship 
and connections with other Christians, Shylock is still building his groundwork from his stores 
of wealth and his scant kinship link with his daughter and a few other Venetian Jews.  If he is 
rigid, if his household is indeed a tedious “hell,” it is because Shylock believes he can achieve 
definition through stasis, even if it is a definition of a “sober” man in the midst of a society that 
participates in masque parades.
This reading of Shylock serves to humanize him, putting the classic interpretation of 
Shylock as evil Jew into question.  We see a desire in Shylock to belong as an equal, if not as 
a congruous member of society.  It is for this reason that Shylock adheres so closely to the law 
and its according bonds, as well as why he reacts so violently when even his lawful claims are 
denied their proper legitimacy.  He does not have a problem interacting with Christians, so long 
as these interactions do not conflict with the observance of his own Jewish customs: as he says 
to Bassanio, “I will buy with you, sell with you, talk with you, walk with you, and so following; 
but I will not eat with you, drink with you, nor pray with you” (I.iii.35-38).  But Shylock does 
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not receive the same respect in return, and particularly not at the hands of Antonio.  After listen-
ing to Shylock give a list of grievances concerning his ill-treatment in the public marketplace, 
Antonio smugly affirms, “I am as like to call thee [dog] again,/ To spet on thee again, to spurn 
thee too” (I.iii.130-31).  Having had enough of Antonio’s abuse, Shylock calls for the flesh bond. 
Furthermore, it is obvious from the text that Shylock would rather have a nonforfeited bond than 
have to deal with the complications of exacting the penalty for a forfeited bond: when Antonio’s 
wracked venture comes up in conversation with Salerio, Shylock replies, “There I have another 
bad match” (III.i.44).  Also, by Shylock’s account, Antonio, “who dare scarce show his head 
on the Rialto [...] that was us’d to come so smug upon the mart”(III.i.45-47), has acted in a less 
than noble fashion regarding the forfeiture in failing to face Shylock.  The money-lender will 
undoubtedly use this opportunity to exact the penalty as an affirmation of his equality under the 
law, if not in daily, social life.3  In response as to why he would ever want to exact such a grisly 
penalty, Shylock brings up the fact that Antonio owns slaves, and that he would say his cruel and 
thoughtless abuse of them is justified by his title of ownership (IV.i.89-98); for the same reason, 
Shylock will have his bond—“the court awards it, and the law doth give it” (IV.i.300).
Shylock’s claim to belonging and equality under the law, as well as the desires that may 
then be realized, frighten Antonio as he faces the possible dissolution of noticeable difference 
between himself and an incomprehensible Other.4   The intrusion of Shylock as what Heller calls 
an “absolute stranger” is foreshadowed by Jessica’s conversion.  Janet Adelman fully explores 
Jessica’s attempt to deny all ties to her father in order to gain admittance into Christian society. 
Although it is clear to the other characters that Jessica cannot sever her blood ties to her father 
and will invariably remain a Jew, they try very hard to conjure up a distinction through words 
where no visible difference is present.5  Adelman points out that the characters try to use the 
same light-skinned imagery to describe Jessica [as Lorenzo receives a letter from Jessica, he 
says, “I know the hand; in faith, ‘tis a fair hand,/ And whiter than the paper it writ on/ Is the fair 
hand that writ” (II.iv.12-14)] as is used to describe Portia [Bassanio reports, “In Belmont is a 
lady richly left,/ And she is fair and, fairer than that word, of wondrous virtues” (I.i.161-63)]. 
Also, referring to Jessica, Salerio insists to Shylock that “There is more difference between 
thy flesh and hers than between jet and ivory, more between your bloods than there is between 
red wine and Rhenish” (III.i.39-42).  To justify the acceptance of a Jew into their company, the 
Christians’ language evokes a contrast between the bright purity of their faith with the dark, 
unknowable quality of the Other.
This same lack of visual cue to the difference between Jew and merchant is terrible to 
Antonio, resulting in desperate and cruel lashings out, what Rosenshield describes as “an over-
reaction betraying Antonio’s subconscious, or more probably unconscious, fears about himself 
and his profession, about who he is and what he is” (5).6  His deplorable treatment of Shylock 
in a public venue, his calling him “dog” (thereby reducing him to something subhuman), is a 
means by which Antonio elevates himself and leaves no question about the demarcation between 
his profession and that of his Jewish contemporary.  But Shylock’s insistence on the legitimacy 
of his claims to equality refute Antonio’s best attempts to dehumanize him: in demanding his 
bond, Shylock asserts his own subjectivity, and thus his desires.  As a subjective figure, his 
knife poised only a few feet from Antonio’s chest, Shylock represents the full-blown, enigmatic, 
engulfing, desiring Other.  
Although the play lays out Shylock’s take on his demand for the bond (it is lawful as well 
as equivalent to Antonio’s treatment of him), it also provides the Christian’s view of this same 
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desire.  The Christians can not understand why Shylock would exact such a gruesome penalty; 
their confusion increases when he refuses to tell them why he insists on such a bond, answering 
only that it is his “humor,” and that different men desire different things (IV.i.35-62).  Appalled 
by the voracious, unrelenting character of Shylock’s desires, Gratiano attempts to relegate them 
to a subhuman level: “thy desires/ Are wolvish, bloody, starv’d, and ravenous” (IV.i.137-38).  
Such close encounters with the Other’s desire is a natural consequence of the new global 
economy in which Antonio deals, as the law does not honor the same bonds of kinship and shared 
values as the Christians’ code.  However convinced Antonio and the other Christians may be of 
the alienness of Shylock’s desires and of his person, the distinction between Shylock and An-
tonio is clear in the courtroom.  All my sources agree that a greater statement about Merchant’s 
Venetian society is implicit in Portia’s question, “Which is the merchant here?  and which the 
Jew?” (IV.i.174): under the law, all men are indistinguishable.7  Therefore, the merchant Antonio, 
almost convinced of his superiority over, and thus of his invincibility against, the strangers with 
whom he must interact, finds himself on par with them in court and thereby vulnerable to their 
demands.  Speaking to this point, Adelman succinctly expresses the consequences of Antonio’s 
participation in a commerce-driven world with standardized laws: “Like Venice itself, with all 
nations mingling in its markets, the thoroughfares of Antonio’s body are subject to the invasion 
of others who cannot be kept at bay.  This is the danger of the newly modern nation, its porous 
boundaries no longer defined by kinship and race, its blood no longer intact” (22).  Indeed, it 
seems as though the closeness and acuteness of Shylock’s murderous desire cannot be restrained, 
that the Other’s claims to equality will be granted legitimacy in a just court of law.  
Antonio does have one recourse, however: through a non-Othering process, Antonio 
can ally Shylock’s otherness, and thus his alien desires.  In other words, in order to dispel his 
adversary’s hold over him, Antonio must use his universalizing Christian ethic and let go of all 
differences between the two men, ultimately realizing his greatest fear of absolute indistinguish-
ability.  When Portia asks, “What mercy can you render him, Antonio?” (IV.i.378)—“mercy” 
being a concept unilaterally associated in the play with Christianity—Antonio requests that 
Shylock become a Christian, a request that has two implications.  As a Christian, Shylock must 
give up his strange, Jewish practices and mingle with the other Christians in every aspect of life; 
now, he can have no reason not to eat, drink, and pray with them.  More importantly, however, 
the Christian Shylock will no longer be allowed to practice usury, necessarily becoming a full-
blown merchant and Antonio’s equal competitor in the marketplace, in order to make a living. 
Thus, by Antonio’s request, Shylock is simultaneously made Christian and merchant, dissolving 
the two hand-in-hand differences that constituted Shylock’s absolute strangeness.
A society infiltrated by converted Jews is even more frightening and threatening to 
the Christians than a society that suffers a few known Jews to live on its perimeters, however. 
Adelman sets out this concern, stating, “conversion threatened to do away with the most reliable 
signs of difference, provoking crisis in a very mixed society obsessively concerned with purity of 
lineage” (11).  It is not surprising, then, that the abuse of Shylock rises to a fevered pitch toward 
the end of the trial as the Christians employ the same methods of dehumanization and demarcation 
discussed earlier regarding Antonio’s behavior on the Rialto and Salerio’s light/dark comparison 
of Jessica and Shylock: part of Antonio’s request cruelly grants half of Shylock’s fortune “Upon 
his death unto the gentleman/ That lately stole his daughter” (IV.i.384-85), and Shylock leaves 
distraught and ill, pursued by Gratiano’s barked threats.  Reflecting on the cruel response to 
Christian universalism, Adelman writes, “in the face of this unifying dream, Merchant rushes 
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to reinstate the differences of blood” (23).  Paradoxically, the Christians react to the realization 
of their own vision with an uncontrollable fear of equality with the former Other.
Ultimately, the demands upon a universalizing Christian doctrine seem to be too much 
in an increasingly open and commercial world full of encroaching Others.  Speaking on this 
dilemma, Gary Rosenshield summarizes the total effect of the play in the Antonio/Shylock plot, 
stating that it reveals “the inherent contradiction and the limitations of Antonio as a Christian 
merchant; [it] also give[s] pause to those who envision a world in which these contradictions and 
limitations can be overcome” (11).  Although Antonio turns to this Christian ethic to solve the 
dire predicament of his forfeited bond, it is in opposition to his most fundamental feelings as an 
esteemed merchant and Christian that he grants Shylock the same status as himself. 
Notes
1 Gary Rosenshield goes further with this point, asserting Bassanio’s aesthetic superiority (and 
thus ethical superiority): while Bassanio refers to “the golden fleece” as the ultimate prize of his 
venture, Shylock makes less visionary mutterings about “money bags” (II.v.18).
2 In Agnes Heller’s “The Absolute Stranger: Shakespeare and the Drama of Failed Assimila-
tion,” the point is made that Shylock is immediately identifiable as an Other (absolute stranger) 
in his society “because he is employed as a stranger [...] to do certain things that the natives 
of the cosmopolitan city will not do” (2).  It is his lot to do the unnatural but necessary job of 
money-lending. 
3 Though I feel I have sufficiently made my point, it would be remiss not to mention Shylock’s 
“If you prick us, do we not bleed?” speech, as it is the greatest expression of his belief in equality 
of all people under both natural and governmental laws (III.i.59-68).  Coupled with his ironic 
point that Antonio fails to exemplify the Christian philosophy of teaching by example [“The 
villainy you teach me, I will execute” (III.i.71-72)], this speech powerfully exposes the facade 
of Christian universalism at work in Antonio.
4 In contrast, Portia has relatively no discomfort when courted by the other “Others” within 
the play, Morocco and Arragon, because their difference is overtly displayed in their com-
plexions—Morocco is a brown-skinned Arab and Arragon is a ruddy-skinned (not to mention 
Catholic) Spaniard.  Janet Adelman states that, where there is no apparent difference between 
“races” (as in Shylock’s case), the Other “must be blackened: otherwise there is no reliable way 
to distinguish [...]” (14).  We see in the subsequent paragraphs how important language is to 
creating difference where, visibly, there is none.  
5 Jessica, perhaps, is the only character who fails to see the irrevocability of her blood ties to her 
father; responding to Launcelot’s comment on the impossibility of a true conversion [“The sins 
of the father are to be laid upon the children” and “Marry, you may partly hope that your father 
got you not, that you are not the Jew’s daughter” (III.v.1-2, 11-12)], Jessica says confidently, “I 
shall be sav’d by my husband, he hath made me a Christian!” (III.v.20).  In “Her Father’s Blood: 
Race, Conversion, and Nation in The Merchant of Venice,” Janet Adelman further discusses 
Jessica’s interchangeable ideas of marriage and conversion.
6 Rosenshield states that Barrabas the Jew in Marlowe’s The Jew of Malta represents an “eco-
nomic egoism of the new age” (3).  Arguably, Antonio sees his own such egoism reflected back 
at him in Shylock’s practices.  Not willing to equate his seemingly “noble” trade with the over-
scrupulous, usurious practices of his adversary, Antonio must preserve Shylock and his brand 
of mercantilism as Other.
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7 It seems Shylock is right to appeal to the law: even Portia, who bends it to her own advantage, 
recognizes its sanctity.  She urges the Duke presiding over the trial not to make an exception in 
Antonio’s court case and ignore Shylock’s claim: “Twill be recorded for a precedent,/ And many 
an error by the same example/ Will rush into the state.  It cannot be” (IV.i.220-22).
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Harold and Maude: Transcending 
the Fundamental Fantasy
Amanda Knapp
While now a popular cult classic, when first released Hal Ashby’s Harold and Maude 
was not well received: the match of a seventy-nine-year-old woman to a twenty-year-old man 
proved to be too much for critics and viewers alike.  As one critic put it, “Mr. Cort’s [Harold’s] 
baby face and teen-age build look grotesque alongside Miss Gordon’s [Maude’s] tiny, wizened 
frame” (Canby).1  Many others agreed with Harold’s psychiatrist in the film, who accuses Harold 
of having an Oedipus complex.  My thesis, however, is that those who insist that an oedipal 
struggle is at the heart of Harold and Maude are missing the point of the movie, which is Harold’s 
journey beyond neurosis.  
As Christian Metz describes it, an Oedipal narrative “contains a male protagonist 
who, after resolving a crisis and overcoming a ‘lack,’ then comes to identify with the law of the 
father, while successfully containing or controlling the female figure, demystifying her threat, 
or achieving union with her” (Creed 79).  Although Harold is clearly a male protagonist who 
overcomes the obstacle of his interest in death, he does not contain or control the female figure 
whatsoever.  Maude dies of her own will, by her own hand, and clearly against the wishes of 
Harold, for whom it is a complete surprise.2  Therefore, the progress Harold makes is not a 
moving through the Oedipal complex, but rather Harold traverses his fundamental fantasy, the 
basic relationship between a subject and his elective cause or desire: he moves from a subject 
who demands to a subject who desires, finally becoming a subject who enjoys at the end of the 
movie.  He thereby joins Maude beyond neurosis, beyond the hang-ups and uncertainty around 
one’s personal enjoyment.
“Do you…enjoy…knives?”: Harold’s fundamental fantasy
“Were they all done for your mother’s benefit?” 
“No, no. I would not say benefit.”3 
As Lacan describes, the fundamental fantasy is “the fundamental relationship between 
the subject (not the ego) and his or her elective cause, the subject as positioned with respect to 
the cause” (Fink 56).  Central to Harold’s character is his demand for his mother’s [played by 
Vivan Pickles] affection, which he tries to bring about from his phony suicide attempts.  The 
meaning of these attempts becomes clear in a crucial scene in which he describes to Maude an 
incident from his school days: in an accidental explosion, Harold set fire to the school’s science 
laboratory.  Assuming that Harold had died in the fire, the police reported his death to his mother, 
who fainted at the news. Having crept into the house unbeknownst to anyone, Harold was able 
to view this scene as it played out.  From this event, Harold constructed a fantasy primary to 
his existence in which death is the only gateway to his mother’s affection.  In the subsequent 
re-enactments of a death event, however, his mother does nothing or tells him to stop fooling 
around.  Harold is desperate to recreate the situation in which his mother demonstrated genuine 
affection for him.
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 Mixed with this demand for his mother’s affection is the rejection of his mother’s 
demands.4  When his mother brings dates to the house in an attempt to get Harold to marry, 
Harold uses his fixation with death to scare them away.  The fantasy of his mother’s desire is 
best shown through his interaction with his therapist [played by G. Wood] for, as Lacan would 
have it, “the analyst is considered to want from him or her [the analysand] the same thing the 
parents wanted” (Fink 57).  In affirmation of this, Harold dresses exactly the same as the analyst 
when they are in the same scene, imagining that the analyst, as well as his mother, wants him to 
be exactly like them.  Much of his ambivalence toward his mother comes from the fact that he 
thinks he cannot be just like everyone else.  Underwriting this is Harold’s belief that, in death, 
everyone is the same.
“WHAT?!”: Harold desires. 
With the appearance of Maude, Harold moves from a “subject who demands (as well as 
being subject to the Other’s demand) to being the subject who desires (as well as being subject 
to the Other’s desire)” (Fink 65).  In one scene, Harold wishes he could be a flower in a meadow 
because “they are all alike,” in accordance with his fundamental fantasy.  Maude, however, 
points out that every flower is different and special in its own right: “You see Harold, I feel that 
much of the world’s sorrow comes from people who are this [unique], yet allow themselves to 
be treated as that [commonplace].”  The camera then moves from the shot of white flowers in 
a green field to rows of white gravestones, making a clear connection between the way society 
treats the dead as being all the same, and the way Harold imagines the flowers to be all the same. 
Thus, Harold’s fundamental fantasy is directly challenged; Maude proves that people are unique 
entities even in death.
By this point in the movie it is clear that Harold has fallen in love with Maude.  She has 
opened up to him an aspect of the world he had not previously experienced.  As the quintessence 
of individuality in Harold’s eyes, Maude becomes the object of his desire.  Maude is also the object 
of his jouissance, which is to say his ‘kicks,’ implicated through a single bedroom scene. 5  After 
this scene, Harold still desires Maude; he tells his mother he is going to marry her.   
In desiring a marriage with Maude, Harold passes through the demands of his mother. 
She demands that he get married, but implicit in that demand is that the marriage be to a woman 
approximately his own age. By desiring Maude, he simultaneously accepts and rejects his mother’s 
demand.  Yet, as the movie clearly shows, his desire is still subject to the desire of the Other, 
Maude.
“L-I-V-E, Live!”: Maude transcends Neurosis
Maude’s philosophy is essentially the enjoyment of life.   She says to Harold, “It’s best 
not to be too moral; you cheat yourself out of too much life that way. I aim above morality.”  For 
Maude, to live means to enjoy, which is exactly what the transcendence of neurosis is about.6 
As Bruce Fink explains in A Clinical Introduction to Lacanian Psychoanalysis: Theory and 
Technique, “[O]ne way of stating the configuration analysis aims at is to say that the analysand 
is at last allowed to be able to enjoy his or her enjoyment” (211).  Maude never displays guilt 
about her enjoyment: she sleeps with Harold, smokes marijuana, and steals cars, but never in 
the movie does she regret her enjoyment. 
In fact, when Harold admonishes her for disturbing people, she explains her philosophy: 
“Well, some people get upset because they feel they have a hold on some things.  I’m merely act-
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ing as a gentle reminder: here today, gone tomorrow.  So, don’t get attached to things.”  Everyone 
pretends they have some claims to a particular object—a car for example—while at the same time 
acknowledging that ownership is a man-made concept.  Maude, however, does “the truly subversive 
thing [...] stick[ing] to [the] letter against the fantasy which sustains it” (Zizek 29).  Unlike the 
rest of the people, she acts as though ownership is really empty: rather than understanding that it 
is empty, she acts as if it is not empty by committing theft.
Furthermore, Maude understands that desire does not adhere to a single object. For Har-
old, Maude embodies his desire; he does not realize that his desire exists without her presence. 
That is why, when Maude tells him that she has taken the pills to die, he calls an ambulance. 
In the ambulance, he cries, “Maude I love you.”  But Maude, who realizes that his desire does 
not end with her demise, replies, “Harold that’s wonderful.  Go and love some more.”  In going 
beyond neurosis, Maude realizes that Harold’s love is not dependent on her existence.
In fact, in the act of suicide, Maude’s transcendence of neurosis shows itself the most 
clearly.  One goal of analysis is to achieve “a desire that does not allow itself to be put off by 
obstacles or swayed by the Other” (Fink 206).  Maude realizes that Harold would not want her 
to die, yet goes through with it anyway.  She knows, for example, that Harold loves her, for he 
has admitted as much to her.  She returns that love, but ultimately remains true to her desire for 
personal autonomy.  It is Maude’s desire to die of her own choosing, thumbing her nose at the 
‘authority’ of death.7  In fact, Maude wishes to remain outside any authority other than her own 
self-governance: she laments, “How the world still dearly loves a cage.”  Although she fully 
acknowledges the desire of the Other, Harold, her desire to be rid of authority comes first, and 
she therefore commits suicide.
“I know we’ve come a long way, changing day to day”: Harold traverses the Fantasy.
Harold encounters the ‘real,’ the kernel of trauma, in his scream of “What?!” as Maude 
tells him that she has already taken the pills to kill herself.  Indeed, Harold has been so quiet 
and passive-aggressive throughout the movie, that this scream comes as a shock for the audi-
ence.  Until this point, one is unsure of the intensity of Harold’s desire.  From the point of this 
scream on, it becomes impossible for Harold to pretend to kill himself, as he has encountered 
the ‘real’ of suicide.8
 After this scream and Maude’s subsequent death, Harold traverses the fundamental 
fantasy.  He becomes the “subject who enjoys (who is no longer subject to the Other)” instead 
of “the subject who desires (as well as being subject to the Other’s desire)”9 (Fink 65).  Maude, 
the object of his desire, has gone.  Therefore, he has two options: he can finally succumb to his 
fantasy, killing himself in actuality to gain the affection of the Other, or he can ascend beyond 
neurosis and find within himself the means to be happy.  Just as the hearse Harold drives is about 
to tumble over the cliff, the shot is still, emphasizing the point of decision.  The following shot 
shows Harold, alone on the cliff top. He plays the banjo that Maude gave him, but for his personal 
pleasure only— there is no other character present.  By discarding the hearse, the symbol of his 
fixation with death, Harold turns, like Maude, into a creature who enjoys purely and who is no 
longer subject to the Other. 
The future of Harold is necessarily unclear.  Even Lacan is not sure what happens after 
one breaks free of the fundamental fantasy: as Fink interprets, “The traversing of fantasy leads 
the subject […] beyond neurosis into largely unexplored territory” (Fink 195).  The viewer must 
not know what happens to Harold after he walks from the cliff side, as our imagination of the 
event is far more desirable than any actuality.
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 “What puzzles me, Harold, is that you want to sleep with your grandmother.” 
None of the authority figures in the movie can grasp that Harold’s attraction to Maude 
is not primarily physical—in fact, many of the film’s reviews did not grasp that, either.10  The 
authority figures, the uncle in the military [Charles Tyner], the psychiatrist, and the priest [Eric 
Christmas] all attempt to draw on a signifier to make Harold relinquish his love for Maude, 
these being President Nixon, Sigmund Freud, and Pope John Paul, respectively.  What they 
fail to realize, however, is that Maude demonstrates that the signifiers to which they appeal 
are empty.  Maude represents the anti-authority, an individual who acts for her own enjoyment 
and takes action on the empty gestures of society.  This is best observed during the encounter 
with the motorcycle policeman, where Maude takes the policeman at his word that everything 
is ‘alright’ and leaves. 
Also, unlike many movies today, the camera does not focus on Maude’s body.   This is 
due in part to the audience watching the film: most people do not want a close-up of a seventy-
year-old’s breasts.  But the same can be said of Harold’s gaze upon Maude: although he certainty 
looks at Maude with love, there is not a scene where he is gazing at her body as a fetish.  Maude 
is not objectified in this movie, the way women typically are in the classic oedipal narrative. 
Many film critics notice that classical films “appeared to exhibit an Oedipal trajectory; 
that is, the (male) hero was confronted with a crisis in which he had to assert himself over another 
man (often a father figure) in order to achieve social recognition and win the woman”(Creed 
76-77).  Yet the key point in Harold and Maude is that in the end, Harold does not have Maude. 
Maude eludes his mastery, she commits suicide when she wants, how she wants, and where 
she wants.  Therefore, the struggle that Harold goes through in the movie cannot be Oedipal in 
nature. 
Yet, it is obvious that Harold changes drastically in the film.  The Jaguar he has turned 
into a hearse flies over a cliff, without him in it.  Following Maude’s example, Harold discovers 
that life is meant to be enjoyed, and that authority does not have the ultimate control over one’s 
life.  When Harold begins to play his banjo on the cliff, he has finally traversed his fundamental 
fantasy. 
Notes
1 Of course, this is not universally true.  For a positive review of Harold and Maude, see 
Shedlin, Micheal. “Harold and Maude.” Film Quarterly. Fall 1972.
2 We viewers note that, at the couple’s first meeting, Maude exclaims that eighty is the perfect 
age to “pass on.”  Afterwards, she remarks that she will be eighty soon.  This foreshadowing is 
completely lost on Harold.
3 It is the acting skill of Bud Cort as Harold in uttering this line that truly delivers the correct 
impact.  The written form is sadly lacking.
4 Mixed with this is melancholia.  In one telling scene, Harold takes out a gun and points it at his 
mother who is filling out an electronic dating sheet for him.  He reconsiders and points the pistol 
at himself.  As Freud comments, “If one listens patiently to a melancholic’s many and various 
self-accusations, one cannot in the end avoid the impression that often the most violent of them 
are hardly at all applicable to the patient himself, but that with insignificant modifications they 
do fit someone else, someone whom the patient loves or has loved or should love” (“Mourning 
and Melancholia” 248).
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5 Indeed the sexual interplay between an old woman and a young man was considered so 
distasteful that the kissing scene was cut from the final movie.  The implication of sex only 
comes from a shot where the couple wakes up in bed together.  See Zizek, Slavoj. “From the 
Sublime to the Ridiculous: The Sexual Act in Cinema.” The Plague of Fantasies.
6 In a private conversation, Ashar Foley pointed out that in the essay “Finding Ourselves on 
a Lost Highway,” Todd McGowan shows us that there is no superego in transcendence, the 
superego also being the seat of morality.
7 The source for Maude’s refusal to submit to any authority is shown in the brief shot where 
Harold glances at her arm and silently notices the identification number tattooed thereon—a 
sign she had been in a Nazi concentration camp. 
8 This point was brought up by Ashar Foley in a private conversation. 
9 In many ways, the soundtrack plays the part of the superego in the movie.  Every one of Cat 
Steven’s songs demands enjoyment or the right to enjoyment, especially that proclaiming, “If 
you want to sing out, sing out, and if you want to be free, be free.”
10 In Variety’s 1971 review, the movie was described as having “all the fun and gaiety of a 
burning orphanage.  Ruth Gordon heads the cast as an offensive eccentric who becomes a 
beacon in the life of a self-destructive rich boy, played by Bud Cort.”
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“Justice and realism and really looking”:
The Gaze in Iris Murdoch’s The Nice and 
the Good
Teresa Moore
We not only need to ‘see ourselves as others see us,’ we also need to see ourselves 
seeing one another.  But to visualize looking is not as easy as it might appear.  What 
might seem to be a purely visual theory, or a theory of pure vision, has become lost in 
the mysteries of human relationships. 
~Margaret Olin
Iris Murdoch’s use of Bronzino’s mannerist painting Venus, Cupid, Folly and Time in 
The Nice and the Good reveals her interest in the gradual exposure of evil.  Indeed, Murdoch 
exposes immorality and temptation through the novel’s plot and it’s use of the painting by linking 
these themes to art theory’s definition of the gaze.  In fact, the cover illustration depicts only the 
loving embrace of Cupid and Venus, a portion of the painting which, when separated, implies a 
scene of idealized love.1  The portion hidden here is not in itself evil but instead reveals the evil 
in Cupid and Venus’ embrace. The gaze of other allegorical figures—Deceit, Jealousy, Time, 
and Truth—shows the horror of incest in the love scene.  No longer can Cupid and Venus be 
mere objective lovers; now the presence of Time and Truth compromises both their sin and the 
wish of the viewer to find pleasure in the sin. 
Murdoch composes her story to discuss both the good and evil to be found through 
the gaze of others; though incest and evil are revealed in Bronzino’s painting, so is truth.  This 
paradox can be found in both sides of the gaze; the gazer and the object of the gaze are subject 
to corruption and virtue.  For example, the gazer confronts evil through the desire to possess 
and control the object of the gaze.  For Margaret Olin, this desire turns “all human relations [to] 
power relations.  To acknowledge someone visually is to make that person a part of oneself, a 
possession, as though the person whose image is seen enters another’s body through the win-
dow of the eyes and ceases to lead a separate life” (216). The ability to dominate is an obvious 
temptation for the gazer.  But such temptation works upon the object of the gaze as well.  The 
object, given the power to interpret how he or she is observed, is conditioned to register a hysteric 
reaction in which his or her actions seek to fulfill the desire of others.2  By allowing another to 
define oneself, the object of the gaze denies his or her own sense of responsibility for the world. 
Rather than confront his or her actions and relationships, the object of the gaze refuses to judge 
the morality of his or her situation or correct immoral behavior in the surrounding world. 
However, a redemptive good can be found on both sides of the gaze.  For the gazer, 
acknowledging the power of sight ruins the pleasure of looking and creates a more moral outlook. 
As the presence of others ruins the pleasurable love scene in Bronzino’s painting, so the observer 
becomes ashamed of his or her voyeurism by the gaze of another.3  Olin argues that it is in this 
returned gaze that both the object of the gaze and gazer are redeemed: “If you can look back, 
you cannot be possessed by another.  […] Rather than emphasizing the power of the gazing one 
to make the gazed at into an object, this idea suggests responsibility toward the person looking 
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back at one” (217).  Though such a return is often unsettling, an awareness of both viewpoints 
illuminates a world of human connection.  The resulting sense of shared responsibility begins a 
joint venture to produce a livable society.  The building of an equal, responsible community is 
available because of the shared gaze, a method for producing a moral secular world. 
Murdoch produces such a moral society in The Nice and the Good as her central char-
acters, John Ducane and Mary Clothier, move from evil to good. Both Ducane and Mary spend 
their time at Octavian and Kate Gray’s summerhouse.  There, they both take roles of comforter 
and voyeur to the lives of the characters around them.  Ducane and Mary transcend this voy-
euristic behavior and the evil of the gaze characterized by a self-centered obsession with how 
they are seen and how they see others.  Ducane confronts the duplicity of his conceived identity 
as a good man and his affairs with Kate and Jessica Bird while attempting to extricate his own 
deficiencies from the co-worker’s death he is investigating.  Likewise, Mary overcomes her 
desire to be the ideal confidante to reflect on her own past guilt she feels over her husband’s 
death.  By encountering and acknowledging what cannot be seen by human constructs, these 
two characters reject their self-focused views to embrace a new code based on selfless love.  In 
doing so, Ducane and Mary find in one another a partner to share the gaze, to monitor moral 
actions, and to define himself or herself.  
The gaze as defining self
In The Nice and the Good, Murdoch creates a world wherein morals are derived from 
social interaction.  According to A.E. Denham, this social world plays a part in shaping the 
individual: “we discover what we ought to believe, ethically speaking, and how we ought to 
act in part by attuning ourselves to the claims of other human beings” (614). This social code 
stifles Murdoch’s characters early in the novel; Mary and Ducane place the crux of their iden-
tity in their social role.  Though, ironically, it is their own actions and interpretations that hold 
them to this prescribed social identity, the imagined gaze of others paralyzes Mary and Ducane. 
Consequently, their self-image, while created by themselves, is dependent upon others.  In other 
words, society has created a social code, and, though it is open to individual interpretation, it is 
what defines proper conduct. This conduct is monitored and maintained through the watchful 
eye of others.  Ducane and Mary both fall subject to this form of self-definition and the resulting 
fear and insecurity it causes. 
Ducane is subject to this self-doubt through his conduct towards Jessica and Kate, two 
females with whom Ducane is conducting romantic relationships.  Though his conduct does not 
technically breach any social mandate, Ducane hides his relationships from the women for fear 
that it might appear inappropriate.  Indeed, the immoral appearance of his behavior is quickly 
delineated to be the source of Ducane’s fear of discovery and what would cause him the greatest 
remorse; he admits “he could bear to part from Jessica but he could scarcely bear that she should 
think ill of him” (Murdoch 178).  Ducane confesses that he knows his actions to be those of a 
“cold-blooded deceiver” but cannot face being thought one (Murdoch 189).  The true source of 
moral consciousness for Ducane is the gaze, or his appearance in the eyes of another.  The real-
ity of immorality lies less in Ducane’s actions than in the light in which he imagines others see 
those actions.  He cannot reveal himself to Jessica or Kate because his actions towards the two 
women would ruin the positive image they have created of him.  He becomes a slave to their 
idea of him—an idea which Ducane uses to define himself.  Thus, when Ducane claims he is not 
“acting like himself,” he is speaking of himself as defined by his social interactions. 
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Mary Clothier also suffers from the “evil eye” of the internalized social judgment. 
Mary has internalized the gaze of her dead husband, Alistair, much as Ducane has internalized 
the gaze of Jessica and Kate.  Mary imagines Alistair watching her “all sad and deprived and 
unappeased […] I feel as though he still wants my love and I can’t give it to him” (Murdoch 
215).  This haunting, however, is obviously not caused by Alistair but by Mary’s perception of 
him.  By imagining Alistair’s opinion, Mary projects her feelings of guilt for Alistair’s death 
and for the inadequacy of her love onto an imagined ideal of married life.  The sources of guilt 
can be traced, cyclically, back to the internalized gaze.  Mary describes her love for Alistair, and 
all men, as “nervous, plucking, plucked at”; though “both her body and mind had been involved 
in this love[,] they had never been in accord about it” (Murdoch 93).  Instead of focusing on 
her husband and her love for him, Mary hovered around him, seeing herself through his eyes. 
Because Mary is unable to act without contemplation of the gaze, her love is not free.  Indeed, 
Mary’s consignment to a social position defined by serving and comforting others stifles all of her 
own desires.  She admits, “my wants are huge, my desires are rapacious.  I want love, I want the 
splendor and violence of love, and I want it now” (Murdoch 109).  However, Mary’s obsession 
with her duty to the social norm denies her any object that could fulfill these wants.  Thus, her 
current pursuit of Willy Kost, another summerhouse guest, is characterized not by her concern 
for him, but for her concern that she is doing what will be good for him.  This slight revision 
accentuates the preoccupation with self that obscures Mary’s love; in turn, Mary’s fear of how 
she is received in Willy’s eyes causes this preoccupation. 
Thus, it is the social self that causes awareness of the gaze and the power that it holds over 
the individual: although guilt and fear stifle Mary and Ducane’s actions because they both define 
themselves through others’ perspectives, the gaze is real only within their minds.  Murdoch likens 
this condition to “roving gases [that] travel the world, causing pain and mutilation, without their 
owners having any full awareness at all, of the strength and whereabouts of these exhalations” (150). 
The characters whose gaze Mary and Ducane internalize are not aware of their power, for it is not 
their own.  Instead, it is a morality for which no one is responsible.  As such, it is a construction 
built without conviction and upheld through fear of judgment; it is not a true morality.  
The gaze as society’s judgment
Ducane and Mary both hold positions of societal import in the novel: Ducane, as detec-
tive of the Radeechy case and legal advisor to Octavian Gray, is asked to judge according to the 
written, governmental code; Mary, as head of the Dorset house, is seen as high council in the 
beach house and must maintain order on the estate.  These roles both obscure and emphasize the 
self.  Ducane and Mary subjugate their own gaze to a prescribed method of looking; however, 
the social gaze is maintained because Ducane and Mary define themselves through their soci-
etal roles.  To allow selfish impulses to overwhelm their duty would at once deny the societal 
construct that Ducane and Mary pride themselves on fulfilling.  Thus, selfish pride controls the 
gaze even from the viewpoint of the gazer. 
Gazing through others’ eyes rather than his own, Ducane is unable to separate himself 
from society’s standards.  His ability to judge cannot transcend his own experiences and his 
ability to act cannot overcome society’s judgment; in this way, Ducane and his gaze are limited. 
Indeed, Ducane’s inability to place himself in foreign situations impedes his career; Murdoch’s 
narrator tells us that “his career as a barrister had been less than totally successful [because] 
he lacked the capacity to conceive of any kind of villainy of which he would not have been 
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capable himself” (67).  Here, Ducane’s sense of self denies the reality of the situation; Ducane 
is unable to see past what society is supposed to be in order to see its reality.  At the same time, 
by becoming society’s eye, he is unable to interact fully with others.  This role denies him the 
ability to make love to the temptress Judy.  Understanding that he cannot connect with Judy, 
Ducane realizes that:
I cannot pity the wretched or bring hope or comfort to the damned. I cannot 
feel compassion for those over whom I imagine myself to be set judge. I can-
not even take this girl in my arms. And that not because of duty or for her 
sake at all, but just because of my own conception of myself as spotless: my 
quaint idea of myself as good, which seems to go on being with me, however 
rottenly I may behave.  (Murdoch 261)
Ducane cannot act according to a morality based on personal interaction and experi-
ence; he cannot look beyond himself to experience the physical or emotional bonds between 
humans.  Instead, he remains held within the expectations of society, unable to break out of his 
role as society’s gazer and judge.  Indeed, such restrictions hold Ducane’s character in place as 
an exemplary citizen, but keep him from becoming truly exemplary.  Mary, too, is given and 
denied self in the role of judge.  As housekeeper, she is often left outside of the actual household 
experience; as she sits at a Sunday luncheon, for example, she finds herself in “a conversational 
vacuum,” isolated from the interactions of the houseguests.  Yet she does not resent this isola-
tion, instead embracing her role as gazer with “a sort of maternal sense of ownership towards 
the group of chattering persons all round her” (Murdoch 108).  Mary denies herself interaction, 
aligning her self-image with the success of order and the maintenance of social norms within 
the household.  The society itself becomes her image, her possession; Mary’s pride is dependent 
upon the performance of others, and so her love of them is a self-interested one. 
Transcending the gaze
Both Mary and Ducane are able to transcend the selfish nature of the gaze through 
encounters with selfless love.  Murdoch creates situations wherein both characters are able to 
look past themselves to realize the confinements the gaze imposes.  For Ducane, this realization 
occurs through a confrontation of death, aptly set in the darkness of a cave, a place in which 
sight cannot penetrate.  Ducane enters this cave in order to rescue Mary’s son who had swum 
inside.  Similarly, Mary also encounters death through the cave as she faces the possibility of 
losing yet another loved one.  These experiences reveal to Mary and Ducane the insignificance 
of their positions as objects of the gaze and the inadequacy of their adherence to specific social 
norms as gazers. 
Before the encounter with death, Mary and Ducane begin to lead one another towards 
enlightenment.  They advise each other on their troubles, advocating a disinterested gaze as the 
course to goodness.  Ducane urges Mary to overcome her guilt over Alistair’s death by encour-
aging her to love him fully now after his death: “Don’t try to see him. Just love him […].  Love 
can’t always do work.  Sometimes it just has to look into the darkness.  Keep looking and don’t 
be afraid.  There are no demons there” (Murdoch 215).  Ducane’s advice outlines a love for 
Mary without the gaze; though she should keep looking, she should not try to create anything in 
the world or in herself but instead allow the situation to develop outside of her control.  In other 
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words, Mary should not make what she sees conform to a pre-existing standard but should instead 
remain open to the truth.  In doing so, true love is available—even for one long dead—and this 
love can be without judgment of Alistair or herself.  Similarly, Mary advises Ducane to make his 
decision concerning the Radeechy case without drawing on his current feelings of insecurity and 
immorality.  She asks Ducane, “shouldn’t you just think about the decision and not about your-
self?  Let the machinery work and keep it clear of the jumble” (Murdoch 281).  Here, judgment 
beyond the self is advocated.  A need to judge is admitted, but this judgment should overcome 
standard social norms to interrogate the actual situation and outcomes of those being judged.4 
Through this method, Ducane’s image, still caught into his role of judge, would be freed from 
the actual judging process and thus capable of searching for truth. 
The advice that Mary and Ducane give one another, however, is not taken until each 
character confronts situations in which the truth can no longer be obscured and the advice can be 
implemented.  The encounters with death, showing the finitude of self, illuminate the means for Mary 
and Ducane to transcend his or her past placement concerning the gaze.  Mary waits outside of the 
cave to discover the fate of her son and Ducane who are trapped inside by the tide.  In this waiting, 
Mary is able to contemplate death and her past with Alistair. She finds a new way to love: 
Since death and chance are the material of all there is, if love is to be love of 
something it must be love of death and change.  This changed love moves 
upon the ocean of accident, over the forms of the dead, a love so impersonal 
and so cold it can scarcely be recognized, a love so devoid of beauty, of which 
one knows no more than the name, so little it is like an experience.  This love 
Mary now felt for her dead husband and for the faceless wraith of her perhaps 
drowned son.  (Murdoch 318) 
Mary faces the death she had avoided and is able to look beyond her decisions in and 
concerns about life in order to love what has been lost.  No longer is her deficiency the object 
of the gaze; instead Alistair and humanness and the act of living itself garner attention.  Freed 
from the past, Mary is able to take Ducane’s advice and look “into darkness”; her gaze without 
sight reveals the goodness in Mary’s past and in her love. 
Within the cave, Ducane also realizes the truth of Mary’s advice and relinquishes the 
self from his role as gazer.  The darkness of the cave, the inability to see clearly, allows Ducane 
to judge himself without the imposition of another’s gaze.5  He refers to himself “as a little rat,” 
acknowledging the selfishness in his gaze.  He promises himself:
if I ever get out of here I will be no man’s judge.  Nothing is worth doing except 
to kill the little rat, not to judge, not to be superior, not to exercise power, not 
to seek, seek, seek.  To love and to reconcile and to forgive, only this matters. 
All power is sin and all law is frailty.  Love is the only justice.  Forgiveness, 
reconciliation, not law.  (Murdoch 315) 
Ducane recognizes his distance from good lies in his seeking the good rather than allowing 
himself to encounter it.  He promises himself that he will no longer disconnect his gaze, but 
instead look at the reality of each situation and impose love over duty.  He is now able to extract 
himself from what Mary calls “the machinery” of judging, instead looking toward bettering 
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himself and others.  After escaping the cave, Ducane is able to implement his new vision; he 
punishes Biranne for his involvement in the Radeechy case, not by exposing his bad behavior 
and ruining his career, but by encouraging Biranne into better company.  Ducane, looking at 
the situation rather than at his duty as a social agent, finds that “human law,” the social law, “is 
only a very rough approximation to justice and it’s far too clumsy an instrument to deal with 
the situation [Biranne is] in” (Murdoch 324).6  Ducane, like Mary, has been able to extract the 
self from judgment.  In doing so, both characters are more capable of comforting others, while 
finding love, granting forgiveness, and finally reaching happiness themselves.  
The new gaze
By encountering the lack of gaze and the lack of a visually defined self, Mary and Ducane 
enter into an enlightenment wherein the gaze is given and received with unselfish love.  Indeed, 
the couple has reached Olin’s moral state of a returned gaze.  Murdoch seals this alliance by 
romantically grouping Mary and Ducane into a relationship of mutual respect.  In their marriage, 
each member will look to the other for moral guidance and, by doing so, will continue to provide 
the gaze that defines the other.  This new view, however, will be dependent upon mutual love 
and interaction, drawing Mary and Ducane into society rather than isolating them above it.7 
Mary and Ducane reach their state of love through a belief in one another’s moral good-
ness.  Ducane places his old selfish moral justification in Mary, and Mary takes the role of social 
law.  Indeed, Ducane submits to love only when “he thought, she is better than me.  During his 
gradual loss of a stiff respect he had for himself, he had felt the need to locate in someone else 
the picture of an upright person” (Murdoch 344).  Mary becomes the point within the world at 
which Ducane is able to leave himself both as object of the gaze and gazer according to his soci-
etal role.  Again, this release allows Ducane to embrace not only a better form of judgment, but 
also a better image of himself.  Though Ducane “had begun to need Mary when he had begun to 
need a better image of himself” (Murdoch 344), he ends by gaining a positive image of himself 
according to his new standard bearer of the gaze—Mary.  Mary helps Ducane find goodness within 
himself and gives him “a moral, even a meta-physical confidence in the world, in the reality of 
goodness” (Murdoch 344).  In turn, Ducane brings forth the good in Mary’s character.  Though 
she initially struggles to surrender control over the gaze, Mary also relinquishes the self in love 
of Ducane.  She realizes the whole of herself in this giving of the self, “her whole thought-body, 
her whole being of yearning” (342).  Thus, Mary discovers depths and realities within herself by 
overcoming her connection to a social order.  Conversely, she gives up her old image of herself 
to once again take part in the reality of everyday life and relationships. 
Murdoch then advocates this new gaze as the source of moral good.  The gaze without the 
self yet engaged in the world becomes the flexible, changeable standard of morality.  Murdoch’s 
philosophy supports such a reading.  In Sovereignty of the Good, a collection of philosophical 
musings, Murdoch claims, “the love which brings the right answer is an exercise of justice and 
realism and really looking.  The difficulty is to keep the attention fixed upon the real situation and 
to prevent it from returning surreptitiously to the self with consolations of self-pity, resentment, 
fantasy and despair” (91).  Here, the definition of the new gaze is foremost; it denies obscurities 
of the self to see the real and discern goodness.  Most importantly, it requires interaction with 
society on a level without hierarchy and power.8
Ultimately, Murdoch aligns morality with social interaction, forgiveness, understand-
ing and love.  This social life is the journey to encountering the good and creating good in 
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others.  As Denham notes, “Genuine love […] is a matter of looking out and beyond the self; 
and when one looks lovingly, one sees not only the empirical reality of what lies beyond, 
but its value and significance” (625).  Yet, the self still maintains a place in the journey; 
awareness of the gaze and of selfishness must occur within the self in order for the process 
of enlightenment to begin.  Murdoch advocates a goodness that lies both within and beyond 
the self, a paradox whose tension creates the reality of experience.  In The Nice and the 
Good, Murdoch celebrates this tension and the human ability to reach a higher level of good. 
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Notes 
1 Though there is no evidence to show that Murdoch had a hand in the cover’s design, it seems plausible to 
argue that the cropping of the picture was done intentionally to reflect the novel’s predominant theme. 
2 I refer here to hysteric reactions in accordance with psychoanalytic theory.  In this light, the object of the 
gaze is attempting to fulfill the desires of the gazer.  In doing so, his or her own desires are subordinated 
to the desire of the gazer. 
3 This idea of discovering guilt only through the eyes of another is first discussed by Sartre in Being and 
Nothingness. There, Sartre uses the example of a man being caught looking through the keyhole of a door 
by the idea that someone is watching him.  Thus, the pleasure of gazing in the peephole is ruined and the 
immorality of the action is revealed.  For Sartre, this is caused by an increased awareness of the self, a 
discovery of existence: “I now exist as myself for my unreflective consciousness.  It is this irruption of the 
self which has been most often described: I see myself because somebody sees me” (349).
4 This new judgment implies a new reading of Bronzino’s painting.  Though Jealousy, Truth and Time 
all gaze down with horror and scorn at the love scene of Cupid and Venus, the ability to judge the lovers 
lies in specific knowledge of the situation.  Cupid and Venus’ love, while condemned by social standards, 
may prove to be a meaningful, loving union.  Murdoch opens her story to such an outcome through the 
reunion of Paula and Biranne.  Though Biranne admits he will cheat again, defying social acceptability, 
the marriage appears salvageable and capable of good at the end of the novel. 
5 The cave is a particularly weighty symbol for Murdoch.  Her close scholarship of Plato suggests that this 
cave symbolically represents Ducane’s encounter with the realm of ideas and the true version of the world 
according to Plato’s metaphor of the cave. 
6 I do not mean to suggest that Murdoch completely discards the idea of social law and communal policies 
in this novel; instead, I see her advocating a personal interaction with this law that complies with a good 
and rational thinking available to all humans. 
7 Murdoch does present a further option of life without the self and without the gaze.  Theo, by returning 
to his life as a Buddhist monk in India, presents a possibility that completely selfless love is attainable to 
humans.  Theo’s choice, which ends the novel, suggests Murdoch’s definition of pure goodness as life 
without possessive love of any kind.  Yet, as Ann M. Ashworth suggests, Murdoch “knows that human 
love is always somehow self-fulfilling, but she does not, therefore, condemn it; rather, she makes it the 
way of goodness” (21). 
8 Murdoch proposes so much in The Nice and the Good when she aligns evilness in the novel to feel-
ings of detachment.  Ducane panics when he finds, “I am becoming cut off […].  I am becoming 
like Radeechy, it is all indirect, it is all in my mind” (Murdoch 207).  At this moment, he aligns his 
character to Radeechy, a man who embraced and pursued the evil and occult.  Ducane does not reach 
such a level, however, instead discovering the same level of self-centeredness in Radeechy that he 
held when under the power of the early gaze.  Now freed by the new gaze, Ducane is able to see the 
selfishness of Radeechy without judging or obscuring himself from an alignment with his actions.  
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An Examination of Courtship and 
Dating from 1900 through the 1950s
Kari Parker
In a world where singles bars and dating services dominate the social scene, it is no 
wonder people are obsessed with finding their perfect mates.  In the twenty-first century, the 
dating process increasingly revolves around technology, and the practice of premarital sex is 
quite common from the first date to the hundredth.  It is important to realize, however, that our 
modern sense of dating has not always existed. 
 Indeed, modern dating derives from critical changes that occurred from the 1900s through 
the 1950s.  For example, in 1900, dating was termed “courtship;” the term “dating” only came 
into usage starting in the mid 1940s.  An examination of magazines and newspapers reveals three 
key periods of change in the history of courtship and dating between 1900 and the 1950s.  The 
three periods include “traditional courtship” from 1900 to 1920, “new woman courtship” from 
1920 to the mid 1940s, and the emergence of “dating,” from the mid-1940s to the present.  Tra-
ditional courtship was a male-driven, asexual, and etiquette-conscious practice.  The shift from 
traditional courtship to new woman courtship resulted in the ability of women to have sexual 
identities, which they had never had before, and the power to pursue men. Unfortunately, the shift 
from new woman courtship to dating gave way to a return of male-driven processes; however, 
the new game-like dating system resulted in social acceptance for an emerging sexuality among 
teenagers.
 In 1900, courtship was a “preliminary contract […] when two mutually attracted, young 
people begin to find their lives blending.”1  Traditional courtship was intended to unite a couple 
with the dual purpose of marriage and perpetuation of the species.  It was also a way for parents to 
rid themselves of the financial burdens their daughters represented.  During this time, few women 
were actually in the workforce; most were financially dependent on their parents or husbands. 
Marriage was the socially acceptable practice to ensure a woman the support she needed.  While 
traditional courtship encouraged a man and woman to interact in an intimate setting, its purpose 
was to ensure a marriage contract for the benefit of both partners.  
 Before traditional courtship could even occur, men and women had to enter society.  To 
enter society, children had to reach a certain age.  Many times, depending upon the economic 
status of parents, a grand ball was thrown to celebrate the child’s entrance into the social scene. 
After they entered society, they would receive invitations to formal events, such as balls, dances, 
and dinners.2  Formal events allowed young people to meet and realize primary attractions, 
yet always under a chaperone’s surveillance.  According to a series of Ladies Home Journal 
Magazine articles on etiquette for social occasions, women were required to have chaperones at 
formal events, walks, or even dinners.  For example, at a ball, if a man wanted to see a woman 
again, he had to ask her chaperone for permission.3  Likewise, the man could not call on the girl 
unless he had been invited for a formal receiving day.4  If he visited regardless, the call would be 
considered inappropriate.  These rules were just some of the practices of traditional courtship.
 In selecting a woman to court and start a family with, a man had many considerations. 
During traditional courtship, the most prevalent consideration for selecting a wife was family. 
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According to a 1916 article in Current Opinion, “Knowledge of family traits is essential as a 
guide in the selection of marriage mates or at least in the elimination of obviously unfit unions 
[because] everyone desires the best physical, mental, and moral hereditary equipment for his 
children.”5  In Cold Springs Harbor, New York, a Eugenics Record Office distributed free fliers 
encouraging people to look at family background before courting and marrying.6  These fliers 
were based on Galton’s theory, which gained great popularity in the early 1900s.  According 
to this theory, “the total inheritance of any living being, plant, animal, or man, each parent has 
contributed a quarter, each of the four grandparents a sixteenth, each of the eight great-grand-
parents a sixty-fourth, and so on.”7  Therefore, a man should choose to court a woman based on 
her qualities, her family’s qualities, and what qualities he wants for his children. 
 In traditional courtship, the man not only initiated contact with a prospective wife, but 
pursued her as well.  The term for the man’s pursuit of the woman was “wooing.”  The most com-
mon way for a man to woo a woman was to buy her gifts and travel far distances to see her.  A 
1910 article from Puck portrays a man hitting a hi-striker, a carnival game of strength, to determine 
which gift he will give the woman of his attentions.  The accompanying text describes a man who 
had bought his woman everything from candies to flowers, even a car.  However, when his rival 
buys the woman an airplane, the man loses the woman.  In another article from Puck in 1904, a 
man describes his illusions of courtship: “Your idea that you can buy her all she wants; and her 
idea that she won’t want anything you can’t buy her.”8  The amount of effort a man took to see a 
woman was also considered wooing.  For example, in a 1903 story in McClure’s Magazine, a man 
travels from Colorado to New York just to visit a woman;9 in 1900, this was particularly significant 
given the slow methods of transportation.  Wooing was a critical aspect of traditional courtship 
because it involved a man’s relentlessly trying to win the woman of his affections. 
 Along with wooing, traditional courtship very much relied on the etiquette and habits 
of the persons involved.  For example, in order for a woman to be deemed a suitable mate, she 
had to be proper, pretty, and ready for all moments of the day.  In a 1905 Ladies Home Journal 
article entitled “Pretty Girl Papers,” the writer lists several techniques for a woman to ensure 
her beauty.  For example, one author argues, “You cannot afford to forget the advantage it is 
to your looks and dispositions to go to bed early.”  Or, “a smooth forehead adds greatly to the 
beauty of the face […].  Try never to express anything with the forehead.”  The author also sug-
gests that women take laxatives in the summer, ride side saddle when riding a horse, and refrain 
from drinking ice water, which was known to bloat a woman.10  Meanwhile, in order to talk 
with women, men had to take off their hats.  Also, in order to walk with a woman, men had to 
walk on the outside, near the street.11  Etiquette was critical in the selection of mates, as it told 
of one’s ability to be proper.
 In keeping with this emphasis on etiquette, physical intimacy was harshly frowned 
upon during traditional courtship.  Women and men displayed little physical expression of their 
affections towards one another.  In a 1909 article from Puck, an illustration depicts a man trying 
to put his arm around a woman’s waist.  In the accompanying text, after the man’s attempt, the 
woman responds, “You shan’t put your arm around my waist” and proceeds to slap the man on 
the jaw.  The woman proclaims the man must be “shamed of himself actin’ so silly.”12  Even the 
attempt to touch a woman’s side was strongly discouraged in traditional courtship, much less 
an evening kiss. 
  Between the years 1914 to 1918, which marked World War I, articles on courtship 
drastically declined in number because men were overseas and women were at work in the 
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factories.  Due to their experiences in the workplace, women developed a new sense of indepen-
dence.  They soon realized that they could do exactly the same jobs as men.  These revelations 
led to the creation of the “new woman” ideal in the 1920s.  The new woman was “college-edu-
cated, frequently unmarried, and [a] self-supporting new woman.”13  She was also a working 
girl, as “growing numbers of working women in blue-collar, clerical, and service occupations 
[…] reshaped the parameters of [the] female experience.”14  In addition, she was very political, 
working towards suffrage, and also experienced a healthy sexuality because she was unmarried 
and self-supporting.15  In the 1920s, the advent of the new woman and her beliefs and practices 
helped shift the direction of courtship.
 New woman courtship lasted from 1920 to the mid-1940s.  Periodicals of the time 
proclaimed, “[T]he age of chivalry is considered a joke, and we say it’s dead.”16  Another article 
notes, “We’re living a new code of ethics-morals, if you will.  Our experience and thought are 
eternally at war with the old rules and conventions.”17  From these two statements, it is obvious 
that the new woman ideal brought about a change to once-accepted customs in courtship.  Now, 
courtship centered around feminine sexuality, and encouraged women to pursue and initiate re-
lationships.  It also encouraged women to act naturally because they no longer needed to follow 
the strict rules of etiquette.
 During the 1920s, public acknowledgement of feminine sexuality arose, leading to the 
commonality of physical intimacy.  Women were seen as capable of having a sexuality, whereas 
previously under Victorian attitudes they were assumed to be asexual.  Periodicals of the decade 
declare “a woman’s body her own.”18  While men used to be seen as sexual and even promiscuous, 
women were allowed to claim their own bodies and be sexual if they so desired.19  The advent of 
birth control allowed this to happen, and also allowed women to practice sex without the concerns 
of childbearing.  Men could “no longer dictate the lives of their daughters and wives […] who 
[were] emotionally and chemically able to have as few children and as many love affairs as they 
desire[d].”20  Although not all women partook of this new freedom, some women did.  Physical 
intimacy did not necessarily mean sex, however; it also meant kissing.  With this period, it was 
more socially acceptable for a woman to express her affections for a man physically; men were 
no longer slapped for trying to put their arms around ladies.  A 1923 Current Opinion article 
notes, “The older conventions of sexual morality originated in a pre-evolutionary age when the 
orthodox believed in the vileness of human nature and its conception in sin […].  [Now] natural-
ism has rendered these dogmas obsolete.”21  Women were encouraged to do what was natural:22 
if kissing is natural, then kiss.  As shown, female sexuality and birth control changed traditional 
courtship to new woman courtship.
 In addition to sexuality, many other characteristics of new woman courtship were dif-
ferent from earlier decades.  Instead of men choosing, pursuing, and wooing women, women 
became the choosers, pursuers, and wooers.  A 1927 astrology article from McClure’s argues 
that the idea, “If a man cares for you, he will tell you so,” was no longer correct.23  Instead, 
periodicals of the times strongly encourage women to pursue the man.  Moreover, often these 
periodicals encourage women not to pursue men due to their busy professional lives.24  This 
same article suggests that modern men should “wait for the ladies of their affections to indicate 
at exactly what speed they wish the love affair to develop.”25  Women of new woman courtship 
took on the dominant role of pursuer, or at least of initiator.
 Surprisingly, women learned these roles in the classroom.  According to various New 
York Times articles in the 1920s, the emergence of college courses on courtship and marriage 
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gained popularity.  In these courses, women were taught how to make conscious decisions about 
choosing their own mates.  One course at Vassar focused solely on marriage, with lectures on how 
to choose husbands.26  Another course at Pennsylvania State University taught women aspects 
of courtship and marriage in order to prepare them for married life.27  These articles indicated 
that women were taking a lead role in relationships, yet there were limits as to whom society 
deemed the right man. 
 While women were learning in classrooms about marriage and men, they were encour-
aged by popular magazines to be themselves.  This was the first time this idea had been accepted. 
During traditional courtship, so much pressure was placed on etiquette that neither boy nor girl 
truly got to know each other.  A 1927 McClure’s article states, “No wonder so many marriages are 
unsuccessful when one considers the trickery and hypocrisy of courtship.”28  Therefore, as new 
woman courtship came into existence, etiquette and proper appearance were still recommended 
but no longer essential.  New rules on etiquette allowed women to be who they were, no longer 
presenting a fake self in order to impress the male, as the McClure’s article suggests.
 Similar to the years of the First World War, articles on courtship again diminished in 
the popular magazines in the 1940s, during World War II.  The end of courtship had come, as 
it was no longer the accepted form of behavior.  Instead, dating emerged as the new accepted 
practice.  The end of the war and the Depression allowed for the American economy to thrive, 
making jobs and money abundant.  As a result of the booming economy, the idea of the teenager 
first took shape, along with a new consumer group: young people were getting jobs and spending 
money.  For the first time in history, teenagers were a part of American society.  Courtship was 
no longer an accepted practice for young people who had money to spend.  A 1955 New York 
Times article quotes a professor from Cornell as he looks back at the previous era of the Great 
Depression, saying, “Many parents come from generations stultified by the money problems 
of the depression and the emotional separations of the war which kept their social lives to a 
minimum.”29  He continues, “[K]ids today have little trouble getting jobs and therefore have 
money […].  Teenagers have many more planned social events in school and as a result their 
social maturity level is developing at a faster rate.”30  The emergence of the teenager after the 
depression and World War II had shifted the scene from courtship to dating. 
 With the advent of the teenager, many things about American courtship practices 
changed dramatically.  For one, “courtship” as a term disappeared, and, instead, teenagers were 
“dating.”  According to a 1950 article in Readers Digest, “The custom of ‘dating’ is a pre-court-
ship behavior peculiar to the inhabitants of the United States.”31  Dating used the same language 
and gestures of courtship, but did not imply the reality of courtship.32  Therefore, teens did not 
intend to marry, as they had in traditional and new woman courtship. 
  Dating was a foreign trend to most Americans; thus, popular magazines spent a lot 
of time explaining the mores that defined dating.  A 1951 Today’s Health article states, “As a 
rule, girls of today have their first dates between the ages of 12 and 14, and boys a year or two 
later.”33  A 1950 Reader’s Digest article describes dating as a game: the boy wants to date the 
most admired girl, while the girl wants to receive as many invitations as possible.  Dates typically 
occurred in public places and events, such as soda shops, the skating rink, or dances.   Despite 
the dominance of the female in new woman courtship, dating returned to a male-dominated 
process similar to that of traditional courtship because, according to popular magazines, boys 
asked girls on dates.  The boy’s job was to captivate the girl, while the girl in return was supposed 
to discourage her partner.  The victor was the one who made the other lose self-control, while 
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maintaining his or her own.  In addition to characterizing dating as a game, the Readers Digest 
article also describes the intimacy of dating.  The article suggests both that a goodnight kiss is 
a minimum repayment for a night out, and that the favors should increase over successive dates 
with the same person.34  However, the author was quick to note, repayments “seldom includ[ed], 
actual intercourse” because the ultimate “goal of dating was not sexual satisfaction.”35  Instead, 
the overall goal of a date was for a boy to show that he was worthy of love and success.36  A 
boy could prove his worthiness through many skills performed on their date, such as dancing or 
bowling.  So, even though dating was perceived as a game, it also had intimate implications.
While some values, like spending money, were familiar from courtship days, the pro-
cess of dating proved very different from the process of courtship.  According to a poll taken in 
a 1952 article from American Journal of Sociology, only thirty-three percent of girls thought it 
was appropriate to kiss on the first date, compared to the male’s fifty-five percent.  These num-
bers indicate a drastic change from courtship to dating.  In traditional courtship, it was frowned 
upon to even kiss, while in new woman courtship, a woman’s sexuality was increasingly her 
own.  When asked if the first kiss should be saved for marriage, only three percent of males 
and females agreed that it should.  That this question was asked at all reveals a lot about dating 
and the conservative society in which it existed.  However, when asked about intimate petting, 
sixty-six percent of females and thirty-one percent of males agreed that it should wait until after 
marriage.37  These figures indicate that, while acceptance of sexual promiscuity had increased, 
it had by no means become the liberal standard practice of the twenty-first century. 
 Dating had taken over the American social scene.  One article goes so far as to suggest 
that children should be taught techniques of successful dating because “gradual preparation gives 
assurance.”38  A 1951 article in Today’s Health creates twelve techniques, suggesting the general 
need for parents to teach appropriate behavior and to give children the ability to practice necessary 
skills prior to their first dating experience, such as entertaining, talking, and wearing dress-up 
clothes.39  This indicates not only the importance of dating to society, but also the importance of 
dating to the social lives of teenagers.
 There were many who liked and disliked this new dating system when it appeared 
around 1950.  Those who thought highly of dating had many great things to say about the effects 
it could have on a child.  A 1948 New York Times article records a study from Bowling Green 
University, which concluded that students who frequently dated had better grades, were well-
balanced, and were more capable of making effective adjustments at school and in their social 
lives.40  Later, a 1955 article from the New York Times offers the benefits of dating, quoting a 
teenage girl: “It gives us a sense of security […].  Maybe we don’t get enough love at home and 
this is one way of being sure we won’t be left out of things.”41  Others suggest that dating was a 
learning experience and that “mature love is built on childhood and adolescent experiences […]. 
The experience of being in love has the value of teaching youngsters how to handle this normal 
and desirable emotion […] [and] the characteristics desirable for a permanent relationship.”42 
Therefore, dating could be considered as an excellent opportunity for teens to not only help with 
emotional stability, but also to prepare for the future.
 Meanwhile, other articles from the New York Times tell a completely different story. 
Those against dating indicated that, if students dated, they were robbed “of the finer experiences 
of growing up—the friendship and companionships of as wide of a circle of acquaintances as 
possible.”43  Others feel that dating put too much pressure on young people.44  Dating was so 
detested that, in some Catholic high schools, it was banned altogether.  In 1947, for example, 
49
ae
gi
s 
2
0
0
5
p
a
rk
e
r
four teenagers were dismissed from Bristol High School in Connecticut for their steady dating 
habits.  A school official responded, “[W]e want the students’ mind on their school work and 
not on their boy or girl friends […].  We want to make clear that company keeping is a prepara-
tion for marriage and none of the students in this school have yet reached that stage.”45  Many 
Catholics in particular believed dating would ruin the Christian concept of marriage and that 
teenagers were not prepared to keep company with the other sex.
 From 1900 through the 1950s, one thing is certain: the practices of men and women 
courting or dating have changed dramatically.  They went from traditional courtship, which 
marked a male-dominated, non-sexual, and etiquette-heavy social system that led to marriage; 
to new woman courtship after WWI, in which women were allowed sexual identities, became 
the pursuers, and were encouraged to act naturally; to dating after WWII, in which men regained 
control as the pursuer, dates became games, and society began slowly to accept a new sexuality 
emerging in teenagers.  These changes had significant ramifications on the ways in which men 
and women interacted with one another.  In fact, it is these changes experienced during traditional 
courtship, new woman courtship, and dating which have helped explain the derivation of our 
modern sense of dating.  
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From Another Time and Place: Oral 
Testimony and the Holocaust
Zach Reat
And sometimes we were out walking in the snow and ice for weeks.  Sometimes 
we were on a train, which wasn’t the train like the first train, but this was an 
open freight train.  And, sixty, eighty, or I don’t know how many people were 
locked on that train.  And that was another time that I thought, if I ever lose 
my mind, this is where I have to lose my mind.  Because people were by then 
terribly irritable, that’s a nice way to say it.  If I put my foot on somebody, they 
were screaming.  Then somehow, somebody, put a loaf of bread on that train.  I 
don’t know where it came from.  They were fighting for the bread.  So people 
were getting to be just absolutely [Mrs. Klein delicately clears her throat] not 
like humans.  They were fighting, they were hitting each other.  They were 
biting, and it was a miserable situation.  But there was no way out.
  -From the oral testimony of Mrs. Ann Klein, survivor of the Holocaust
 This story and many others like it, come from the oral testimony of Mrs. Ann Klein. 
Mrs. Klein was born in the town of Eger, Hungary.  She was raised in a Jewish family, but 
was educated at a Catholic school for most of her teenage life.  When the Nazi’s occupied 
her town in 1944, her life changed forever.  Mrs. Klein survived her imprisonment under the 
hated regime, but images, sounds, smells—everything from that time and place—live on in her 
memory.  For fifty years Mrs. Klein did not speak about her time in the camps, but now she 
shares her memories with anyone who will listen.  As I listened to Mrs. Klein, I realized that her 
words confronted my emotions in a way no other source on the Holocaust ever had before; the 
stories seemed to find a resonance within me that no book or movie could produce.  For the first 
time, I felt that I was personally remembering the Holocaust.  
 Oral testimony is a relatively new source available to scholars of the Holocaust.  Many 
attempts to memorialize the Holocaust have come in the form of books, fictional novels, films, 
theatrical productions, memoirs, poems, and artwork.  These works of memorial all address 
different issues surrounding life under the Nazi regime in Europe during World War II.  While 
all of these memorials bring the Holocaust into the minds and lives of people today, they seem 
to leave the observer on the outside looking in.  Oral testimony, however, brings the memory 
of the Holocaust survivor directly to the observer in as much detail as the survivor is willing 
to offer.  The nature of oral testimony, specifically its unique intimacy, allows the listener to 
truly bear witness to the event of the Holocaust through the immediate recall of the survivor’s 
memories. By studying the oral testimony of Holocaust survivors, scholars and students will 
gain a fuller understanding of the Holocaust and the effects it had on its victims.  
 This paper will examine oral testimony and its value as a source on the Holocaust. 
The first section will examine some of the scholarly work that has been done on the subject of 
oral testimony and Holocaust memory, specifically the major arguments of Lawrence Langer 
and Robert Kraft.  The second section looks more in depth at the work of Lawrence Langer, 
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and includes my own analysis of Mrs. Klein’s oral testimony, for which Langer’s classifications 
of Holocaust memory offer a good organizational framework.  I will also call upon the work 
of Primo Levi and some examples from other testimonies to supplement my discussion of 
Langer’s main points.
Memory and oral testimony
The function of memory in the everyday lives of humans is central to the work of 
Robert Kraft and Lawrence Langer.  Both authors argue that memories form the foundation 
for one’s fundamental belief system, and, furthermore, that memories form the basis for one’s 
understanding and interpretation of the world on a broader scale.1  However, in the case of 
the Holocaust survivor, memories from the camps are oftentimes so grotesque or horrific that 
they seem to originate in a world set apart from the one that exists today.  Accordingly, Kraft 
explains that these memories often leave a survivor’s memory split between the self that exists 
today and the self imprisoned in the camps.  As Kraft states, “Perceived memories split the 
self and leave behind dichotomous human beings who live in the present world as tormented 
guests.”2  Langer and Kraft both explore this split consciousness, seeking to understand and 
explain how its disrupted memories manifest themselves in oral testimony.3
 In oral testimony, the witness attempts to accurately convey memories of his 
experiences in Nazi Germany to an audience which in most cases shares no common memory 
of that experience.  When the survivor is able to tell his story smoothly, the listener is rarely 
confronted with concepts or problems that cannot be understood, or at least imagined.  However, 
in most testimonies, the smooth flow of the narrative is broken by disrupted memories.  These 
disrupted memories are not easily recalled, and are often punctuated by body language or a 
change in the speaker’s tone of voice.  The survivor’s memory is disrupted when the postwar 
self cannot justify or understand the actions of the imprisoned self.  The story becomes more 
difficult for the listener to grasp as the survivor can no longer tell the story with a smooth, 
narrative flow.
 In Lawrence Langer’s book, Holocaust Testimonies: the Ruins of Memory, the author 
explains the types of disrupted memories that emerge in oral testimony.  He begins with an 
explanation of the Holocaust survivor’s memory and how it can become disrupted by the 
presence of deep memories, or memories that make the survivor feel as if they were back 
in the camps.  This concept of deep memory provides the foundation for the next four types 
of memory Langer discusses: anguished, humiliated, tainted, and unheroic.  There are many 
memories that emerge in testimony that may not fit neatly into one of Langer’s categories, but 
they offer a good starting point for understanding oral testimony.
Langer’s classifications of disrupted memory and the testimony of Mrs. Ann Klein 
 The first type of memory Langer discusses is deep memory, which “tries to recall 
the Auschwitz self as it was then.  Common memory has a dual function: it restores the self 
to its normal pre- and post camp routines but also offers detached portraits from today, of 
what it must have been like then.”4  Common memory provides the basic framework for most 
testimonies because it is much easier for the subject to tell her story in the context of today’s 
society; however, many factors can trigger deep memory, thus breaking the chronological 
flow of the narrative as the narrator is cast back into the time and place of the camps.  When 
common memory breaks away to deep memory, a “vast imaginative space”5 is created between 
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the subject and listener, one telling a story that the other cannot possibly understand.  However, 
Langer reminds the reader that “to share this dissonance with a perception built from the ruins 
of mutilation without being crippled by it ourselves is the summons we face when we embrace 
the legacy of these testimonies.”6
 Kraft defines these two categories of memory with different terms, but agrees that 
Langer’s basic principle holds true.  Deep memories become core memories and the common 
memory is referred to as the narrative memory.  According to Kraft, core memories are 
“representation[s] of the original phenomenal experience in the form of perceptual, emotional, 
and physiological experience.”7  It is these very distinct and vivid memories that eventually 
shape the narrative memory that allows the victim “to tell of the horrible events” in a manner 
that is “structured and coherent.”8  Like Langer, Kraft recognizes that, in the course of testimony, 
“the witness may be drawn into core memory, losing contact with narrative memory, immersed 
in the hypnagogic past in a state referred to as back there.”9
 In the testimony of Mrs. Klein, the presence of deep memory is not glaring - she is 
careful to maintain her composure in front of a classroom full of students.  Her narrative seems 
to be rehearsed to the point of memorization, but there are times when she can no longer go on 
telling the story with her common, or narrative, memory.  When Mrs. Klein describes her time 
at Birkenau her narrative is disrupted by deep memory:    
Now we stayed at that place for four weeks.  There was. . . There were 
barracks, and the barracks had big rooms, but the rooms were, uh, huge.  And 
I would say eighty to a hundred people easily, uh, stayed in one of those big 
halls, but there were no beds, there were no mattresses, and there was just 
really nothing there that you could lie down.  There. . . So . . . It was pretty 
horrible because if you want to put your foot. . . You were going to put your 
foot on somebody, it usually end up that you put your foot on another human 
being.   And we were at this place four weeks.10
By beginning this story with a statement of time, Mrs. Klein prepares the listener for a smooth 
telling of her experience at Birkenau.  As deep memory begins to take over the story, she 
stumbles over her thoughts, confused by the event she remembers vividly but cannot transmit 
accurately to her audience.  She realizes that the story she is telling does not find resonance in 
the detached listener’s ear—how could it?  The outside observer has no idea what it would be 
like to live under circumstances such as these.  To bring the audience back into the story, Mrs. 
Klein quickly repeats the statement of time that began the passage; perhaps she is guarding 
against losing her audience to something that they could never imagine.
 Another type of disrupted memory Langer discusses is anguished memory.  Anguished 
memory comes from a disagreement between the memories of the survivor, who has continued 
life beyond the camp, and the inmate, whose life ended after the camps were gone.  Langer calls 
upon the testimony of Jacob K. to explain the nature of anguished memory.  Jacob K. recalls, 
“I feel my head is filled with garbage: all these images, you know, and sounds, and my nostrils 
are filled with the stench of burning flesh.  And it’s. . . you can’t excise it, it’s like-like another 
skin beneath this skin and that skin is called Auschwitz, and you cannot shed it, you know.”11 
Jacob’s anguished memory cannot be reconciled with common memory; the sensations of the 
camp no longer exist, but he still carries them in his anguished memory.  This irreconcilable 
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memory creates a distinct gap between him and the rest of the world as his testimony continues: 
“I am not like you.  You have one vision of life and I have two.”12  The anguished memory 
of Jacob K., the memory which cannot be understood in the present, has become a boundary 
between his story and the imaginative capacity of his audience.  
 In the written testimony of Primo Levi, a perennial theme is the breakdown of  language 
that occurred in the camps.  In “The Canto of Ulysses,” Levi recalls a story about going to get 
soup with the pikolo of his Commando, Jean.  On the journey, Levi tries to recite a passage 
from Dante’s Inferno, and then translate the passage into French.  However, Levi finds that it is 
impossible for him to remember every passage, and many words prove difficult to translate.13 
Anguished memory surfaces as Levi is unable to fully conjure up knowledge from his pre-camp 
memory and translate it into the language of the camp.  Levi also admits that “If the Lagers had 
lasted longer a new, harsh language would have been born”14; only in this language could Jacob 
K.’s second vision of the world be understood.
 The next type of memory Langer discusses is humiliated memory, the memory of the 
unethical and immoral self.  He writes, “If anguished memory may be seen as discontent in 
search of a form, humiliated memory recalls an utter distress that shatters all molds designed 
to contain a unified and irreproachable image of the self.”15  Langer explains that humiliated 
memory is evident in testimony when the subject admits that all of the rules governing life 
before or after the Holocaust, could not exist in the camps.  Humiliated memory in testimonies 
is sometimes perceived as grotesque, and highly undesirable in the study of the Holocaust. 
Its stories display blatant opposition to all ethical and moral standards, and construct a useful 
model of the unethical and immoral world that emerged in the camps.     
 According to Levi, prisoners and perpetrators alike were forced to live in a ‘gray zone’ 
by circumstances in the camps: “This gray zone possesses an incredibly complicated internal 
structure and contains within itself enough to confuse our need to judge.”16  Within the gray 
zone of the Holocaust, the ethics and morals of society held no power over human instinct.  But 
within the framework of the unethical and immoral camps, there is no allowance for judgment. 
Therefore, it is impossible for anyone to judge the actions of the Holocaust survivors.  Many 
survivors understand and sympathize with Levi’s idea of a gray zone that exists outside of 
judgment’s jurisdiction in the post-camp world.  
 Speaking within the context of the gray zone, Mrs. Klein shares a part of her humiliated 
memory that displays the breakdown of morals and ethics in the camps.  After leaving Auschwitz, 
Mrs Klein was transported from camp to camp, one of which was Magdeburg.  She was in a 
barrack with many people who did not speak her language, and she was very hungry:
And again, I can’t remember what we ate except, one incident that I remember, 
which I have to admit that I am ashamed to say that I did it.  But right behind 
my bunk bed, some of those people had a loaf of bread.  And my companion 
said, take the bread.  [Slowly quieting] And I know they were just as hungry 
as we were, but I did take the bread, we ate the bread [Almost whispering], 
and when they came back they were furious, and pretty loud, and spoke a 
language we never understood but by then the bread was gone and we ate it. 
And I’m not apologizing for it, but it’s something that kind of made me guilty 
because they were hungry, but we were little, maybe hungrier.17
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To steal someone’s bread was to steal their nourishment and strength.  In a normal world, this 
act would be understood as a crime and the perpetrator would be judged in accordance with the 
human ideal of justice.  However, in the camps no justice is present; therefore, there can be no 
judge, or even any coherent code of laws to be broken.  Mrs. Klein understands this concept 
and does not feel the need to apologize.  She feels guilty only because those people were 
hungry, not as a direct result of her decision to take the bread.18  She knows that her humiliated 
memory of stealing bread lies outside of judgment today because it happened in another time 
and place that cannot be understood.  When the scholar of the Holocaust is able to accept the 
humiliated memory of the survivor, to embrace its horrible memories as an indispensable part 
of the Holocaust narrative, new understanding is possible.   
 Tainted memory follows very closely on the heels of humiliated memory.  Langer 
defines tainted memory as “a narrative stained by the disapproval of the witness’s own present 
moral sensibility, as well as by some of the incidents it relates.”19   In Admitting the Holocaust, 
Langer examines the memories of some survivors of the Warsaw ghetto.20  Many of the survivors 
feel like their actions in the ghetto jeopardized their legitimacy in their society after the ghetto. 
One example of testimony he offers explains this idea clearly.
 Dr. Szwajger was working at the hospital in the Warsaw ghetto when Nazis and 
collaborators came to clear everyone out.  Instead of trying to help the children to safety, or 
negotiate with the soldiers, Dr. Szwajger went around to each child and poisoned him or her with 
morphine.  This action disturbed her for the rest of her life.  As a pediatric doctor after the war, 
she often had doubts as to her own legitimacy in that profession: “I thought that I had no right to 
carry out my profession.  After all, one does not start one’s work as a doctor by leading people 
not to life but to death.”21  In this case, not only does the subject have trouble telling the story, 
but constantly struggles with her role in post-ghetto society.  The tainted memory of the survivor 
“leaves a tainted legacy and a tainted life” which cannot be healed with the passage of time.22
 Unheroic memory is the last type of memory Langer addresses in his work.  This 
memory type exposes the largest gap of understanding between the Holocaust survivor and the 
outside observer.  In the world that exists outside the Holocaust, there is a freedom of choice. 
Inside the camps this freedom was broken down along with the rest of civilization.  Unheroic 
memory surfaces when the survivor admits that the will to resist was replaced in the camp by 
the will to survive.  For many, including Mrs. Klein, resistance was never an option.  From the 
very beginning of Mrs. Klein’s testimony, unheroic memory is present.  She constantly reminds 
her audience that resistance was not an option under Nazi rule, using phrases like, “we could do 
nothing,” and “it was not possible to.”   In the camps, the breakdown of civilization, as well as 
the breakdown of the physical self, was so great that resistance was impossible.
 Primo Levi is careful to remind his readers that those who could find the strength to 
resist were very privileged.  They had access to a greater means of survival, and therefore had 
the energy and spirit to foment an effective resistance.  Levi contends that the Germans were 
able to break the spirit of everyone in the camp to the point that not a single one, not even a 
collective group, could offer a challenge to the society of total domination under which they 
lived.  Unheroic memory is present as Levi explains the accomplishment of the Nazi system: 
“To destroy a man is difficult, almost as difficult as to create one: it has not been easy, nor 
quick, but you Germans have succeeded.  Here we are, docile under your gaze; from our side 
you have nothing more to fear; no acts of violence, no words of defiance, not even a look of 
judgment.”23  
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When examining the effects of the Holocaust on the people that lived through it, there 
is no source better than oral testimony.  The memories of survivors paint a vivid picture of what 
actually happened in the camps, but that vivid picture is not always clear at first glance.  The 
context of the memory lies in a time and place which is foreign to the standards, laws, and moral 
codes of today’s society.  Therefore, the survivor’s memory becomes disrupted as they recall 
memories that seem to have no place in today’s world.  It is the task of the devoted listener 
to embrace these disruptions and seek out what lies underneath the broken speech and fuzzy 
chronology of the memories.  To take this extra step towards understanding may be painful, but 
working with an event like the Holocaust is never easy. 
Notes
1See Robert N. Kraft. Memory Perceived: Recalling the Holocaust. Westport, CT: Praeger, 
2002. Chapter 1, “Revealing Memories.”  In this chapter, Kraft discusses the effects of specific 
memories, especially traumatic memories, and their influence on life after the event.  He argues 
that “Holocaust testimony tells us that the most pervasive characteristic of memory for atrocity 
is its extraordinary persistence.” (1)  Kraft continues to explain that memories of the Holocaust 
continue to influence the lives of survivors for an indefinite period of time.  
2Ibid., 184.
3Kraft and Langer both conducted their research at the Fortunoff Video Archives for Holocaust 
Testimonies at Yale University.  This archive offers a unique opportunity for survivors to 
voluntarily offer their testimony, and to have it videotaped for future viewing by audiences 
specified by the survivor.  Most of the tapes are open for public viewing.  
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University Press,  1991, 6.
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14Primo Levi. Survival in Auschwitz. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1996. 123.
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Vintage International, Vintage Books, 1989, 42.
16Ann Klein. Presentation at Otterbein College, History 410-The Holocaust in the Twentieth 
Century. 11/11/2004.
17Langer explains that humiliated memories are often so painful that the survivor does not 
even wish to try and reconcile the memory with today’s world: “But it is clear from the 
struggle of many witnesses, from their expressions as well as their words, that they inhabit two 
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worlds simultaneously: the one of ‘choiceless choice’ then; the other of moral evaluation now. 
Harmony and integration are not only impossible-they are not even desirable.”  Langer, 83. 
While Mrs. Klein admits she did feel guilty, she never offers an apology for her actions.  The 
listener must accept that this humiliated memory will not, and cannot, be reconciled with our 
common memory.  
18Holocaust Testimonies, 122.
19Lawrence L. Langer. Admitting the Holocaust: Collected Essays. New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 1995.
20Ibid., 38.  Also see the testimony of Dr. Szwajger, 37.
21Admitting the Holocaust, 38.
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Late Nineteenth-Century Women’s 
Clubs: An Education for Evolving Citizens
Jennifer Roberts
Developing alongside the nineteenth century American women’s rights movement, 
women’s clubs provided an important outlet through which middle-class women could challenge 
traditional feminine ideals and move beyond the home into the community.  Popular magazines of 
the time, such as The Ladies Home Journal and Forum, provided a wealth of information on the 
inner workings of women’s clubs as well as underscored their accomplishments and widespread 
growth.  The evolution of these clubs brought women into the civic arena.  In the beginning 
years, their foci were social enjoyment, management of house and home, motherhood, and the 
fostering of intellectual stimulation through literature.  Later, the foci shifted to include com-
munity, social and educational reform, industry, and politics.  Club life gave women experience 
in running organizations and attending to business affairs through electing officers, organizing 
philanthropic endeavors, and handling money.  Club life also offered women experience with 
public relations and gave them both a voice in and an influence over the development of reform 
laws; clearly, club life opened them up to the prospect of mastering the future of their sex.  In 
short, women’s clubs of the late nineteenth century helped prepare American women to be re-
sponsible, voting citizens of the twentieth century.
Before the era of the women’s club, women had almost no political rights and led 
virtually none of the organizations fighting for such rights.  Jane “Jennie June” Croly—author 
and pioneer of women’s suffrage clubs—argued that women’s suffrage, temperance, and anti-
slavery campaigns were led by men up until the 1850’s.  She goes on to say, in an article for the 
nineteenth-century ladies’ magazine Frank Leslie’s Popular Monthly, that “up to the [eighteen-
] sixties […] there were no secular organizations of women.  They had no rights to property, 
not even their earnings; nor in their own children.  There were no women’s colleges, and few 
schools of the collegiate class where women could receive more than a ‘seminary’ education.”1 
However, by 1869, just as Croly was forming the first women’s club in New York, the govern-
ments of Wyoming, Minnesota, and the District of Columbia were beginning to allow married 
women the rights to property and earnings,2 opening doors for women to advance in all arenas 
of public life.
To understand how club life helped women become activists and leaders in the latter part 
of the nineteenth century, it is necessary to observe how clubs developed from social gatherings 
to entities of social reform and philanthropy.  Early on, women’s clubs were simply groups of 
women who gathered for intellectual and moral stimuli centered around literature—precursors 
to Oprah’s Book Club, if you will.  The club was a place that “addressed itself to the woman 
in the home” and was not a place of “women leaders and agitators.”3  The early agenda of the 
women’s club was to provide a place where women could exercise their intellect and strengthen 
their moral bonds in a socially stimulating environment4; thus, clubs were a great way for the 
educated woman to stretch her mind. 
Largely isolated within the home, women found clubs a welcome retreat.  Even though 
women had access to some education, this training was not as effective in making them into 
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productive citizens as higher education was for men.  A man was able to use his education outside 
the home on a daily basis: “[h]is life broadens, becomes alert; he is full of plans and ambitions.” 
Conversely, a woman, since she was unable to use her education outside the home, withered: 
“[s]he grows petty, occupied with trifles, warped, censorious.”5  The educational differences 
between the sexes, coupled with the disparity between men’s lives of business and women’s 
lives within the home, influenced the interpretations of club life: dealing daily in the business 
world, men gathered in clubs for leisure, whereas women grew anxious to participate in the 
world outside their own windows.
 Women embraced the term “club” and redefined its meaning.  Instead of clubs being 
a place of diversion and leisure, they became an “educational and intellectually progressive 
movement.”6  Their mission and definition held a higher significance: a club was an effort to 
bring women of all social degrees together in support of each other to “break down walls of 
prejudice” and to make a difference.7  Women balked at coming together simply for “recreation 
[or] to eat and drink and chat unless they had a higher use.”8  This was in keeping with their ideals 
of womanhood.  Alice Hyneman Rhine’s article, “The Work of Women’s Clubs,” published in 
the December 1891 issue of Forum, contends that it was the natural differences between the 
sexes and women’s inclinations to be helpful that explained the definition of a women’s club.9 
Club life welcomed breaking down social classes and was open to both “women pos-
sessed of culture, and women hungering for it,” from women of high society to teachers.  Girls 
emerging into womanhood gathered among the mature in a shared interest for promoting the 
“social, intellectual and moral advancement of humanity.”10  Not surprisingly, early women’s clubs 
soon grew into more than social gatherings.  Having included women from nearly all walks of 
life, they now decided to expand their usefulness.  In an 1898 article for the Ladies Home Journal 
titled “Twentieth Century Village,” author Natalie Blanchman insightfully states, “[w]omen are 
never happy very long to be doing for themselves alone.”  Women understood they could flex 
their intellectual muscles beyond the home for the direct benefit of the community.11 
Women had always considered themselves to be the moral center of the family; thus, 
the transition into embracing the community was a natural one.  Women began to see the com-
munity as a larger extension of their homes and, as a result, threw their energies into community 
reform on all levels.  For example, among the various betterment projects that the Peoria Women’s 
Club of Illinois tackled within their community were the systemization of street cleaning and 
the improvement of sanitary conditions.12  Other clubs added sidewalks and planted shade trees. 
They also improved parks, drove public wells, and brought electricity to gas streetlamps.13  
As club events began to include philanthropic activity, women occasionally welcomed 
men into their organizations; not having much financial experience in or out of the home, women 
were expected to allow men to handle the business end of their affairs.  The June 1896 publica-
tion of The Galaxy points out that women “can hardly make the purchases necessary for their 
own households, and would be afraid to undertake anything in the shape of business on their 
own responsibility.”14  Most women understood that, in order to learn how to manage their own 
money and gain more independence, they should exclude men.  Women realized that a women’s 
club could offer the preparation for handling their own business affairs. As The Galaxy article 
reveals, a women’s club “enlarges ideas, teaches system and order in the transaction of business.”15  
Women’s clubs were valuable tools through which its members could learn new skills. 
Some women balked at having male members at all, saying that, until equality was 
reached, men and women could not come together in the club environment for fear that “men 
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would naturally assume the office of teacher, director, and lawgiver, which they have held so 
long.”16  Women feared they would never learn finance and business if the men were around; 
another role for men needed to be found.  Writing for Arthur’s Home Magazine, Anne Wharton 
produced a solution when she declared that men would be welcome in the club on “gala days,” 
as they might be “useful and sometimes ornamental in a picturesque boating or tennis cos-
tume.”17  Although some women’s clubs kept male members, others began to tackle economics 
and business on their own, creating another step toward equality and, in the process, shutting 
their doors to men. 
Established in 1877, the Women’s Educational and Industrial Union of Boston exempli-
fied the progress and fierce determination with which the club movement advanced in areas of 
finance and business.  Incorporated in 1880, this club featured a lavish, three-story clubhouse 
that represented its successful endeavors in finance and education.  Women took classes in 
housekeeping and prepared luncheons for the officer meetings held on the second floor.  There 
were reading rooms that encouraged employers and employees to come together for joint learn-
ing, as well as lodgings to rent, and the cooking department “did an outside trade to the extent 
of 11,000 dollars.”18  
The Boston Club was not alone in reaching financial success, however.  The Old and 
New Club of Massachusetts aimed for individual progress through education in economics.  To 
aid individual improvement, each member took turns running the business affairs of the club.19 
Not only were women resourceful with money—the Ladies Literary Club saved dues for eigh-
teen years to build their clubhouse—but they also became business-savvy.  Women were active 
in incorporating into stock companies to finance their meetinghouses.  One fine example of 
this business strategy was the Women’s Club of Wisconsin, which built their lovely house, the 
Athenaeum, from stock profits.20
Though women were branching out into new, unchartered territory and showing excep-
tional skill in challenging the gender status quo, they were not willing to relinquish traditional 
feminine ideals.  Indeed, they justified the balance between home and community by identifying 
themselves as “city” mothers; it was their duty as women to “mother” the community, the state, 
and the nation, therefore substantiating the need to expand their responsibilities from home to 
country.21  Likewise, they emphasized the importance of promoting their moral standards to be 
“[i]nterpreters between the gods and men,” and believed that broadening their intellect would not 
interfere with their “natural” position.22  Many clubs even kept domestic activities a large part of 
their mission to make sure women would not neglect home life.  Mrs. Henrotin, President of the 
State Federation of Women’s Clubs, put it best when she said that the Federation “represents the 
sum and soul of all causes, Home and Society.”  She went on to reiterate that homes were in no 
danger of being neglected, pointing to the subject matter discussed within the clubs: nutrition, 
home economics, sanitation, and household expenses.23 
The opportunities that club life offered women—the opportunities to use and develop 
their education, to widen their scope of usefulness and, ultimately, to obtain equal footing with 
men in suffrage, industry, and education—appealed to them.  Soon, women’s clubs began to 
experience rapid expansion.  By May of 1889, it was obvious that there was a need for clubs 
to organize on a national level and band together for support.  As the first established women’s 
club—the New York Sorosis Club—approached its twenty-first birthday, founder Jane Croly 
invited clubs from around the nation to gather in celebration.  The purpose of the coalition was 
to weave a network of women together to share accomplishments and assist each other in achiev-
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ing successes on both local and national levels.  As a result, the General Federation of Women’s 
Clubs (GFWC) was born.  Within three days of the first meeting, a committee was formed to 
draft a constitution and elect officers; the goal was to have a full-fledged organization by the fol-
lowing year.24  Undeniably, growth in this club federation was rapid.  Within the first four years, 
the number of clubs went from less than one hundred to five hundred, each with memberships 
numbering anywhere from twenty-five to five hundred. 
Yet, the popular biennial meetings of the GFWC presented a problem to many club 
members.  On one hand, it was difficult for some members to find the time and money to travel 
the long distances to the conferences; on the other hand, the overwhelming number of delegates 
who attended the meetings increased beyond building capacities.  By 1900, the problem of finding 
large enough buildings to house thousands of club members during GFWC conventions forced 
reorganization: the development of the State Federations of Women’s Clubs helped resolve these 
difficulties by holding annual meetings for local clubs within each state.25
The development of state federations also allowed for stronger focus on club-specific 
topics based on geographic locations.  It was decided that states would send delegates to the 
GFWC and each local club would “find its representation through the State.”26  Like their larger 
sisters, membership in state federations grew swiftly.  In 1894 only four states had organized 
under the State Federation of Women’s Clubs, but in four short years that number had grown 
to thirty.  For example, the New York State Federation had 228 clubs federated, with its total 
membership at thirty thousand.27 
It was clear that women understood the workings of organizing a vast body of citizens, 
as they quite purposefully adopted the local, state and national government structure after which 
to model their clubs.  As explained by Mary C. Francis in an article for a December 1895 issue 
of Godey’s Magazine, “The club woman holds her relation to the club; the club is a member of 
the State Federation, and the State Federation is an […] affiliated branch of the General Federa-
tion of Women’s Clubs.”28  This system would assist them in focusing on the individual needs 
of each club, which were quite broad and varied.
Women designed their local club missions to fit the specific needs of their particular 
environment, even as they benefited from the larger focus of the GFWC as well.  Club needs 
varied depending on their geographic locations, and state federations made it easier to address 
specific concerns.  Clubs in the East and Midwest, having seen some women in the workforce 
and being surrounded by industry, were more likely to focus on the workforce environment. 
They discussed ways to enhance and establish industrial reform, child labor laws, tenement 
housing, and higher education.  A club in Wilmington, Delaware, established an industrial 
school for girls, and Clubs in Chicago focused on sweatshop abuses, the problems of wage 
earners, and social issues.29  
Some women were leading the public outcry in matters of reform.30  One of the most 
progressive cities in the matter of women’s clubs was Philadelphia.  An outcropping of that 
city’s New Century Club was the founding of the Legal Protection Society.  The purposes of this 
association were to counsel women and intervene in disputes with employers over the rightful 
claim of wages—in short, it was a watchdog for women workers’ rights.31  Using their literary 
skills, club women took to writing essays and reports on various community projects that needed 
attention, and soon these reporters moved on to tenement and child labor reform, women in the 
workforce, and workforce conditions.  Clare De Graffenried wrote a lengthy article in Forum 
describing the need for proper housing for wage earners and citing the deplorable conditions 
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of tenement housing.  She cleverly linked the problem to nationwide concerns about health 
and commercial productivity, writing, “If the mass of the people must live in a way which 
interferes with physical strength and soundness, the productivity and commercial value of labor 
are lessened.”32  She also talked about the high cost of maintaining hospitals and institutions 
that housed victims of illness, and she made a successful argument that the “health of a nation 
is its wealth.”33
Unlike their northern neighbors, southern women tended to be more conservative and, 
at times, viewed clubs linked with political activism as unwomanly.34  Since they sometimes 
cringed at the term “club” and thought that progressive movements were affronts to their 
femininity, they focused mainly on educational and philanthropic efforts in art, music, and 
literature.  The Kentucky State Federation, for instance, cited an increase in membership when 
they focused on literary work, mainly along the lines of the creation of libraries.35  There 
were exceptions to the southern antagonistic view of reform clubs, however: the New Orleans 
Woman’s Club, for example, added industrial training to its mission.36  Similar to southern 
groups, the western clubs were also rarely philanthropic and focused mainly on social and 
literary education.37  Yet, women in the West and in other isolated areas of the country heralded 
the women’s club as a “bright spot in an otherwise monotonous and toilsome existence.”38 
One of the greatest improvements brought about by the western women’s club 
movement was the establishment of traveling libraries and art galleries—institutions that 
women’s clubs were vital in creating, supporting, and expanding.  Traveling libraries, 
permanent “free libraries,” and galleries brought literary education and culture to women in 
the West.  Women were crucial in opening and maintaining these institutions.  Emily Tolman 
from Lippincott’s Monthly Magazine reported, “In Minnesota it is stated that of the sixteen 
towns having public libraries, fourteen were started and controlled by women.”39  Along with 
traveling libraries, art galleries were soon on the move, providing more intellectual motivation 
for women in remote areas.  These touring galleries operated much like lending libraries in that 
a painting was loaned out for a varying length of time and returned in exchange for another. 
The value of the circulating pictures was incalculable.
Although women’s clubs differed according to geographic needs, they were consistently 
unified on the issue of education.  Since clubs had been designed to stimulate intellect, their 
focus naturally moved to educational institutions.  In addition to introducing “pictures of high 
order” into schoolrooms, women were key in establishing kindergartens and placing women 
on school boards.40  They created post-graduate courses and college extension centers.  The 
Women’s Legal Education Society, which “endorsed a chair for law lectures to women in the 
University of New York,”41 was another product of the active women’s club in the area of 
education.
 By the time women got the right to vote in 1920, they had already influenced many 
major reform movements across the nation.  Women in New Hampshire diligently worked toward 
the protection of children.  Washington women helped raise the age of consent to sixteen.  In the 
District of Columbia, women took it upon themselves to investigate rules regarding property 
rights, composed a bill that recommended changes, and saw it signed into law.  Missouri women 
worked toward health issues by securing the inspection of milk.  Illinois clubs formed schools 
for the jailed and provided suitable housing for “criminal and destitute boys.”  The Midwest saw 
Chicago clubs join forces to tackle issues specific to their communities, including everything 
from street improvements to marketplace renovation.  They established training schools for 
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women and provided scholarships for both American and European women’s colleges.  In the 
area of reform, they worked on improving housing conditions for women in the workplace and 
raised money to provide legal assistance.42
 In 1897, Emily Tolman summed up the women’s club movement with great foresight: 
“Women have just begun to learn to increase their power by organization.”43 Women had gone 
from being isolated homemakers to proto-citizens who were experienced in parliamentary 
procedure, politics, social reform, and the management of financial and business affairs. 
Tolman’s statement was profound.  Over the next twenty to thirty years, women continued to 
organize to win suffrage, to acquire civic and labor reform, and to gain and protect their legal 
and political rights, thus evolving into a powerful force in our nation’s development. 
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Women’s Agency as Represented in 
Various Works of Medieval Literature
Amber Robertson
Representations of women can be considered lacking in medieval literature, as female 
characters are often overshadowed by the male characters.  Women’s agency, however, is estab-
lished through authorial power.  Medieval poets and writers had the opportunity to mold female 
characters in a fashion that challenged the popular cultural opinion, depending on the position 
they took.  By evaluating the popular cultural view of this specific time period and exploring the 
different approaches taken, this paper will show that both Chrétien de Troyes and Marie de France 
constructed their individual works around their perspectives on medieval culture and society.  It 
is my opinion that the use of the personal female voice in the Lais of Marie de France creates a 
better representation of female agency, while Chrétien de Troyes’ female characterization merely 
reflects the popular cultural view of women in Medieval society.
 In her work, Medieval Women, Eileen Power states, “The expressed opinion of any 
age depends on the persons and classes who happen to articulate it; and for this reason alone it 
often represents the view of a small but vocal minority” (9).  The Medieval culture was a society 
deeply rooted in the feudal system, meaning the personal opinion that became popular belief 
hailed from the top of the social ladder—the Church and the aristocracy.  In all matters concerning 
the female sex, it is ironic that the expert authority stems from the two branches of society least 
acclimated with it.  The clergy, most having taken the vow of celibacy, knew little of women, 
and the aristocrats filed them away as “ornamental assets” that fell some distance behind the 
priority of land ownership (Power 9).  With such ideals in mind, the view was established and 
accepted: women were inferior to men.  
 The feudal system alone cannot be credited with the ideas of male superiority and female 
inferiority:  
The Middle Ages inherited from Greek culture, especially from Platonic phi-
losophy, a deep distrust of mortal flesh, especially in contrast with the immortal 
soul.  The corruptible body seemed to exemplify moral corruption, but the soul, 
sharing in God’s eternal existence, participated in divinity.  Since women’s 
primary function in classical and medieval societies was motherhood (men, 
although fathers, were not limited to that role), they were identified with the 
bodily functions of conception and birth, and with the body generally.  Viewed 
as more fleshy than men, women stood for all that the modern word “carnal” 
suggests:  unlawful sexuality, sin, and death.  (Potkay 5)
Though Greek philosophy helped build the foundation of the medieval male superior-
ity complex, the Church went back even farther to the root of this view: Eve.  Eve was created 
secondly, with the intended role as helpmate to her male partner, Adam.  She was made from 
his own rib, making her a part of him.  Therefore, “Eve was created in the image of man, not 
God,” making her inferior to man’s dominant being (Potkay 86).  The Christian-dominated 
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society found no problem in accepting the concept that was embedded in their scriptures and 
upheld by their clergy.  
 Eve, however, was not the only female figure set in comparison with medieval women. 
Contradicting their view on female inferiority, the ruling classes elevated the feminine status 
by drawing connections between “the Virgin in heaven and the lady on earth” (Power 10).  This 
association of the medieval lady and the Virgin Mary was advocated by the important presence 
of chivalry in the male society.  To be brave, honorable, and courteous, chivalry was the example 
the gentlemanly knight, the male counterpart of the medieval lady, set for his society: “In chivalry 
the romantic worship of a woman is as necessary a quality of the perfect knight as the worship 
of God.  The devotion of the Virgin Mary was often indistinguishable in form from that which 
the knight lavished upon the mortal lady” (Power 20).  Only from this chivalrous point of view 
was a woman placed in a position of superiority.  
 It is also imperative to note that this elevated status depended not only on the stance 
of chivalry, but also on the role of the superior female: she must be a lady.  The part of the 
dominant sex could not be placed on a young girl, a working maid, or even a wealthy widow; it 
was a privilege set aside for a fairer, finer femme—a maiden lady.  The maiden lady, one who 
possessed all the characteristics attributed to the Holy Virgin: “chastity, purity, delicacy and 
beauty of body, modesty, humility and openness of manner, freshness, incorruption” (Phillips 7). 
These were the qualities valued by society, which, compiled into one being, created an object of 
affection worthy of praise: the lady.  Power affirms, “In the ideal of chivalry she was the adored, 
the source of all romance and the object of all worship, who had but to command and she was 
obeyed, and for whom all deeds of valor were performed” (35).
 It is from this popular view that the majority of medieval literature is constructed.  Here, 
fictional females are seen as descendants from Eve and Mary.  They are the sinner and the Virgin. 
They are the permanently inferior who get to hold a dominant card every now and then.  They 
are characteristics molded together to be fashioned at the author’s will.
Many of Chrétien de Troyes’ literary works reflect the poet’s preference for characters and 
themes that identify with the popular cultural view of women, meaning that they were most likely 
written for a primarily male audience (Ferrante, To the Glory 120).  Maintaining the idea that Eve 
is a part of Adam, that woman without man is incomplete, de Troyes keeps two of his mainstream 
female characters, Enide and Laudine, nameless until they both take husbands (Gold 31).  Not until 
each marries the respective hero of her own romance do these women have identities.  
Many authors identify with the female characters they create, endowing certain charac-
ters with qualities and concerns they themselves possess.  In de Troyes’ tale of “Erec and Enide,” 
the female character, Enide, is known for voicing her husband’s faults:
Sir, since you press me so, I shall tell you the truth.  I shall not keep the 
matter hidden longer.  But I fear you will be upset.  Throughout this land, 
everyone—the fair, the dark, and the ruddy—is saying it is a great pity that 
you have set aside your arms.  Your reputation has suffered from it.  Last year 
all were accustomed to say that no finer or braver knight was known in the 
entire world.  Nowhere was there anyone to equal you.  Now all, young and 
old, highborn and low, make fun of you.  They all call you lost to honor […]. 
And what pains me even more is the fact that they blame me for this.  (de 
Troyes, “Erec and Enide” 33)
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Though she speaks the truth in order to help her husband, he punishes her for speaking out and 
recognizing one of his flaws.  This points to the poet’s effort in challenging his culture, “calling 
attention to the faults in the chivalric world” (Ferrante, To the Glory 118).  But the faults he sees 
in the chivalric world do not shed a favorable light on the female figure.  
The main theme in both of de Troyes’ works, “Erec and Enide” and “The Knight with 
the Lion,” for example, revolves around the conflict of a knight’s loyalty to his lady’s love and 
“the male warrior ethic.”  It is between “the call to love and the call to adventure” (Gold 22). 
In de Troyes’ poems, women are “romantic objects,” a goal to be obtained by men.  They are 
vital components of the story, but not as participants; rather, they are vital only as accessory 
characters (Gold 28).  De Troyes’ conflict between love and prowess directly affects the position 
his female characters take in the story:  
The primary female character cannot help the hero resolve his conflict between 
love and adventure because she, identified with love, is herself part of the 
problem.  Thus a woman also cannot be at the center of romance; the central 
experience of the romance is a conflict between personal and social concerns 
in which love for a woman is part of the personal aspect of the inner develop-
ment of the man.  (Gold 37)
Both Erec and Yvain’s knighthoods are questioned after they are married.  Once Enide calls at-
tention to the fact that people are talking about Erec and his deep, infatuated love for his wife, 
Erec immediately sets out to prove his prowess.  Gawain is the one responsible for Yvain’s 
dilemma.  He tells Yvain that he will lose his honor and respect as a knight if he remains with 
his wife, forsaking the life of jousting and tournaments.  In both situations, the women are seen 
as helpless, unable to fix the problem and associated with its cause.  
 The theme of female helplessness and weakness is carried on throughout “The Knight 
with the Lion.”  Once Yvain kills Laudine’s husband at the spring, she immediately has to find 
a new husband.  Her gender is the lone restriction that prevents her from mourning longer than 
a day.  As a woman, she is incapable of protecting the spring and defending her land.  Even her 
councilmen recommend that she find a suitable candidate for marriage right away:  
When my lady married nearly six years ago, she did so on your advice.  Now 
she is sad: her lord is dead.  The man who held all this country and adorned it 
so well has now but a plot of earth.  Such a shame that his life was so short. 
A woman is incapable of carrying a shield or striking with a lance.  If our 
lady could marry a fine lord, she would improve and strengthen her position. 
Never was there greater a need than now.  Do you all advise her to take a lord 
before the tradition ends that has been observed in this town for more than 
sixty years?  (Troyes, “The Knight” 282)
Helpless women continue to be a priority in de Troyes’ world as Yvain continues on his journey.  After 
breaking his promise to return to Laudine, Yvain goes mad and realizes that he must win back his honor. 
He therefore dedicates the rest of his knightly deeds to rescuing damsels in distress (Gold 24).
 De Troyes does, however, give one of his female characters a subtle hint of power in her 
voice.  Many medieval authors harness cleverness, wit, or sometimes even magic to give their female 
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characters a sense of power over male characters.  This can be seen in “Erec and Enide,” when 
Erec and Enide venture into the Joy of the Court.  There, they encounter a lady (who turns out to 
be Enide’s cousin) and her knight, whom she has trapped in the garden by a “hidden promise”:  
She extracts the promise of a favor from him in the first bloom of their love 
when he is willing to promise anything.  She only later reveals that he has 
promised never to leave her until he has been conquered by another knight in 
battle, which traps him in a very uncomfortable situation: he can only escape 
by the loss of his life or his honor as a knight, yet by staying, by defeating 
and killing all his opponents for no real purpose, he is denying, indeed sub-
verting, one of the basic tenets of knighthood—to serve society.  (Ferrante, 
Public Postures 216)
Through this “hidden promise,” the lady of the Joy of the Court holds a position of power over 
her knight.  It is one of the few opportunities in which de Troyes presents female authority.  
 Women writers in the Middle Ages, on the other hand, focused on the achievements 
of female characters more often than male authors.  Women writers wanted to make a point 
that would influence their female listeners through a story that was still entertaining to a male-
dominated audience (Ferrante, To the Glory 176).  Though many of the known women writers 
had male patrons—Marie de France even dedicated her Lais to “a noble king”—the underlying 
theme consisted of female characters with more prominent roles (Ferrante, To the Glory 176).
 In order to establish a strong voice while maintaining a subordinate position in a male-
dominant society, women writers often “adopted a posture of helplessness and ignorance when 
speaking of themselves” (Ferrante, Public Postures 213).  Potkay discusses one such way of 
adopting this posture, stating “Humility topos [is] a conventional literary vehicle for self-abase-
ment” (Minding the Body 54).  Medieval women authors used this tool to validate their writing. 
By assuming a diminutive position and thus humbling themselves, they eliminated any opportunity 
to be classified as “presumptuous” women (Potkay 55).  Accepted in society under the assumed 
distinction of an inferior woman, these authors were able to make subtle textual maneuvers that 
influenced their culture (Ferrante, Public Postures 213).  Using the humility topos was another 
way in which medieval authors could identify with their fictional females.  Much like their ro-
mance characters, who often manipulated situations with secretive and sometimes even deceptive 
maneuvers, “these writers exercised powerful influence from positions of apparent weakness” 
(Ferrante, Public Postures 227).
Marie de France, however, does not utilize the humility topos.  She does not belittle 
herself or her authorial power, but rather “asserts herself and her abilities, proclaiming her gifts 
and her duty to use them for the instruction of others” (Ferrante, Public Postures 222).  In the 
“Prologue” to the Lais, de France even insists that it is God’s intention for her to use her ability 
to tell her tales: “Whoever has received knowledge/ and eloquence in speech from God/ should 
not be silent or secretive/ but demonstrate it willingly” (de France, “Prologue” 1-4).  By ac-
knowledging the fact that her talents are issued by God, Marie adds a valuable “divine sanction” 
to what limited womanly power she possesses (Potkay 29).  To further emphasize her authorial 
power, she closes her prologue, not with humble gratitude or belittlement, but with the simple 
statement, “Do not think me presumptuous/ if I dare present them to you./ Now hear how they 
begin” (de France, “Prologue” 54-56).
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Marie de France did not overtly seek fame or praise with the writing of the Lais; rather, 
she sought a sense of value and worth as a woman writer in her society.  She wanted her voice 
to be recognized as “a female author within a culture in which women’s voices too often go 
unheard” (Potkay 83).  Throughout the Lais, de France refers to herself as “the rememberer,” 
making known that these Breton stories have a history, but also establishing her position of 
authorship (Potkay 81).  In transcribing these oral tales, she is ensured that she, a female voice, 
will be the one credited for their longevity (Potkay 83).  Also, by choosing to relate stories that 
have no existing written form, she is enhancing her authorial power to shape and mold characters 
and themes to her preference (Ferrante, To the Glory 195).  
By writing with a female voice, de France “offers her audience the opportunity to 
imagine a woman’s experience of the quest and to explore gender inequities of her culture from 
not only a male but also a female perspective” (Potkay 87).  She does not abuse this power by 
developing stories solely about women, but rather writes her Lais in a fashion that are attractive 
to both men and women.  The women Marie de France characterizes “are articulate and active 
figures who accomplish something the audience, male and female, can admire” (Ferrante, To the 
Glory 176).  She includes characters and themes that are more compatible with her prospective 
readers.  With the exception of several supernatural elements, the Lais revolves around ordinary 
life with ordinary people and ordinary problems, “unhappy marriages, possessive parents, inad-
equate reward for service, frustrated desires, the limitations of people and of society” (Ferrante, 
To the Glory 197).  In the Lais, “Yonec,” the heroine, lady fair, was secluded in a tower by her 
jealous husband.  In “Les Deus Amanz,” an incestual father finds “consolation” in his daughter, 
guarding her potential marriage with the request of an impossible task (de France, “Les Deus 
Amanz” 23).   Although she maintains a good balance of good and evil as well as of men and 
women, she tends to devote more time to the problems concerning women and “their need to 
take control of their lives” (Ferrante, To the Glory 197).  
Marie de France continues to utilize some of the tactics that Chrétien de Troyes uses 
to give female characters some form of power or control.  Like the “hidden promise” used in 
“Erec and Enide,” de France allows women to wield wit, deceit, and magic in order to achieve 
the upper hand.  In the Lais, “Yonec,” the lady lover is given an enchanted ring that will make 
her husband forget all that he has discovered of her and her lover: “She left carrying the ring/ and 
returned to her country./ There with her lord/ she lived many days and years./ He never accused 
her of that deed,/ never insulted her or abused her” (de France, “Yonec” 441, 452-56).
She also creates female characters with established power that presents itself and grows 
within the text.  In the story of “Lanval,” the title character, an honorable knight, is overlooked 
in King Arthur’s court and leaves, worried for his well-being.  He is met by a noble lady who is 
“worthy and wise and beautiful” (de France, “Lanval” 72).  He is immediately taken by love of 
her and his chivalric heart elevates her to a superior status.  “If such joy might be mine/ that you 
would love me,/ there is nothing you might command,/ within my power, that I would not do,/ 
whether foolish or wise./ I shall obey your command;/ for you, I shall abandon everyone,/ I want 
never to leave you./ That is what I most desire’” (de France, “Lanval” 122-30).  The lady grants 
Lanval her love and her body and tells him that she will provide him with all that he needs, as 
long as he keeps their love a secret.  In other words, the lady assumes the position of Lanval’s 
private patron.  She supplies him with love as well as any material he might need from what is 
most definitely a position of power (Potkay 96).  
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Aside from constructing her female characters into powerful figures, she uses their at-
tributes, like beauty, to challenge the ways in which the medieval society views women.  When 
Lanval’s lady comes to Arthur’s court to attest to their relationship, Marie gives a detailed ac-
count of her appearance:  
She was dressed in this fashion: 
in a white shift
that revealed both her sides
since the lacing was along the side.
Her body was elegant, her hips slim,
her neck whiter than snow on a branch,
her eyes bright, her face white,
a beautiful mouth, a well-set nose,
dark eyebrows and an elegant forehead,
her hair curly and rather blond;
golden wire does not shine
like her hair in the light.
Her cloak, which she had wrapped around her,
was dark purple. (de France, “Lanval” 559-72)
Marie de France gives a quick overview of the lady’s body, focuses great detail in her face, and 
then mentions her regal clothing.  In this way, the author removes the emphasis from the lady’s 
body, from her sexual presence, and “offer[s] a visual feast that encourages her audience to see 
women diversely” (Potkay 98).  Also, de France redirects the audience’s focus from body to mind 
in her description of the lady’s two servants who precede her entrance at court, noting that all 
who saw them thought them more beautiful than the queen, but finally distinguishing the girls 
with age and wisdom: “Here come two maidens,/ well adorned and very beautiful/ The older 
one was courtly and wise” (de France, “Lanval” 521-22, 533).
However, in de France’s “Le Fresne” (the only story of the Lais originally named for a 
female character), the tables are turned.  Here, female characters are overtly the dominant figures, 
while the male characters take on the supporting roles.  More than that, de France focuses on the 
aspect of male weakness to show their insignificance.  The husband of the wife who first bore 
twins is pressured by the growing knowledge of his wife’s rumored affair to keep her under lock 
and key, and the influence of society ruins his happy family.  The father of Le Fresne and her twin 
was tricked into believing that he had fathered only one child; therefore, he could not interfere 
in his wife’s decision to abandon one of his daughters.  Gurun, Le Fresne’s lover, cannot marry 
the woman he truly loves because he gives in to the wishes of his vassals and allows them to 
choose a more suitable mate: “Even the archbishop agrees to disregard the rules of the Church 
concerning annulments in order to obey the dictates of true love” (Freeman 257).  
In the few examples seen here, it is obvious that the characters found in Marie de 
France’s Lais show a more thorough display of female agency.  The authorial liberties taken 
by Marie de France illustrate the fact that she was more concerned in giving a strong voice to 
the women of medieval society, while Chrétien de Troyes was more concerned with urging the 
culture to reevaluate its position on public life versus private life.
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Communism and Communal History: 
The Death and Rebirth of Vietnamese 
Peasants
Michelle Yost
Introduction
Communal land distribution in Vietnam1 pre-dates the communist reforms of the twen-
tieth century.  Before the arrival of French imperialism in the mid nineteenth century, Vietnam 
enjoyed a relatively stable system of ‘equal land’ that was communal in nature and adequately 
provided for the subsistence of its peasantry.  Taxes were low and large landholdings were not 
permitted (even among the royal family).  What happened, then, to the traditional Vietnamese 
peasant with the onslaught of French colonists?  It is the contention of this paper that the French 
methods of colonial administration—oppressive taxes, land usurpation,2 and harsh tenant 
practices—abolished the tradition of independent Vietnamese peasant farmers and instilled a 
willingness to accept communism as a viable alternative for survival.  
 To demonstrate this idea, the paper will be organized into four main sections: 1) the 
communal history of Vietnam’s peasants and the organization of land, 2) the ascendance of French 
imperialism and its methods of administration, 3) the effect of landlessness on peasants, and 4) 
the appeal of communism for these peasants.  A mix of both personal stories and statistics will 
be utilized.  Economics will be very important (a person’s wealth was often measured in how 
much rice he harvested) because it is important to note the changes in living conditions from 
pre- to post- colonial northern Vietnam. 
 There has already been some work in this field of inquiry.  Ngo Vinh Long explored 
the importance of land and land concessions in his book Before the Revolution: The Vietnamese 
Peasants Under the French (1991).  It details the impact of French policies of land expropria-
tion and taxes on the peasants.3  Nancy Wiegersma explores the plight of farmers in her book 
Vietnam: Peasant Land, Peasant Revolution (1988) with an intense study of village traditions. 
She focuses on the village community and the peasant family as the building blocks of traditional 
Vietnamese society.4   While these are important works, no one has truly attempted to connect 
the communal traditions of pre-colonial Vietnam with the resistance against French imperialism 
and the acceptance of communism in the twentieth century. 
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Part I.   A communal history
To begin to understand the importance of agriculture in Vietnam, it is imperative to 
understand the significance of rice to the Vietnamese political economy.  Rice was the staple 
of their diet; for adequate nutrition, the average person needed to consume 223 kilograms of 
milled rice annually.5  Additionally, rice was distilled into wine for use in religious ceremonies, 
the importance of which is prescribed in the traditional adage, “a man without wine is like a 
flag without wind.”6  Wealth was measured by a farmer’s rice production and taxes were paid 
in kind.  The emperor himself would symbolically dig the first furrow for rice every year at the 
beginning of the growing season.
 The very nature of rice growing and cultivation required a communal relationship among 
villagers.  Rice is labor intensive and even all the members of a family could not carry out the 
planting, transplantation and harvesting alone.  Village leaders often organized the peasants at 
important times so that everyone carried out the necessary steps, regardless of whose fields the 
peasants worked in: “At harvest-time, conditions were different and there was little margin of 
time since the harvesting had to be done when the paddy was fully ripe […].  Regular exchange 
of workers occurred between villages […].”7  Thus a tradition of mutual assistance was long-
standing among the peasants of Vietnam.
 In 1428, following the expulsion of the Chinese once again, the Le dynasty was founded. 
A census was taken and land was to be redistributed equally among the population.  These com-
munal lands were to be divided among all the males in the village over age fifteen (Article 384 
of the Le code) and redistributed every three years (Article 346).  Article 347 of the Le Code 
prohibited the formation of large farms or estates as part of the protection of public lands.  While 
there has been a long tradition of village autonomy, those local officials responsible for keeping 
records of the land distribution had to receive approval from the emperor, prescribing a very 
strong central government.  To prevent government officials from usurping public property, 
Articles 342 and 371 dictated that “land illegally usurped would be reclaimed and the value of 
the harvest confiscated.”8  In all, for the use of these lands, a peasant was taxed less than ten 
percent of the total product of his harvest.  The amount of tax also varied based upon the quality 
of a field (a farmer with a first-grade field paid twice as much as one with a third grade field) 
and crop losses due to natural disasters.  Through this code, the common lands provided income 
for every family in the village as well as a small tax revenue.  This system remained in use for 
two centuries until the fall of the Le dynasty.  There was an important development at the end 
of the eighteenth century, however, when the land that was to become known as Cochinchina 
was annexed into Vietnam’s borders from Cambodia.  This region then lacked the traditions of 
the Le dynasty and was never as heavily populated as Annam and Tonkin.  It would also be the 
first region completely ceded to the French in 1867, and so Cochinchina never developed the 
communal traditions of the north.
 The Tay-Son rebellion began around 1765, throwing Vietnam into a chaos that would 
last until the end of the century.  Led by three brothers from the village of Tay-Son, they toppled 
the ruling families of both the north and south, uniting the country under their rule.  During this 
time, large landlords arose and many people starved.  In response to these conditions, upon the 
ascendance of the new Nguyen emperor Gia-long in 1804, the Le system of land distribution, 
now known as the “personal share land system,” was resurrected.  Land was given to civil and 
military personnel in place of a salary.  An official with the highest rank could expect to receive 
fifteen parts (a part varied between locations and years) of land.  Even at the bottom of the 
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scale, the lowest ranking official would receive eight parts of land.  As for civilians, the most a 
male peasant9 could receive was six-and-a-half parts, with a peasant suffering from long illness 
receiving five and a half parts; even widows and orphans were given three parts of land. 
 However, by 1814, Gia-long began to pay some government bureaucrats a salary to 
make more land available for the peasants.  The royal court adapted this idea and expanded on 
it, paying in money as well as rice.  The trade-off for officials, though, was that they could not 
receive any profit from the cultivation of the communal lands.  Even those with royal titles had 
restrictions placed on how much land they could hold.  A member of the royal family or a duke 
could only have ten mau,10 a marquis up to eight mau, a count six mau, a baron four mau, and 
an earl three mau.  This was a significant development (especially from a western perspective 
where the possession of a vast amount of land was a prerequisite for royalty until World War I), 
as it was meant to appease the peasants and prevent rebellion.  Even the poorest peasant was still 
guaranteed several sao11 to cultivate.  The Nguyen emperors strictly enforced provisions against 
large landholders, as demonstrated in the reforms of 1839.  In one village, half of the privately 
owned land was converted to communal land, the owner, who was not compensated for the loss, 
left with only five mau.12  Any government official, no matter how high his post, was dismissed 
from his position and punished if he rented communal land for private profit. 
 There were several prescribed uses for communal lands in each village.  Salary land 
(luong dien) was used to pay soldiers.  In 1809, the Nguyen court calculated that eight sao to 
a mau were available for each soldier.  The tax assistance land (tri suu dien) was designated to 
help the poor pay their taxes.  Study land (hoc dien) paid for teachers and educational materials 
for the village.  The orphans’ and widows’ land (co nhi, qua phu dien) was used to help sup-
port the unfortunate.  The cultivation of these lands not only provided an income for necessary 
government institutions and personnel, but also served as a form of social assistance, a safety 
net for individual peasants in case of misfortune.  These lands could also be rented out to private 
citizens for a period of three years, the rent money going to the village government.  The sale 
of these lands was absolutely prohibited.
 This was the structure of land distribution among the Vietnamese before the arrival of 
the French in the mid-19th century.  Peasants were able to work and feed themselves through 
‘equal share,’ and the tight cohesion of the village provided for those who couldn’t work.  The 
planting and harvesting were performed communally to provide for the best possible crop yield. 
As will be seen, this system swiftly collapsed through land usurpation, and peasants soon found 
themselves without any land to cultivate.
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Part II.   The French colonial administration
In 1858 a fleet of fourteen French and Spanish ships carrying 3000 troops seized Dan-
ang; by 1883 the French had seized control of all of southern Vietnam and made the central and 
north portions protectorates.  Though the Nguyen dynasty still stood, it was only ceremonial after 
ceding all sovereignty to the French (see Map 1).  There followed a process of land concessions 
and usurpation that robbed over half of Vietnam’s peasants of their land and left many more on 
the edge of subsistence, ending a traditional way of life. 
Through their conquest, the French forced the Vietnamese Emperor to give up his 
right to distribute land; the first concessions to the imperialists were thus the communal public 
lands.  In the Annam, near the imperial court in Hue, there was a higher amount of communal 
lands left, amounting to over two-thirds of the total cultivated lands.  But in Cochinchina and 
Tonkin, communal lands became almost nonexistent.  The small farmers had lost their only 
means of supplementing their insufficient crops.  However, all of the lands the French claimed 
were awarded to French citizens (ranging in grants from thirty to a thousand hectares or larger) 
who then rented the land back to the Vietnamese peasants.  Some Vietnamese who cooperated 
with the French—Catholics, colonial militia, and mandarins exiled from court—were also given 
tremendous land grants. 
Map One: French Indochina
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Table One: Total Land Ceded to the French by 1930
   Tonkin   104,000 hectares
   Annam   168,400 hectares
   Cochinchina  606,500 hectares
   Total   878,900 hectares
Even after six decades of French rule, the Vietnamese were still ceding land to the French.  By 
1932 the French and their Vietnamese allies laid claim to 1,950,000 hectares, which increased 
to 2,100,000 in 1938 and in another ten years, totaled 2,300,000 hectares.13  In this way, more 
than two-fifths of the total cultivated land in Vietnam had been ceded.
 Land concessions were carried out in ways beyond the French merely claiming the 
area for free.  Usury was a tremendous problem for many Vietnamese peasants. The major-
ity of peasants worked as tenants and sharecroppers on land owned by a French (or a favored 
Vietnamese) landlord.  The rent and taxes were so high that most peasants had to borrow in 
order to cover the cost of production and for the food to sustain them while working on the rice 
paddies.14  However, if a peasant didn’t ask for a loan from the landlord, he was generally not 
well-treated.  Sometimes a landlord would file fallacious charges against a farmer (in concert 
with local officials) so that the peasant would have to take out a loan from the same landlord to 
pay off the officials in order to keep out of prison.15
 Since the peasants owned nothing to mortgage, these loans were generally short term 
and granted at exorbitant interest rates.  Pierre Gourou, a French observer, explains how the loan 
system worked:
There are two methods of granting short-term loans. According to the first, 
which is called bac gop (“money collected daily”), a loan of 10 piastres is 
reimbursed by a daily installment of 0.40 piastres over 30 days.  At the end of 
this period, the lender had gained 2 piastres, that is, disregarding calculation 
of compound interest, an interest rate of 240 percent a year.  By the second 
method, which is called vay bac ngay […] (“daily loans”), a piastre borrowed 
in the morning is paid back that same afternoon with a supplement of 0.10 
piastres: the annual interest is thus 3,650 percent.16
The long-term loans (those lasting more than a month) were just as oppressive.  In Tonkin, a loan 
averaged an interest rate of 60 to 100 percent a year.  When a peasant could not repay, as was 
often the case, the landlord immediately foreclosed on the peasant’s farm.  In Cochinchina, the 
average interest rate was 100 to 200 percent a year.  This kind of practice is what left Cochinchina 
with only three percent of its communal land in tact by 1931 (as opposed to twenty percent in 
Tonkin and twenty-five percent in Annam17).
 The taxes enacted by the French administration were oppressive.  As stated before, 
under the emperors, taxes had been less than ten percent of an individual’s income.  Under the 
French imperialists, though, the personal tax was fifty to seventy percent, leaving a peasant fam-
ily without enough to live on through the year (thus the common practice of taking out loans). 
The head tax alone was ten to twenty percent, but those who collaborated with the French were 
exempt.  These taxes were to be paid equally, whether or not the peasant owned any land.
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Alcohol became another market for the French to exploit.  Rice whisky, once produced 
in the village for religious ceremonies, came under the control of the colonial administration. 
To buy a bottle officially sanctioned by the state was 900 percent more expensive than if the 
peasant produced the wine himself.18  It was illegal for a peasant to distill his own alcohol and 
the colonial administration actually enacted a quote system, compelling each province to buy a 
certain amount of this over-priced whisky every month.  
These heavy taxes were enacted to develop an infrastructure in Vietnam that would serve 
French investors.  Between 1860 and 1935, the French constructed 15,625 miles of road and 
1,570 miles of railroad.  Dams and new irrigation also helped to open up more land for cultiva-
tion.  All of these new facilities, though, did not serve Vietnamese peasants in the least—they 
only served to transport taxes, French administrators, agricultural exports, and military personnel 
to quell the occasional peasant uprisings.  Wiegersma puts it aptly when she writes, “The main 
purpose of the French colonization of Vietnam was the economic development of the country 
in ways which would benefit French capitalists.”19  Despite having to pay for their construction 
and being forced to work cheaply through the corvee system,20 most Vietnamese peasants had to 
carry their produce to market, leaving the roads and railways of little use to them.  These taxes 
weren’t reduced to account for crop losses from floods or drought: in the past, a crop loss of 
thirty percent reduced taxes by twenty percent; under the French, taxes remained even.
 To express their displeasure with the French, many Vietnamese writers disguised their 
stories as political commentary, and taxes were a common theme.  One example of this is Mud and 
Stagnant Water written by Nguyen Tuong Long and published in September of 1938.  In chapter two, 
the protagonist stops and asks a man in the market place why he has a young boy in a basket:
 I was very surprised to hear the man’s answer: “I am selling him, young sir.”
 “Selling him?  What for?”
 “To pay my taxes.”
 Then the man smiled bitterly.  “All day long nobody has inquired. It 
has really been miserable.  Here, if you want to buy him, I’ll let you have him 
cheap.”
 Although he was surely only jesting, his face at the same time showed 
a certain hope, like that of a drowning man trying to cling to a thin piece of 
wood in the hope of escaping death […].
 From that time on, slowly, the things I heard and witnessed brought 
me to a general realization: the peasants, who never have enough food to eat 
or enough clothes to wear but who must always pay the full amount of taxes, 
will sacrifice everything in order not to be marked as a tax evader.
 One could try no harder than they to meet their responsibilities.  But 
human energy is limited.  Ideally the responsibility of the government should be 
to collect taxes only in accordance with the ability of the individual to pay […].
 Unsurprisingly, this story was immediately banned by the colonial administration, 
which had banned the publication of political essays.  Though written as a novel, its contents 
were meant to be taken seriously as a documentary-style essay.
 Heavy taxes, free land concessions, and usury of peasant lands through high-interest 
loans all served the French colonists.  The peasants weren’t noticed beyond the profit that could 
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be made through their exploitation.  The tradition of communal cultivation and communal rela-
tionships quickly came to an end.
Part III.   The impact on Vietnamese peasants
By 1930, in Tonkin and Annam, almost half the population was landless, and in Co-
hinchina, that figure was near seventy-five percent.  Land concessions and usury had robbed 
the majority of Vietnam’s peasants of their way of life.  In Tonkin in 1938, there were 968,000 
families without any land, and by 1953 that number reached over a million, so that there were 
more people without land (fifty-eight percent) than people with holdings.21  These figures may 
actually be worse, in that large landowners may have been putting their tenants’ names on parcels 
of land to hide how much wealth they actually possessed. 
Not only were a majority of the Vietnamese without land, but they were starving as 
well.  Rice had become a very profitable export for the French, accounting for nearly 70 percent 
of the total value of Vietnamese exports.
Table Two: Rice Exports from the Harbor of Saigon
   Year   Tons of Rice
   1860   57,000
   1877   320,000
   1937   1,548,000
In looking at the figures in Table Two, it is important to remember that, while the production of 
rice in Indochina increased twenty-four percent between 1900 and 1937, the population increased 
by eighty percent.  The per capita availability of rice fell from 232 kilos in 1900 to 182 kilos in 
1937.  Remember, also, that about 223 kilos of rice are necessary per person per year to maintain 
adequate health.  The members of a family of four would need at least 1.08 hectares (three mau) 
to feed themselves.  Clearly, too much rice was being shipped abroad and not enough retained 
to feed the growing population. 
 To truly understand what the peasants of Vietnam under French rule endured, it is impor-
tant not just to examine the statistics, but also to listen to their own words.  Testimonies collected 
from several individuals during the late 1960’s offer examples of life under French rule.
Phan Van Chu gave this statement when he was 61 years old, living in the village of 
Xich Dang in the Kim Dang province.  In this passage he addresses all the issues of being poor 
and landless, of heavy taxation, and of having to take out oppressively high loans, ending with 
the forfeiture of his land:
I was born in this village of a family of landless peasants […].  Under the 
feudal regime there were lots of taxes […].  When we were old enough to start 
paying taxes—eighteen—we were given a plot of land to work, down by the 
river.  But as the taxes were very high, a man was unable to hold on to his 
land and had to sell it to the rich […].  I had a plot measuring eight saos, and I 
kept it for three years, and then I had to cede it to a peasant for thirty piastres 
because of a three-year loan he had made me […].  In the old days, we had 
to do forced labour when we were eighteen.  Among other things, we were 
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obliged to put up buildings for the Residence, the mandarins and the French. 
We had to garden for them, too.22
Vu Van Cat was a sixty-year-old peasant in the hamlet of Huong Dao, in the  Phat Diem 
district.  As an older citizen, he can also recall the heavy taxes and unfair lending practices of 
landlords:
Under the French I didn’t have any land at all, except the tiny plot my hut 
stood on […].  My parents were poor and used to work for a landowner […]. 
When I was sixteen, and therefore more or less a grown-up, I became a hired 
labourer on a landowner’s estate […].  When I was a child myself, back in 
colonial times, living conditions were very hard.  Every year, I used to run 
deeper into debt with the landowner.  In those days we were all subject to the 
capitation tax.  I also had to pay a tax on my house, and other money besides. 
Some years it was hard to pay the tax, and you had to borrow.  The landowner 
used to lend money at an extortionate rate […].  The famine of 1945 caused 
a great many deaths in the village.23
 
There were additional consequences for Vietnamese peasants under this sort of 
governance: namely, the productivity of their land decreased.  The peasants didn’t have any 
resources to put back into the land, nor did they see any reason to since it would only benefit 
the landlord.  An example of these consequences is the steep decline of rice production in 
Cochinchina (see Table Three). 
Table Three: Rice Production in Kilos / Hectare by Year
  1934   1,500 k/ha
  1935   1,468 k/ha
  1936   1,468 k/ha
  1937   1,208 k/ha
  1938   1,607 k/ha
  1939   1,865 k/ha
  1940   1,353 k/ha
  1941   1,254 k/ha
  1942   1,392 k/ha
  1943   1,186 k/ha
Unfortunately, there is little data available about crop yield before the arrival of the 
French, but this overall decline over a ten-year period is enough evidence of the detrimental effects 
the French had on agricultural production.  This can also be seen in relation to other countries in 
Asia not under the influence of Colonialism.  From 1935 to 1940, in China the average yield of 
rice per acre was 2,259 pounds, and in Japan that number was 3,408 pounds per acre.  However, 
in Vietnam, there was only an average of 1,096 pounds of rice cultivated per acre.
Moneylenders also saw no purpose in exploring any industrial or commercial investment 
because rice was still the largest export of Vietnam, making usury the most profitable venture. 
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Peasants lost their land to the unbearable interest rates placed on the loans they were forced to 
take.  A moneylender thus reaped sixty to one hundred percent interest on a loan, or gained land 
that could be rented to poor sharecroppers to produce rice.
Under French administration, these peasants had nothing.  Because they were unable 
to afford the lands they had once labored on freely, there arose a tremendous landless labor 
force that the French wasted no time in further exploiting.  Although some tried to remain in the 
villages of their birth, when there was simply no work to be found, peasants were shipped off 
to French mines and plantations whose conditions were so poor they were often referred to as 
‘hell on earth.’  Because so many of them were sent so far away from their homes (ninety-eight 
percent of all rubber plantations were in Cochinchina, but most workers came from Tonkin and 
Annam), it was almost impossible to run away.  Those who did try were beaten and often killed. 
The estimated mortality rates in French mines and plantations were around thirty percent, 
though owners frequently gave lower figures so as not to alarm local Vietnamese officials.
One of the most poignant examples of this ‘hell on earth’ comes from the memoir 
of Tran Tu Binh’s The Red Earth (1984).  For three years, Tran worked on the Phu Rieng 
rubber plantation, owned by the French Michelin company (a company still in existence today). 
In 1927, Tran was one of 17,606 workers brought to the French plantations of the south. He 
describes the harsh conditions there:
The most common forms of punishment were to make the person drop his 
pants, then beat him on the buttocks, or beat his feet until the soles were in 
ribbons.  After a beating, the worker would be locked up in a dark room, legs 
shackled, and left without water for two or three days.  Some people were 
forgotten there until they died of thirst […].  Each time a tree was felled and 
came crashing down […] the workers held their breath and listened to see if 
anyone was crying out.  On some days two or three people were crushed by 
trees.  There would be at least several people with legs broken, arms pulled 
out of joint, or faces slashed as the small branches whipped by […].  When 
we were felling trees there were few weeks when no one was crushed to death 
by a tree.  As we went to work each morning we were anxious, not knowing 
whether when evening came we would still be alive to return.  The work was 
extremely arduous as well.24
All of these statistics and personal stories are revealing of the true conditions Vietnam’s 
peasants found themselves living in under the French.  They were poor, landless and starving 
with little hope of returning to the communal lives their ancestors had enjoyed.  Where once 
a community helped to bring in the rice harvest, now sharecroppers struggled to feed their 
families, giving up seventy percent of their yield to a landlord.  Having no other source of 
income to support their families, peasants were shipped to far off plantations where thousands 
died.  It was a new way of thinking—communism—which stepped in to offer relief. 
Part IV.   The appeal of communism
With no land to cultivate, oppressive taxes, and the constant threat of starvation, few 
alternatives presented themselves to the peasants of Vietnam.  Although there was resistance to 
the French among scholars in the cities, there was no one to speak for the peasants, who com-
posed ninety percent of the population.25  Ho Chi Minh, though, believed not just in liberating 
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the people of Vietnam from the French, but also in throwing off the capitalist system brought by 
the colonial conquerors and instituting communism.  Ho wrote the following in La vie Ouvrière 
on January 4, 1924, summarizing the plight of the peasant:
The Annamese in general are crushed by the blessings of French protection. 
The Annamese peasants especially are still more odiously crushed by this 
protection: as Annamese they are oppressed; as peasants they are robbed, 
plundered expropriated and ruined.  It is they who do all the hard labor, all 
the corvees.  It is they who produce for the whole horde of parasites, loungers, 
civilizers and others.  And it is they who live in poverty while their execu-
tioners live in plenty and who die of starvation when their crops fail […].  In 
former times, under the Annamese regime, lands were classified into several 
categories according to their capacity for production.  Taxes were based on 
this classification.  Under the present colonial regime, all this has changed. 
When money is wanted, the French Administration simply has the categories 
modified.  With a stroke of their magic pen, they have transformed poor land 
into fertile land, and the Annamese peasant is obliged to pay more in taxes on 
his fields than they can yield him […].
Most of these [land] concessions were founded on legalized theft.  During 
the course of the conquest, the Annamese peasants […] had abandoned their 
land to seek refuge in the still free part of the country.  When they came back, 
their lands had been given away.  Entire villages were plundered, and the na-
tives reduced to tenants of the lords of a modern feudalism, who sometimes 
appropriates as much as 90 percent of the crops.26
Ho understood that it would be Vietnam’s peasants that would throw off French imperial rule. 
Summing up Marxist-Leninism for the Vietnamese people, Ho writes, “Revolution is the work 
of the worker and peasant masses.”27  It was the right group to target, because less than half of 
Vietnam’s peasants owned land.
 In 1952, preparations were begun by the communist government for a two-tier land 
reform program: the first phase was moderate, consisting of a reduction in rent (which is purported 
to have had a positive impact on the soldiers at Dien Bien Phu28); the second was more radical, 
forming farm collectives or “co-operatives.”  By 1954, Vietnam finally succeeded in expelling 
the French, though the country was divided between north and south.  To understand how com-
munism appealed to these rural villagers requires a closer look at tradition.  Michael Adas writes, 
“The ability to maintain collective, rather than household, responsibility for revenue payments 
and corvee obligations has often been associated with strong village solidarity,”29 and, during 
the pre-colonial era, Vietnamese villages were very communal.  Social relief during hard times 
and mutual aid during cultivation helped to make these ties stronger.  By robbing the Vietnamese 
of their land, France nearly destroyed this tradition.  Under communism, and Ho Chi Minh’s 
land reforms, though, this type of village solidarity was resurrected (much like when Gia Long 
resurrected the Le system).  
 During the 1950’s, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam instituted sweeping land reforms 
to abolish rich landlords.  Without private property owners to object, new canals were built to 
improve irrigation for everyone.  Fields were made larger to use the land in an optimized fashion 
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and collective labor was once again organized.  The agricultural surplus was collected by the 
state and redistributed to those who needed it (including the new urban industrial workers).  In 
1959, forty-five percent of peasant families had joined with a cooperative, and by the following 
year, it was up to eighty-six percent. 
Table Four: The Co-operative of Hung Yen
 Year  Households Area (maus)  Rice produced (tons)
 1959 32 31 -
 1960 82 82 98,668 
 1961 332 390 572,890 
 1962 357 417 662,863 
 1963 368 426 537,778 
 1964 387 429 677,872 
 1965 420 450 709,731 
 The above data indicates that the growth of North Vietnam’s collective operations oc-
curred rapidly.  Beyond the stories they told about enduring French colonial administration, the 
Vietnamese peasants also offered many reasons as to why they supported communism and had 
joined local co-operatives.  While patriotism may have played a small role, these peasants all 
comment on how their lives changed for the better following both the departure of the French 
and participation in a local co-operative.
Phan Van Chu testifies: 
After the first nineteen households had joined the cooperative, our family 
joined too […].  What made us join?  Patriotism and enthusiasm, that’s all. 
The spread of irrigation staved off drought, and we gradually increased the 
yield.  By 1963 there was a distinct improvement, and we had 700 extra kilos 
of rice […].  Life is certainly better than it was [...].30 
Vu Huy Hoc recalls: 
I was one of the first to join the co-operative, for what I had been told made 
me feel I would be better off if I did.  Collectivization brought me many 
advantages: for instance, there are now three harvests a year, a rice harvest, a 
jute harvest and a maize harvest; you can earn a lot if you work hard […].  We 
no longer have any real worries about the future.  There is never any shortage 
of reserves when Tet draws near.31
Vu Van Cat affirms: 
With the return of peace in 1954-5, I received nearly a mau under the land 
reform programme.  I became a member of the mutual-aid labour pool: this 
was form of collective labour […].  In 1956 I bought a buffalo.  Things were 
looking up for me: for the first time in my life I owned land and a buffalo.  In 
1959 the collective farming was introduced.  I joined the cooperative.  In my 
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first year of membership I earned enough to cover my basic needs and pay 
off my debts […].  What is socialism?  If you ask me, socialism is a way of 
improving the lives of the peasants.32
 This is not to say that every peasant in North Vietnam completely understood the phi-
losophy behind communism, but they did readily accept the relief the communist land reforms 
brought.  The cadres espoused a philosophy for the poor farmers: “Living together, eating to-
gether and working together.”33  In villages, poor peasants were trained by the cadres to carry 
out the reforms, the rich landowners now gone.  As demonstrated by the cooperative of Hung 
Yen, villages began to prosper once more.
 Communism offered the peasants of North Vietnam a chance to regain the collective 
traditions of their past and improve the miserable conditions under which they had been living. 
Once again, villagers worked the fields together and supported each other in difficult times.  Ex-
ploitative ‘hired’ labor was replaced by the more traditional household and family labor.  Most 
telling about this resurrection of communal organization was the success that peasants had: from 
1955-59, there was a forty-seven percent increase in rice, potato and corn production.  While 
this grand amount, 5.8 million tons, was not to be reproduced until 1974, it may be attributed to 
the war.  For comparison, South Vietnam produced 5.3 million tons in 1959, the same as it did 
in 1939. 
Conclusion
There is still a great deal of work that can be done on this topic.  Research into peasant 
agricultural output during the nineteenth century before the arrival of the French would provide 
for a more adequate comparison of declining productivity.  Unfortunately, many records were 
lost during the wars that decimated Vietnam in the last century.  It is also important to remember 
that any statistical reports or interviews with North Vietnamese peasants may be unfairly biased 
due to political influence.  However, there is no denying the atrocities suffered by peasants under 
the French, which may be under-reported, given how plantation owners covered up the number 
of workers that died under their supervision. 
 Even communism and the land reforms of Ho Chi Minh could not completely restore 
Vietnam’s peasants to their previous traditions, but at least they were given back the land that 
had been so egregiously usurped, and a chance to survive, if not prosper.  Many did prosper, 
though, increasing their production of not just staple crops, but pigs, poultry and vegetables. 
An economic boom of house building took place in the countryside, and small kilns were con-
structed to fire the bricks that would replace the mud-huts so many peasants lived in.  As one 
North Vietnamese observer put it:
The recent changes in the appearance of the rural areas is full of promise. 
The spectacle of desolate, muddy villages with a few ancient tile palaces of 
lords interspersed with rows of obscure thatch and mud houses and clusters 
of flimsy, twisted huts exists no longer.  In its place is the spectacle of well 
lighted, attractive new brick houses belonging to the agricultural cooperative 
workers.34
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 The coming of French colonialists destroyed the peasant farmer and communal villages 
of Vietnam’s past.  High taxes, usury loans and forced land concessions robbed the peasants 
of the land they once worked.  Peasants were forced to labor on tremendous farms and planta-
tions owned by Frenchmen, sometimes very far from their homes.  But as there was already a 
communal tradition among Vietnamese peasants, Ho Chi Minh’s communist land reforms were 
more readily embraced.  There was not a return to the old ways, but new irrigation and electric 
innovations improved upon peasant production. Mutual assistance between neighbors was resur-
rected, as was the safety net for families that fell on hard times.  Most importantly, the land was 
returned to the hands of peasants.
Notes
1 It is important to distinguish that, when referring to Vietnam in this paper, it is Northern 
Vietnam that is being discussed.  Southern Vietnam and the Mekong river delta were not 
extensively populated by the Vietnamese until the 19th century, and thus lacked much of the 
cultural and economic traditions of the north.
2 Usury is defined as exorbitant interest charged, in this case a method of high interest loans 
used by rich landlords to cause peasants to forfeit their lands.
3 Ngo Vinh Long, Before the Revolution, pp. xxvi. 
4 Nancy Wiegersma, Vietnam: Peasant Land, Peasant Revolution, pp. xiii.
5 Ngo Vinh Long, Before the Revolution, pp. 123.
6 Ibid., pp. 65. Original Vietnamese: Nam vo tuu nhu ky vo phong. 
7 Nancy Wiegersma, Vietnam: Peasant Land, Peasant Revolution, pp. 63. 
8 Ibid., pp. 37.
9 This meant males ranging in age from sixteen to sixty.  Before the age of sixteen, a young 
man would live at home and help the family.  After the age of sixty, a man was too old to 
work and it was expected that his family would provide for him.
10 A mau is equal to roughly nine-tenths of an acre, or 3,600 square meters.
11 A sao is equal to one-tenth of a mau.
12 Ngo Vinh Long, Before the Revolution, pp. 10.
13 In 1940, the French official Pierre Gourou estimated there were five million hectares in 
Vietnam for cultivation of both food crops and industrial crops.
14 Ngo Vinh Long, Before the Revolution, pp. 84. 
15 Ibid., pp 84.
16 Ibid., pp. 85
17 Ibid., pp. 15.
18 Neil L. Jamieson, Understanding Vietnam, pp.63.
19 Nancy Wiegersma, Vietnam: Peasant Land, Peasant Revolution, pp. 67.
20 A system of forced labor instituted by the state.
21 Ngo Vinh Long, Before the Revolution, pp. 19
22 Gerald Chailand, The Peasants of North Vietnam, pp. 137-138
23 Ibid., pp. 236-237.
24 Tran Tu Binh, The Red Earth, pp.25.
25 Ellen Hammer, Vietnam: Yesterday and Today, pp. 121.
26 Bernard B Fall, Ho Chi Minh on Revolution, pp. 24-25.
27 Nancy Wiegersma, Vietnam: Peasant Land, Peasant Rebellion, pp. 91.
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28 Ibid., pp. 137
29 Michael Adas, State, Market and Peasant in Colonial South and Southeast Asia, pp. X 9. 
30 Gerald Chailand, The Peasants of North Vietnam, pp.138-139
31 Gerald Chairland, The Peasants of North Vietnam, pp. 140
32 Ibin, pp. 137-138. 
33 Nancy Wiegersma, Vietnam: Peasant Land, Peasant Revolution, pp. 138.
34 Wiegersma, Vietnam: Peasant Land, Peasant Revolution, pp. 152.
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Davis, Todd F. and Kenneth Womack, eds.  
Mapping the Ethical Turn: A Reader in Ethics, 
Culture, and Literary Theory. University Press of Virginia: 
Charlottesville and London, 2001. 296 pp.
Ashar Foley
Davis and Womack state in their Preface that the title, Mapping the Ethical Turn, is not 
meant to suggest that ethical criticism is anything new, in need of definition and demarcation. 
Rather, it expresses an intention to “tell a story that highlights a terrain that has always been 
there” (Davis and Womack ix).  The editors acknowledge that we may well wonder who is “do-
ing” this sort of criticism today: aside from the luminaries Northrup Frye and F.R. Leavis, most 
poststructuralist critics have eschewed looking for or taking distinct moral or ethical positions 
in their readings of literary works.  This is an understandable reaction to a century of upheaval, 
a century which saw two devastating world wars, the threat of nuclear attack, and the global 
acknowledgment of systematic genocide.  But although we were bound to momentarily lose our 
ethical and moral bearings, it is absurd to assume that we no longer appeal to or read for “the 
ethical or moral dimensions of the human condition” in the postmodern era (Davis and Womack 
ix).  We continue to decipher the significance and consequences of our actions and of events, 
and we do this most concretely with the use of narration—the attempt to verbally or literarily 
render even the most indescribable experience.  This is a characteristically human endeavor, 
traced throughout history, and so “it would be ludicrous to imagine that readers of literature 
over the past several decades somehow disengaged their ethical faculties as they encountered 
their culture’s grand narratives” (Davis and Womack x).  What is new to the twentieth century 
reader of literature is her role in the evaluation of a work’s ethical significance in tandem with 
the author’s own communication, the basic tenet of ethical criticism being that, in his work, a 
good author provides the reader with concrete life examples in relation to which she can develop 
her own moral sensibilities, thereby enriching her quality of life.  Davis and Womack assert 
that bringing this external, subjective element to a literary work necessarily elicits a variety of 
responses to a variety of literatures; in this way, ethical criticism bars “a dogmatically prescrip-
tive or doctrinaire form of reading” (x).  
As comprehensive as this approach may seem, it has met with objection from many 
critics who posit that trying to evoke ethical implications from a literary work is like squeezing 
water from the proverbial stone.  The essays in the first section, “Theory and the Ethics of Literary 
Study,” address this and other objections, as well as offer several definitions of ethical literary 
criticism.  In “A Humanist Ethics of Reading,” Daniel R. Schwarz takes up the question of the 
(inherently) ethical dimension of literature, stating that “texts demand ethical responses from their 
readers in part because saying always has an ethical dimension” (Schwarz 5).  In other words, 
a text is written because the author wants to communicate something, and this communication 
is achieved only when the text has an active, responsive reader.  Because the text requires two 
people, it can be thought of as a sort of dialogue and, as such, exists in the realm of communica-
tion among people, or the ethical realm.  Thus, the relationship between an author and a reader, 
Schwarz says, is already an ethical relationship, pointing to the importance of both participants 
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in ethical literary criticism.  Continuing this thread, Wayne C. Booth’s piece, “Why Ethical Criti-
cism Can Never Be Simple,” challenges what he calls the “author-is-dead” crowd, referring to 
subscribers of the theory that an author’s life and authorial intentions are irrelevant to the author’s 
work itself.  Booth asks, “If there is no author, how can you talk about an ethical relation with 
anything?  But if there is an author inflicting choices upon me, I have not only a right but a respon-
sibility to think about whether those choices are ethically good or bad” (Booth 22).  It is evident 
here that ethical criticism views a literary work as an author’s whetstone of specific, narrative 
example against which a reader sharpens her own judgement, imagination, and compassion.  In 
“Exactly and Responsibly: A Defense of Ethical Criticism,” Martha C. Nussbaum makes a case 
for the necessity of this dynamic singular to the reading of literature, contending that the human 
situations laid out before a reader are the essential, invigorating supplements to the “shopworn” 
terms in the dry, non-narrative prose of law, sermon, or philosophy (60).  She goes on to state 
that reading can offer us the opportunities to learn the lessons of moral behavior, thus helping to 
shape the reader into a valuable citizen (Nussbaum 65-66).  This is not to say that ethical criticism 
calls for a sermonizing, didactic literature, however.  Schwarz demonstrates quite the contrary, 
citing T. S. Eliot’s “Gerontion,” in which the speaker uses highly disparaging and stereotypical 
language to describe his Jewish landlord (6).  Although ethical criticism calls for “Gerontion”’s 
reader to take account of Eliot’s own anti-Semitism, it does not expect said reader to learn from 
Mr. Eliot or his poem that one should also be an anti-Semite, that the Jew who “squats on the 
window sill” is indeed a bad, miserly person.  Rather, Schwarz cites this piece as one literary 
example that demands reader thought and resistance.  Bloom adds to this discussion, pointing 
to the nature of the stories in the Bible.  Rather than encountering lists of commandments and 
codes, a reader of the Bible primarily engages with morally ambiguous stories: Jesus Himself, 
for example, “told scores of radically ambiguous parables that forced his listeners into moral 
thought,” and His own story, argued by some to be “The Greatest Story Ever Told,” tells “how 
the God/man at the moment of supreme moral testing is ridden with doubt and cries out, as any 
of us would have done, ‘My God, my God, why has thou forsaken me?’” (Bloom 19).  Perhaps 
the most interesting stories, then, do not offer a neatly packaged moral viewpoint like Aesop’s 
fables, but allow the reader to think her own way through morally ambiguous territories so that 
she can critically formulate her own response.  With this conclusion, Booth arrives at one of the 
central premises of ethical criticism: no matter what the literary example or the reader reaction, a 
reader’s character and intelligence are changed and presumably enriched by her read encounters 
with other worlds.  In the words of Schwarz, “Rather than being divorced from life, our reading 
experience—if we read actively and with intelligence—is central to life and contributes to the 
development of the mature personality” (5).1
The second section, “Confronting the Difficult: The Ethics of Race and Power,” fo-
cuses on the relationship between writer and audience.  Kathleen Lundeen’s piece tackles the 
question of reader sympathy, asking the question, “[T]o what extent is our literary engagement 
biologically or culturally determined?” (Lundeen 84).  In other words, do I have to be an African-
American woman to identify with Sealy in The Color Purple, and can Alice Walker reasonably 
expect empathy from a reader who is not?  The logical but absurd conclusion of such a premise 
is that “autobiography would emerge as the sole legitimate creative genre,” read only by its 
author (Lundeen 83).  But the complementary acts of reading and writing do not exist a solip-
sistic vacuum, and so one must always ask why and how an author is representing a particular 
subject, and what he wants his readers to feel.  Lundeen investigates one example in which an 
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author, Felicia Hemans, portrays an infanticide by a Native American woman in an extremely 
non-judgmental and sympathetic way.  Having researched Hemans’ own life, Lundeen relates 
that the author was left alone with five children by an errant husband.  Lundeen then concludes 
that, when we sympathize with the Native woman in the poem, we also sympathize with Hemans’ 
plight—that the Native woman is a poetic proxy for Hemans’ own desire for death, the direct 
representation of which would offend her readership.  James Phelan continues the discussion 
of authorial intentions for the direction of reader sympathy in “Sethe’s Choice: Beloved and the 
Ethics of Reading.”  Authors, he states, always run the risk of being too aggressive with their 
messages and estranging their audience.  Perhaps there is no finer line than that walked by Toni 
Morrison in Beloved, in which a desperate slave woman’s brutal murder of her baby evokes both 
“horror and sympathy” from the reader—but not, Phelan points out, outright condemnation (106). 
Phelan examines how Morrison’s narrative techniques and authorial distance make this reaction 
possible, concluding that her portrayal of Sethe’s dilemma compels the reader to “imaginatively 
engage with Sethe’s instinctive decision that, when faced with the prospect of slavery, loving her 
children means murdering them” (106).  If we can somewhat sympathize with Sethe’s choice, we 
gain a greater understanding of the evil of slavery through direct confrontation with one of its 
consequences.  Margaret Urban Walker looks at different means of moral repair, paralleling the 
non-punitive attitude towards reparation in Morrison’s Jazz with the methods of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission in post-apartheid South Africa.  Both offer empowering examples of 
post-traumatic human healing without retribution, “confirm[ing] that there are many and grave 
grounds for retribution but opt[ing] officially for reparation and conciliation, offering […] a 
passage to a society of citizens, rather than victims and […] criminals” (Walker 117-18).       
The third section of Mapping the Ethical Turn deals with the accuracy and limits of 
artistic representation, looking at the critical “cultural responses” to controversial works.  The 
first of these works discussed, J. M. Coetzee’s Disgrace, is located in the (necessarily) political 
South African literary tradition, and yet it resists this tradition, putting “ethics before politics” 
(Meffan and Worthington 131).  Although it faces charges of irresponsibility by fellow South 
African writers, Coetzee’s Disgrace counters that to represent an Other as an easily decipher-
able entity or object is to do away with alterity in total.  Rather, it is the task of an author to 
preserve the unknowable, as well as the subject’s acknowledgement of “his inability to contain 
all that is perceivable within the ambit of understanding” (Meffan and Worthington 135).  The 
limited understanding of Coetzee’s often despicable protagonist, David Lurie, keeps the Other 
(here, his daughter) from being reduced to its representation, while at the same time allowing for 
respect.  Rather than speaking to some specific, political agenda, Disgrace advocates the more 
general “idea that we must simply learn to speak with our Others on equal terms” (Meffan and 
Worthington 146).  In “The List is Life: Schindler’s List as Ethical Construct,” Todd F. Davis 
and Kenneth Womack also take on popular criticism, defending Spielberg’s film in the face 
of the charge that it violated the basic principle of Bilderverbot—the taboo against any visual 
depiction of the Holocaust (151).  Positing that Schindler’ s List “provides us with a mechanism 
for understanding the moral and pedagogic motives that undergird Spielberg’s narrative” (152), 
Davis and Womack explore the lessons of the “banality of evil” (155) shown in Schindler and 
Goeth’s strange friendship as well as the didactic effects of Spielberg’s more emotional (and less 
historically accurate) scenes.  For Davis and Womack, the danger the film poses of being the 
Holocaust story everyone knows is annulled by the number of people exposed to its message: 
“Plainly and simply,” they state, “it will teach” (161).  Susan Gubar deals with another taboo re-
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garding the Holocaust—that of writing poetry.  Although the American “Testimony Poets”—poets 
who write secondary accounts of the Holocaust from primary materials—keep in mind Adorno’s 
proclamation that to write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric, they do it anyway.  In fact, Gubar 
affirms, these “proxy witnesses” use the form best-suited to the fragmented and urgent narra-
tives of the Holocaust (165).  Rather than undertaking to present a collective, flowing history 
(as does Schindler’s List and similar productions), the Testimony Poets “highlight anomalous 
experiences that in their very unexpectedness put the lie to any deceptive sense that the totality 
of the Holocaust can be captured” (Gubar 183-84).  Their work both recalls the lives on which 
their testimonies are based, but also crucially admits to its own limitations in understanding.
The fourth and final section, “Ways of Seeing: The Diversity of Applied Ethical 
Criticism,” shows how this brand of criticism can be applied to a wide array of disciplines and 
critical perspectives, ranging from biocentrism and collaborative life-writing to linguistics and 
law.  Ian Marshall discusses Margaret Atwood’s twofold project of exploring the snake accord-
ing to its own worldview while recognizing the problem of talking about the non-human realm 
by means of human language.  Marshall places Atwood’s Snake Poems among the most recent 
developments in the evolution of ethics, as it extends rights beyond the human sphere.  Marshall 
asserts that, in order to participate in this moment of the ethical evolution, “We should not act 
to conserve nature because it is useful to us or provides us with some advantage, even if it is a 
spiritual as opposed to an economic advantage, nor because we are God’s appointed caretakers 
of Earth, but because we accept the right to life of all living things” (Marshall 201).  G. Thomas 
Couser explores another means of giving voice to the voiceless in “Making, Taking, and Fak-
ing Lives: The Ethical Problems in Collaborative Life Writing.”  Although he addresses the 
issues of collaborative celebrity and politician autobiographies, Couser’s most interesting topics 
concern the collaborative autobiographies of severely disabled individuals or individuals who 
speak across immense cultural or class boundaries.  Whereas a writer of fiction worries only 
about his obligation to his audience, Couser explores the multiple obligations a collaborative 
autobiographer has to the truth, to history, and to the wishes of his subject: she works knowing 
that “[c]oauthoring another’s life can be a creative or a destructive act, a service or a disservice, 
an act of homage or of appropriation” (210).  Adam Zachary Newton looks at the portrayals of 
explosive, existential obligations through the gaze in a few works by European authors Witold 
Gombrowicz and Bruno Schulz.  Drawing upon the significance and recurrence of the theme 
of the face in both authors, Newton launches an inquiry into ethics using the face as a trope. 
This has interesting implications for such self-referential authors as Gombrowicz and Schulz: 
Newton points out that the weight of the Other’s countenance, necessarily felt by all humans, is 
increased exponentially when one achieves an international readership!  The two final essays in 
Mapping the Ethical Turn, “Henry James, Moral Philosophers, Moralism” by Cora Diamond, 
and “How to Be ‘In Tune with the Right’ in The Golden Bowl,” address James’ novels and the 
philosophical and moral themes and variations represented through his characters. 
Overall, Mapping the Ethical Turn is a marvelous entry into the varied and all-encom-
passing field of ethics.  The reader will be surprised and enlightened by the different insights 
and disciplines each author brings to his or her reading of a text—for example, Margaret Urban 
Walker’s relation of the events in Morrison’s Jazz to the methods of post-apartheid South African 
reform.  What is particularly interesting and impressive about this brand of criticism, however, 
is its humility and responsibility to texts, their readers and authors—a breath of fresh air in an 
often contentious branch of literary studies.
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Note
1. Readers who become familiar with Mapping the Ethical Turn may note that my brief sum-
mary of the first section does not mention Charles Altieri’s essay, “Lyrical Ethics and Literary 
Experience.”  Sadly, this is where my abilities as a reader meet their limits, as I have always 
found Altieri’s writing to be complicated, at times indecipherable.
Todd Davis was one of Otterbein’s visiting Humanities Scholars in the Fall of 2004.  He deliv-
ered a lecture on ethical criticism, using the poetry of friend and colleague Mary Swander for 
his analysis.  He is a Professor of English at Penn State Altoona.
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Schutt, Christing. Florida. Evanston, Illinois: Triquarterly 
Books, 2004.  156 pp.
Amanda Hinds
Until the 2004 National Book Award finalists were announced, no one had heard of 
Christine Schutt.  In 1996, while divorced and raising two sons, she wrote a short story col-
lection aptly titled Nightwork.  Her first novel, Florida, had only sold 700 copies when it was 
chosen as a finalist for the National Book Award.  Criticism has been levied at the National 
Book Foundation for choosing five obscure finalists.  Of course, there may have been other 
qualified books that sold thousands of copies, but it seems important to spread the word about 
books such as this one. 
 Florida is the story of Alice Fivey, who has essentially been orphaned.  When she was 
five years old, her father died when his car veered off the road and into a lake.  The reader is 
never told whether this was an accident, and Alice is only told that her father left and did not 
come back, leading her to constantly question the circumstances surrounding his life and death. 
Alice’s mother, while very much alive, has a series of mental breakdowns and is taken away to 
live in a psychiatric hospital simply known as “The San.”  At the time of her mother’s hospital-
ization, Alice is ten, left to live by jumping from one relative’s home to the next. 
 Intensifying the straightforward story of an orphaned girl trying to find her way in the 
world, Alice seeks to make sense of both her father’s death and her mother’s life.  Interestingly, 
she is named after her mother, and spends a great deal of time trying to distinguish between her 
mother and herself. 
 The story is beautifully written, if not slightly hard to follow.  Written in a series of 
vignettes that seem suspended in time, the novel does not obey a typical, linear plot: while Alice’s 
life moves forward chronologically, the narration often describes past events.  She intersperses 
childhood memories of her mother and father with her account of adolescent life with her “Nonna,” 
an elderly grandmother who no longer speaks but with whom Alice shares a silent connection. 
Although this method may be distracting to some readers, most will find it a welcome change 
from traditional storytelling methods.
 There are themes that resonate in the book, such as that of ‘Walter,’ the generic term 
for the wide assortment of men who date Alice’s mother after her father’s death.  These men are 
described in bulk, as though they share similar qualities and are easily dispensable.  The reader is 
never given a way to distinguish between the ‘Walters’ because there is simply no need: ‘Walter’ 
is representative of the male affection which Alice’s mother, and later the young Alice, seems 
to crave.  Alice has her own Walter when she is in her twenties, a man who is in his forties and 
“more terrible than Mother’s” own Walters had been (101).  When their relationship fails, she 
signs a contract agreeing to pay him if he leaves her.  Walter dies soon afterward, and Alice notes 
that “only the document held up,” forcing her to pay the money to his estate.  She laments later 
that a father could have warned her to “sign nothing with fine print” (103).
 Throughout the novel, Alice attempts to make sense of what it means to be Alice and 
what it means to be her mother’s daughter.  She wonders whether being named after her mother 
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means she is like her mother, and the young Alice often seems defiant about this resemblance. 
When she sent a picture to her mother, her mother wrote in reply, “Your face looks like a pail of 
worms.”  Alice is hurt by this dismissal of the picture, “the only one I liked of me,” and knows 
that she does not want to be like her mother (26).  Later, Alice tells Arthur, a lifelong employee 
of her family, “I am just the opposite of her” and notes how she almost shouts it (36).  Alice 
acknowledges at a young age, “I didn’t want to leave my mother, but I knew I had to leave her” 
(23).
 Also, the ideas of ‘Florida’ and what Florida means to different people recur throughout 
the novel.  The reader discovers in the early part of the book that, just before her father’s death, 
Alice and her parents were planning to move to Florida.  It promised to be a big change from the 
“land of the lakes” state in which they lived—Florida would solve their problems, and everyone 
would be happy all the time:
“In Florida, he said it was good health all the time.  No winter coats in 
Florida, no boots, no chains, no salt, no plows and shovels.  In the balmy 
state of Florida, fruit fell in the meanest yard.  Sweets, nuts, saltwater taffies 
in seashell colors.  In the Florida we were headed for the afternoon was 
swizzled drinks and cherries to eat, stem and all…there was Florida in our 
future while I was licking at the foam on the fluted glass, biting the rind and 
licking sugar, waiting for what was promised: the maraschino 
cherry, ever-sweet every time.”  (7)
A few pages later, we realize that Florida in the literal sense is out of the question due to 
the death of her father, but Alice will continue looking for her own Florida to fill the void.  She 
approaches this turn of events without question, remarking, “My father was dead and my name 
was hers and everyone said I was surely her daughter, so why did she leave me except that she 
did?  The next day she was off to her Florida, and I was off to mine”(11).  For the remainder of 
the novel, the reader watches Alice work to replace her missing Florida with books or men who 
double as father figures. 
One example of these men is Mr. Early, a high school English teacher who believed 
in her ability to be a poet.  His class inspires her to read more and compels her to write.  One 
day during class after she has written a great deal, he tells her that she doesn’t “have to tell the 
whole story.”  She thinks, “[Y]et I wanted him to know how well I knew the story, better than 
anyone else because I was not like anyone else but special, inward, informed.  I wanted to say: 
I have seen such things”(79).  She keeps in touch with him after high school and is later startled 
to learn that she had loved him and he had loved her.  She realizes how much she had needed a 
father figure, and how she had turned Mr. Early into one. 
Alice also constructs a father figure out of Arthur: he is the one who takes her mother 
away, and he is the one who then drives Alice to and from school every day.  She feels sorry 
for him, but also needs his caretaking, and she spends a lot of time keeping him company in 
his room over her uncle’s garage.  They develop a relationship filled with the things she missed 
about her father, and many of the book’s vignettes are titled with his name. 
Throughout the book, the reader comes to identify powerfully with Alice in her at-
tempts to make sense of her life.  One fault however, is that we never get to know any of the 
other characters in the novel on their own terms.  Everyone is seen through Alice’s eyes and her 
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eyes only.  When she turns away, they are forgotten, only to be discussed later in bits and pieces 
when she feels like doing so. 
Although this does not help us understand the motivations and secrets of the other 
characters, it does help us understand Alice.  Even when surrounded by relatives, she has had 
to make a life for herself.  She was always understood as a guest in someone else’s home, and 
had nothing to call her own except for her thoughts.  She is independent and pleased with being 
able to adapt to nearly any situation that comes her way, proudly noting  “I can live anywhere 
easily—have done.  My boast, but I believe it.  I am resilient” (140).
Schutt does an excellent job of portraying the conflict between questions and acceptance 
in this all-too-short novel.  We see Alice question her identity based on all the people in her life, 
and how their actions affect her.  We see her begin to realize the connection between herself 
and her mother, and yet distinguish between the two.  She finds her own place in a world that 
has never seemed to be hers.  Though at times surreal, the book subverts the predictable order 
of time and plot in novels, instead telling its haunting story through fragments and impressions, 
slowly helping us to discover the true Alice.  Although easily overlooked in a time of blockbuster 
novels, Florida is not a book that is easily forgotten. 
ae
gis 2
0
0
5
98
Swander, Mary. The Desert Pilgrim. New York: Penguin 
Compass, 2004.  352 pp.
Amanda Knapp
Swander compares the landscape of New Mexico to that of Iowa throughout the novel, 
noting how the breathtaking immensity of the southwestern desert confronts one with his or her 
relation to the Divine.  Faced with a debilitating illness, the dreary prospect of an Iowan winter 
motivates Swander to accept a temporary teaching position in New Mexico with the hope that 
the climate will help her heal.  During her car journey, Swander is reminded by a small medallion 
of St. Christopher, the patron saint of travelers, of the meaning of her Catholic faith and how her 
perspective of that faith has changed since she was a child.  In doing so, she draws a line between 
the organized system of religion as opposed to her own faith and ties to ancestors.
Though the details of the car accident which left her nearly paralyzed are omitted from 
the text, Swander lives daily with the repercussions.  Much of the book is devoted to conven-
tional medicine’s dismissal of patient needs and faith healing’s emphasis on personal guidance. 
Accordingly, under the pressure of mainstream medical culture, Swander goes to the doctor 
assigned by her health plan; there, however, she is brushed off by the doctor and ignored by the 
staff.  Disgruntled, Swander goes to a counselor to help her sort out her feelings.  She quickly 
finds, however, that this counselor cannot help her, as the counselor herself has had a similar 
experience to Swander’s with which she has not yet dealt. 
In desperation, Swander goes to a healer recommended to her by a student, Ernesto, who 
cautions her not to go into that neighborhood alone.  There she meets Father Sergei, a Russian 
Orthodox priest, whose method of teaching by analogy is not the help that Swander had been 
expecting but upon which Swander comes to rely.  Close to his inner-city monastery, Swander 
is lead to a pharmacy where herbal remedies are dispensed by Luisa—or Lu, as she is referred 
to throughout the novel—an elderly Hispanic woman whom Swander is quick to befriend.
Reflecting upon her own mistrust of faith healing, Swander recollects her family’s view 
of faith.  Though Roman Catholic, her family did not place much stock in religion; rather, they 
believed that science would find the cure to heal them.  She recalls a scene from her childhood 
in which her father threw her Virgin Mary statue, a gift from her nun teacher, out the window. 
Swander admits that she had done the same symbolically in her twenties.
Slowly, Swander becomes angry with the state of medicine.  She argues that, while 
other institutions were being confronted with change, the medical establishment was not.  In a 
particularly moving segment, Swander recalls the memory of her mother’s forced eviction from 
the hospital after she refused futile chemotherapy treatments.  Although not particularly religious 
during most of her life, her mother kept her rosary by her while dying; her faith came through 
in her last words, “This is my cross.”
Swander, who has known the same unfeeling attitude of the medical establishment, 
does not shrink from vividly illustrating her pain.  She describes the medical condition her car 
accident caused, a neck trauma that left her helpless and a painful situation that left her depen-
dent on friends and acquaintances for everyday functioning.  This was something difficult for 
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Swander, who has valued solitude since childhood.  While in this state of terrible pain, Swander 
has a dream that makes her use Luisa’s herbs even though she has doubts.  She draws strength 
from both her mission into faith and in her search for guidance.
  Her new acceptance of faith healing leads her to explore the sacred sites of the south-
west.  She visits El Santuario de Chimayo’s healing soil, the story of which can be traced back 
to the creation myths of the Tewa Indians, who were absorbed by the conquering Spanish.  At 
first, Swander doubts placing her faith in dirt, then concedes, remembering her garden and dirt’s 
power to grow life.  Through these small confrontations with belief, Swander’s faith likewise 
begins to grow.
The novel also confronts issues of women’s oppression in the Catholic Church.  The 
dogma of original sin and the cross represent oppression for Swander.  Yet, she thinks of Lu’s 
goodness and considers the complications that a woman like Luisa has in the larger historical 
context of the Catholic Church.  During the Spanish Inquisition, Lu would have been killed as a 
‘white witch,’ for medicine was being taken out of the wise women’s hands and placed into those 
of the guilds controlled by male physicians and barber-surgeons.  Other laws made it impossible 
for women to use herbal remedies, dismissing such practices as quackery in a time when it was 
thought medically sound to let blood to cure a patient’s fever.
To find models for her own life, Swander turns to Hildegard of Bingen and St. Teresa 
of Avila, both of whom had health problems that led them to fear and despair, and both moved 
through that pain to write great books, finding outlets for their creativity.  A twelfth century 
Benedictine nun, Hildegard wrote about the relationship between spirituality and science, and 
concluded art was the missing link between the two.  Breaking from the patriarchal thought of 
her time, she imagined the universe in female terms.  Like Swander herself, St. Teresa’s illness 
threw her spiritual life into turmoil after a long religious waffling and she began experiencing 
deep meditative states that transcended normal experience.  Soon, she learned to detach from 
the pain.
On Father Sergei’s advice, Swander also turns to the male mystics St. John of the Cross 
and St. Francis of Assisi.  St. John of the Cross was imprisoned by a monk of his own order for 
implementing reforms.  Imprisoned and sickly, he wrote about despair, or “the dark night of the 
soul.”  So, too, Father Sergei counsels Swander not to fight against falling into the void: God 
is the void, God is the dark night of the soul.  Like St. Francis, a charity devotee who didn’t 
find spirituality until ill, Father Sergei tells Swander to stop fighting the pain and to live with 
gratitude, even in suffering.
As Swander herself begins to fall into the void, she wonders if pain and spirituality are 
linked.  After her mother died of breast cancer, Swander did not pack her belongings from their 
small, rented apartment.  Rather, she left her mother’s belongings as they were, week after week, 
until a dream of her dead mother talking to her allowed her to remove her mother’s belongings. 
Now Swander finds herself similarly inert, unable to move without guidance.
But Swander uncovers her faith in her family stories.  She draws from the strength of her 
mother and grandmothers, Lu, and Father Sergei’s dog who benevolently herds her pups.  Father 
Sergei’s story of the hidden Spanish Jews in New Mexico demonstrates to Swander the importance 
of family ties.  He relates to Swander how he found scraps of the Torah hidden inside the crucifix 
of an unknowing woman.  In this, Father Sergi shows how a family’s history is not always as 
straightforward as it may appear.  Swander relates this story to her own stash of crucifixes hidden 
in her attic that she is unable to throw away.  She becomes reconciled to her Catholic faith, not 
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through its oppressive structure, but through a connectedness to family ties and traditions.
By the end of the book, Swander realizes that faith is to accept intuition and not dismiss 
it as superstition—to accept the nonscientific point of view.  From the mystics, she has gathered 
an almost Buddhist sense of detachment from the pain of living.  As Father Sergei announces 
his own illness and demonstrates his acceptance of his own mortality, Swander, too, is able to 
detach herself from the pain of living and accept the blessings of faith.
Indeed, as Swander takes the reader along in this multifaceted journey, one feels her 
own skepticism lifted.  As Swander refills herself with a sense of connectedness to the past and 
reemergence of faith, the reader cannot help but pause for reflection upon her own life.  This well 
researched and stunningly depicted novel, with its careful attention to detail and introspection, 
simply demands to be read.
Mary Swander was Otterbein’s 2005 writer in residence from April 12-14, as part of the Otterbein 
Enrichment Series.  She has been published in the nation’s leading magazines and newspapers, 
and teaches at Iowa State University.  
k
n
a
p
p
10
1
ae
gi
s 
2
0
0
5
in
 b
ri
e
f
In Brief
Lamb, Chris. Drawn to Extremes: The Use and Abuse 
of Editorial Cartoons. New York: Columbia University Press, 
2004.  281 pp.
Political cartooning has a long history, but Chris Lamb (an associate professor of 
communications) begins with a focus on post-9/11 America, then pulls back to 
look at how that history has influenced American journalism and public opinion. 
The book is accompanied by over 150 illustrations, from recent publications to eighteenth century 
cartoons pushing for the American Revolution.  He refers to the circulation wars between Hurst 
and Pulitzer in the dawn of the twentieth century as the “golden age” of political cartooning.  Lamb 
explores the impact that these artists have had on the general public, stating, “At its best, satire 
forces us to take a look at ourselves for what we are and not what we want to be.  We may not 
always like what we see.”  For example, one cartoonist that criticized the financial gain of 9/11 
widows found himself receiving death threats from someone inside the New York City Police De-
partment.  With several of the cartoons, Lamb includes both historical background and the critical 
fallout that ensued, sometimes berating editors who did not stand by their artists.  Lamb critically 
examines the decline in the importance of political cartoons (very few newspapers keep their own 
political cartoonists on staff), despite the necessity for a free exchange of ideas in a democracy—an 
exchange that he believes has been curtailed since September 11.  The only flaw with this book is 
Lamb’s inability to summarize his arguments in a coherent conclusion.
~Michelle Yost
Spiegelman, Art. In the Shadow of No Towers. New 
York:  Pantheon Books, 2004.  42 pp.
Part political commentary and part therapeutic expression, Art Spiegelman’s 
In the Shadow of No Towers is the author’s attempt to work through the events 
of September 11th, which he witnesses first-hand as a native of New York City. 
The first half of the book is arranged in a series of ten, large-scale pages (in his 
mind, to reflect the enormity of the event), designed using illustration, computer 
graphics and photographs.  One image is consistently used on every page because it haunts 
Spiegelman—that of the glowing skeleton of the north tower just before it imploded, a few 
blocks from his daughter’s school.  Through the progression of the series, though, the image 
gradually begins to fade.  As life-altering as 9/11 was for America and the author, Spiegelman 
doesn’t hesitate to criticize the Bush Administration’s handling of the aftermath.  There is no 
developed storyline to correspond with the fragmentary thoughts and images, but Spiegelman 
follows events from the morning of 9/11 to the beginning of the war in Iraq in 2003.  The second 
half of the book is a comic supplement of comic strips from the early twentieth century, many 
of them set in New York City or dealing with issues of patriotism, both meaningful subjects for 
the author.  This book is more than just another political history, touching the reader because it 
is both Spiegelman’s honest exposure of his soul and a creative outlet for his grief. 
~Michelle Yost
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Larson, Erik. The Devil in the White City: Murder, 
Magic, and Madness at the Fair that Changed 
America. New York:  Vintage Books, 2004.  447 pp.
Winner of the Edgar Award for Best Fact Crime and a National Book Award 
Finalist, Erik Larson’s The Devil in the White City will leave its readers stunned, 
entertained, and perhaps a little embarrassed that they were not aware of such an 
amazing part of America’s storied history.  Told with the heft of the best historical 
accounts and the flair of fiction’s finest, The Devil weaves its account of the Chicago World’s Fair 
in 1893 from the perspective of Daniel H. Burnham, the fair’s manic architect, and Dr. Henry 
H. Holmes, the fair’s mad murderer.  Larson’s prose is both invigorating and informative, as the 
story is told in alternating chapters between Holmes and Burnham.  While one would imagine 
the murders to provide the most shocking and alarming moments, Larson is able to convey the 
nearly suicidal effort Burnham had to put forth to build the “White City” that housed the fair.  As 
the fair’s architectural magnificence was on full display, just west of the fairgrounds sits Holmes’s 
“World’s Fair Hotel” where he lures the innocent to an establishment equipped with crematorium, 
gas chamber, and dissection table.  Nearing the twentieth-century, Burnham was determined that 
the fair establish America as an international presence and, with a cast of characters ranging 
from Thomas Edison to the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, Larson is up to the task in presenting 
such a complex time in history.  Meticulously researched and flawlessly told, Larson showcases 
America at its conflicted best, as both a source of grand majesty and imposing insanity.  A grand 
tale masterfully told by an author deserving of every last word of praise.
~ Adam Cottrell
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Murakami, Haruki. Kafka On the Shore: A Novel. 
New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005.  436 pp.
Anyone who has been asked to describe the contents of a Haruki Murakami novel 
will know that it is not far removed from reading a novel by Haruki Murakami: chal-
lenging, exasperating, dizzying, and, above all, enjoyable.  With Murakami’s newest 
novel, Kafka on the Shore, the reader is thrust into an Oedipal tale set in contemporary 
Japan relating Nakata, an elderly Tokyo man, to a fifteen-year-old schoolboy, Kafka 
Tamura.  From the start, readers will rejoice and curse Murakami (at times simultaneously) for the 
wicked web he weaves in this 400-plus page tome that includes fish raining from the sky, a cameo 
by Colonel Sanders, and, of course, the ability to talk to cats.  Yet, for those familiar with Murakami, 
these pages will provide nothing more than a smug grin as his latest tale continues his marvelous 
ability to create scenes and characters filled with love, passion and a pinch of magical realism in the 
post-modern world.  While neither Kafka Tamura nor Nakata are of the quality of Murakami’s best 
characters, they are able to draw the reader into their separate yet linked paths of inevitable fate. 
While readers may grumble that Murakami is trying too hard at points, I offer that this is exactly 
why one should seek out this lovingly crafted work.  While some writers shy away from the chances 
Murakami takes, we as readers must see that any flaws would diminish the originality of the work. 
Put more simply, Murakami’s flaws are just as in important to this novel as his achievements.  In the 
end, Murakami’s new novel is stunning and bizarre and down-to-earth and dreamlike and realistic 
and decadent and focused.  In short, everything a good novel should be.
~ Adam Cottrell
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Mitchell, David. Cloud Atlas: A Novel. New York:  
Random House, 2004.  528 pp.
A finalist for the 2004 Man Booker Award, Mitchell’s Cloud Atlas, immerses and 
re-immerses the reader completely and intricately into the seemingly disparate 
lives of six characters.  Beginning with the detailed “Pacific Journal of Adam 
Ewing,” the book plunges the reader immediately into the nineteenth century 
chronicles of the seafaring Ewing, who is afflicted by a mysterious and worsening 
illness.  Just as the reader gets her bearings, however, Ewing’s journal abruptly stops, superceded 
by the letters of aspiring composer Robert Frobisher to his friend in England, Rufus Sixsmith. 
Frobisher’s missives are in turn replaced by a mystery-thriller starring young journalist Luisa 
Rey and her quest to expose the greed-fueled Seaboard Corporation conspiracy.  Yet another 
story, that of frustrated publisher Timothy Cavendish, disrupts the climax, beginning just as the 
silence seems to have been put on Rey’s investigation.  The stories, six in all, proceed somewhat 
chronologically, with each main character having read and drawn upon the story that comes before 
his own.  Occurring at different times and places, each involves an individual’s resistance against 
and triumph over a larger and often evil power, culminating in “Sloosha’s Crossin’ an’ Ev’rythin’ 
After.”  This tale—that of a struggling civilization in a post-apocalyptic dark age—takes place 
after the collapse of a consumer-based society that goes so far in its inhumanity as to clone people 
for the service industry.  The second halves of the stories then resume in reverse chronological 
order, ending the book with Adam Ewing’s question, “[W]hat is the ocean but a multitude of 
drops?” (509): in other words, what is the world if not a collection of powerful, able individuals? 
Like Ewing, the rest of the characters find it upon their own, small shoulders to save the world, 
or at least to fight for a more equitable one, serving as dots on an atlas of justice that transcends 
time and place.  Just as courageous as the novel’s characters is its form, which is both fragmented 
and self-reflective—at one point, Robert Frobisher wonders if such a six-part, mounting and 
receding structure is “Revolutionary or gimmicky?” (445).  Gimmicky or no, Cloud Atlas serves 
as an exercise in reading as well as an involving and riveting novel, inviting the reader to pick 
out his own thematic course from the six stories before him. 
~Ashar Foley
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Roy, Arundhati. Public Power In the Age of Empire. 
New York:  Seven Stories Press, 2004.  59 pp.
As a part of the Open Media Pamphlet series, Arundhati Roy begins her fifty-nine 
page take on the empire at large, focusing mainly, of course, on the United States, the 
recent election, and the controversial War on Terrorism, the War on Terror, the war 
on whatever stands in the way.  She begins this brief reaction piece by stating:  
When language has been butchered and bled of meaning, how do we under-
stand “public power”?  When freedom means occupation, when democracy 
means neoliberal capitalism, when reform means repression, when words 
like “empowerment” and “peacekeeping” make your blood run cold—why, 
then, “public power” could mean whatever you want it to mean.  
She goes on to compare the idea of public power from her perspective as a resident of  New 
Delhi, India and as a frequent visitor and analyst of the United States.  Although we can often 
pretend that the rest of the world doesn’t exist, driving our SUV’s to the mall and back, residents 
of third world countries, citizens who are not content with accepting what is given to them, must 
be aware of what the US does on a daily basis as it also affects their days.  Roy vents this frus-
tration in Public Power, but by no means does she paint the picture of India’s political system 
as ideal.  In a world full of corruption, she begins to put her faith into the mass movement.  The 
hard-working resistance movements, reminiscent of King and Gandhi’s pacifism, can lead to 
change in the political system.  
Through Public Power we follow Roy as she defines what that means, or really what 
it doesn’t mean for all of the world’s citizens.  She promotes change and ends the piece by 
envisioning the battle ahead: “Exactly what form that battle takes, whether it’s beautiful or 
bloodthirsty, depends on us.”
~ Lauren Suvegesin
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   Kari Benge is a Junior Art major at Otterbein College who spends most of 
her time attending classes either for her Art History and Religion minors or for her Painting 
concentration.  Between classes and work, she likes to spend the little free time she has with 
friends and family, enjoying the weather outside, working on her latest set of paintings, or 
just curled up with a good book.  After graduation, she plans to continue her education in 
graduate school, working on a degree that combines World Religion and Art History.
   Jason Carney is an elusive Senior, triple majoring in English Literary 
Studies, Creative Writing, and Philosophy.  Although he plans to take some time off after 
graduating from Otterbein, he will eventually pursue his Ph.D. in one or all of his major 
fields of interest.   
   Ashar Foley is a Senior English Literary Studies major and Philosophy 
minor.  She would like to express her gratitude to all the students who helped to make this 
journal possible in the last two years.  Thank you and farewell.
    Amanda Hinds is a Senior English major with minors in Psychology 
and Women’s Studies. She is getting married this fall, and after graduating in spring of ‘06 
she plans to pursue a Master’s degree in English or Library Science.
  Amanda Knapp is a Senior with majors in Creative Writing and 
Philosophy.  Among her prospective post-graduation plans are teaching English in Japan 
with the JET Program, working with troubled Pittsburgh youth, or joining AmeriCorps. 
Her tentative long-term plans include earning her M.F.A., getting a degree in Library Sci-
ence, and promoting American Poetry.
  Teresa Moore graduated from Otterbein last spring with a degree 
in English Literature and Creative Writing. She is currently working on her Masters 
degree in literature at the University of Tennessee at Knoxville and plans to continue 
her education through the doctorate level. Though she sorely misses the students and 
professors at Otterbein, Teresa has become smitten with Knoxville’s hills and bluegrass 
music scene.
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   Kari Parker is a Junior Secondary Education major with a focus on History. 
She would like to extend special thanks to both Dr. Sarah Fatherly and Regina Kengla for their 
help in writing (and correcting) her research paper. 
   Zach Reat is a Senior History major at Otterbein College.  He is currently 
serving as President of his fraternity, Pi Beta Sigma, and is anxiously awaiting whatever 
is in store for him in the “real world.”  His intense interest in the Holocaust was spawned 
by trips to Dachau and Terezin concentration camps, as well as a course he recently took 
called “The Holocaust and the Twentieth Century,” the instructors of which were Drs. 
Louis Rose and Paul Eisenstein.  He would like to thank Aegis for this amazing experience 
of being published for the first time.
   Jennifer Roberts is a Sophomore English major with a Creative 
Writing concentration and minors in History and Women’s Studies.  Besides writing and 
being a mother, she enjoys running, having completed three marathons to date.  Her plans 
after graduation include moving, writing, and running the hills of a new, yet-to-be-deter-
mined town as she pursues an MFA.
   Amber Robertson is a Sophomore from Bucyrus, Ohio.  She is 
an English major with a Creative Writing concentration, and is also minoring in Art and 
Religion.  She is a member of Phi Eta Sigma and Alpha Lambda Delta, and volunteers as 
a tutor with America Reads.  She has no definite plans after graduation, but hopes someday 
to make a living as a fiction writer.  She enjoys watching old movies, sewing, and taking 
snapshots of her friends and family.
   Michelle Yost is a Junior pursuing majors in History and Creative Writ-
ing.  She rows for the Otterbein Crew team and has summer plans to study abroad.  After 
graduation, she would like to continue her education in History at the doctorate level in the 
hopes of becoming a professor at a four-year liberal arts college.  She would like to thank 
her family and all of her friends for being supportive and understanding of her work. 
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